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INTRODUCTION
A pervasive sentiment expressed by copyright scholars and by
policymakers in the field is the need for international solutions to fig-
ure prominently in the reform and evolution of present law.' The
'See, e.g., BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10, 117-19, 139 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (em-
phasizing that the development of intellectual property rules in the digital environ-
ment requires attention to protection internationally); Proposal for a European Par-
liament and Council Directive on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright
and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM(97)628 final at 14 (noting that
the implementation of recent treaty obligations was the "principal foundation" of the
Commission's proposals for adaptation of copyright law to the digital age, and recog-
nizing that the proposed reforms could not afford to focus solely on domestic internal
market objectives); Dan L. Burk, Transborder Intellectual Property Issues on the Electronic
Frontier, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 9, 15 (1994) (discussing the alternative means by
which to address the transborder nature of information flow); Gillian Davies, The Con-
vergence of Coyright and Authors'Rights-Realiy or Chimera, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 964, 988 (1995) (arguing that "[ilt should be a priority.., to steer
clear of theological debates about the respective merits of various national approaches
and to seek solutions and an international framework which can accommodate both
the common law and civil law approaches [to authors' rights]"); Laurence R. Helfer,
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need to develop international solutions, and hence to incorporate
global values and policies in the lawmaking process, is scarcely unique
to copyright law. But the effect of digital technology upon the crea-
tion, delivery, and use of copyrighted works has made such interna-
tionalization appear more urgent in copyright than in other areas of
law. Indeed, it is a truism that contemporary problems in copyright
law demand international solutions.
But what does it mean to develop international solutions, and how
is such internationalization to be achieved? On this point, there is less
consensus and often too little analysis. For example, a recent report
by the National Research Council on the challenges raised by digital
networks, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Information Age,
notes the unquestioned need to address the most pressing issues in
copyright law in a worldwide context, but then proceeds to perform a
purely domestic analysis of those issues.2 This token acknowledgment
of the importance of the international dimension, and the difficulties
that it presents, is not unusual; because the basic proposition is largely
unchallenged, there often appears little effort to understand its pre-
cise significance. "Internationalization" is treated as a given, without
considering what it means.
In this Article, I explore the different means by which interna-
tional copyright solutions are being, and should be, developed. My
conclusions flow in large part from analysis of three other truisms of
contemporary copyright thought discussed in Part I. First, copyright
law must accommodate and respond to technological developments;
second, copyright law is an essential instrument of national cultural
and information policy;3 and, third, copyright law affects an ever
Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a European Human
Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (1998) (discussing the role of World Trade Or-
ganization dispute settlement panels in the development of copyright law); Marshall A.
Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism,
76 IoWA L. REv. 273 (1991) (examining reasons for developed and developing coun-
tries to seek development and enforcement of international intellectual property stan-
dards). Such convictions are not wholly new. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on
the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 505-06 (1945) (noting that "art and litera-
ture have always been international in spirit" and suggesting that "international copy-
right... will eventually become more desirable than ever before on account of the
growing cultural interdependence of the world and our hopes for a measure of politi-
cal interdependence").
See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNcIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA] (focus-
ing the report on U.S. law, but noting the need for conclusions about important intel-
lectual property issues to be considered in a global context).
,A SeeJane C. Ginsburg, International Copright: From a "Bundle" of National Copyright
Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47J. COP'RIGHT Soc'V 265, 267 (2000) ("National copy-
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larger and more diverse set of societal interests.4 These three consid-
erations require in turn that copyright lawmaking be receptive to dy-
namic, prospective adaptation, that its results permit some room for
national variation, and that it accommodate pluralistic perspectives.
I conclude in Part II that although classical public international
copyright lawmaking' affords great latitude for national heterogeneity,
and does not inherently or affirmatively exclude diverse perspectives,
it fails adequately to reflect the first of these concerns. As a result of
its backward-looking character, public international lawmaking adopts
a codifying rather than a dynamic character. On one level, I do not
find this troubling: the caution inherent in the classical model arises
in part out of a commendable concern for national autonomy and in-
ternational diversity, and such caution will be even more important if
public international lawmaking truly takes into account the contem-
porary need for accommodating a greater variety of perspectives.
Thus, I accept that the proper role for public international lawmaking
is to reflect a growing consensus among nation-states. Rather, the
disposition of classical public international copyright law merely high-
right laws are a component of local cultural and information policies. As such, they
express each sovereign nation's aspirations for its citizens' exposure to works of
authorship, for their participation in their country's cultural patrimony."); Barbara A.
Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Pas4 Present, and Future, 56
GEO. L.J. 1050, 1050 (1968) ("Though their true influence is dimly understood at best,
a nation's copyright laws lie at the roots of its culture and intellectual climate. Copy-
right provides the inducement for creation and dissemination of the works that shape
our society and, in an imperfect and almost accidental way, represents one of the
foundations upon which freedom of expression rests.").
4 See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 2, at 4-5 (noting the wide variety of stakeholders
with concerns about the impact of intellectual property law).
5 By public international copyright lawmaking, I mean activity that occurs between
or among nation-states (or authorized groupings thereof, such as the European Un-
ion). This includes, for example, negotiation of treaties or state-to-state dispute resolu-
tion before a tribunal (such as the International Court ofJustice or a World Trade Or-
ganization dispute settlement panel). I use the term in contrast to private
international lawmaking activities, by which I mean activities by private nongovern-
mental actors that contribute to international lawmaking. In this category I include,
most prominently, international commercial arbitration and transnational copyright
litigation in national courts. The line between the public and private processes is of
course challenged by a variety of institutional arrangements, such as the UNIDROIT or
UNCITRAL conventions. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 687, 726-31 (1998) (noting parallels and differences between the Con-
vention on the International Sale of Goods and public international agreements). But,
as I explain more fully below, my thesis is that aspects of both what I call "public inter-
national copyright lawmaking" and "private international copyright lawmaking" should
contribute to the process of internationalization, see infra Part III, and thus I use the
contrasting terms merely as shorthand for conventional understandings of lawmaking
processes.
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lights the inability of that form of lawmaking to serve as the sole
means of pursuing internationalist goals while accommodating other
competing considerations.
But the classical model, as I explain in Part II of this Article, no
longer prevails unchallenged. The 1990s ushered in a new era of pub-
lic international copyright lawmaking. Under the new model, rela-
tionships among national, regional, and international institutions are
consciously more fluid; the pressures to reach (particular forms of)
international agreement are strategically heightened by frenetic law-
making activity in an increased range of institutions; and effective
procedures for enforcing international standards have been put in
place, thus transforming copyright law into a justiciable body of law.
As Part II discusses, the institutional mechanisms of this new model
may appear to supply-and some policymakers may wish them to sup-
ply-the prospective dynamism missing from the classical model.
The dispute settlement system6 of the World Trade Organization
("NITO") , within which the substantive public international obliga-
tions imposed by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property ("the TRIPS Agreement) 8 were subsumed, possesses the
most potential in this regard. I argue, however, that an aggressive use
of rO dispute settlement proceedings, or more importantly the
adoption of an activist interpretive philosophy by panels"q that are con-
" See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion [hereinafter 1AbTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENrS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (establishing the
rules and procedures to be used in INTO dispute settlement proceedings).
7 See 1rO Agreement (establishing the NAITO).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, NITO Agreement Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or the TRIPS Agreement].
The TRIPS Agreement is one component of the trade agreement establishing the
ITO emanating from the Uruguay Round revision of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATr"). It includes provisions on all aspects of intellectual property,
including patent, trademark, design protection, trade secrets, and geographical indica-
tions of origin, as well as copyright. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of IntellectualPropeny Protection under the TRIPS Component of the 1IVTO Agreemen
29 INT'L LAW 345 (1995) (providing an overview of the TRIPS Agreement).I f one member state of the wTO is alleged by another to be in violation of
TRIPS, the member states WIll first enter into consultations with each other. If those
consultations fail to produce a resolution of the dispute, a panel of the NITO Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") may be convened at the instance of the complaining party.
See DSU art. 6 (outlining the procedures for establishing dispute settlement panels).
Panel decisions are appealable to a standing Appellate Body of the DSB. See id., art. 17.
References in this Article to VITO panels or the ,WTO DSB encompass both the panels
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vened under WTO auspices, would be counter-productive. It might
supply the dynamism missing from the classical model, but it would do
so at the cost of other relevant concerns, namely national diversity and
pluralistic perspective. Thus, although TRIPS has had, and the WTO
will have, an important role in providing an international dimension
to copyright lawmaking, such new public international copyright law-
making must not be unrestrained.'0
Instead, I argue in Part III for a broader, more expansive notion
of international copyright lawmaking. In particular, I stress that the
internationalization of copyright law may take forms other than for-
mal declarations of binding rules of public international law, and sug-
gest that the properly confined role of public international copyright
lawmaking should consciously be supplemented by private interna-
tional copyright lawmaking." By this, I mean that private law dispute
and the Appellate Body unless the contrary intent is expressly stated.
10 I do conceive a role for public international copyright lawmaking. Public inter-
national copyright lawmaking has clearly contributed to the convergence of disparate
national systems of copyright. See Davies, supra note 1, at 978-87 (discussing the role of
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), TRIPS, and the European
Union ("EU") in effecting convergence). A range of different institutional alternatives
will be helpful in developing a variety of solutions to ongoing international problems.
Just as the different pressures and context of the WIPO and the WTO may generate
different solutions, see Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System
in the Context of TRPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMy. L. REv. 661, 676-82 (1997) (discuss-
ing relationship between the WTO and the WIPO), a greater range of options is likely
to come from an institutional smorgasbord that comprises national, regional, and in-
ternational solutions on both the private and public law sides.
1 This Article focuses on the incorporation of international norms into copyright
law alone because it is useful to consider these questions in concrete settings; the re-
spective roles of different international institutions and mechanisms may vary depend-
ing upon the content of the law in question. It is not clear, for example, that trade-
mark implicates the same nontrade values that might make WTO resolution of certain
copyright issues less than fully dimensional. See infra Part II.C.2.c.ii (discussing the
ability of WTO panels to consider the full range of copyright values). Moreover, al-
though some of my observations regarding the role of private international lawmaking
clearly apply beyond intellectual property law, copyright is a particularly opportune
subject of study because the last few years have seen (and I predict, the coming years
will see) significant resort to a variety of the institutions and mechanisms discussed
herein. Important treaties, such as the once-shelved Database Treaty, remain pending,
regional legislative activity continues apace in the EU, and international copyright ob-
ligations are now being undertaken in the shadow of effective international enforce-
ment mechanisms. In June 2000, a WTO dispute settlement panel handed down the
first report on a copyright dispute arising under TRIPS. See United States-Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000),
at http://www.wto.org (finding the U.S. Fairness in Music Licensing Act to be in viola-
tion of TRIPS). See generally Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A
Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV.
93, 141-85 (2000) (analyzing possible conflicts between the Fairness in Music Licensing
Act and the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention). And the five-year morato-
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settlement mechanisms should play an important role in the interna-
tionalization process. Rather than embrace the new public interna-
tional lawmaking process as the holy grail of copyright internationali-
zation, I seek to accommodate the competing concerns of dynamism,
national diversity, and pluralistic perspective by broadening the means
by which international norms work to infiltrate domestic copyright
law.
Part III of the Article, therefore, explores the ways in which pri-
vate law mechanisms are, and could be, used to develop international
copyright law. First, I consider whether arbitration of copyright dis-
putes possesses the potential to exert influence upon the development
of international copyright norms. International commercial arbitra-
tion proceedings make frequent reference to a lex mercatoria,12 emanat-
ing from standards of international commerce rather than from any
particular national norms, that could, with appropriate adaptation,
contribute to the development of international copyright standards. I
conclude that the use of cybercontractual arrangements in the supply
of copyrighted works makes arbitration based upon ex ante agree-
ment a more likely resource for copyright development than was pre-
viously the case because such arrangements create contractual privity
between copyright disputants typically not found in the bricks-and-
mortar world.
Second, and central to this Article, I seek to enlist national courts
in the task of copyright internationalization by sketching a new choice
of law methodology for private international copyright disputes. All
current approaches to choice of law force courts to fictionalize multi-
national disputes as implicating purely national norms (the process of
"localization"), and thus foreclose the consideration by courts of in-
ternational norms separate and apart from domestic policy objectives.
Each of these approaches requires courts to decide issues raised by
such disputes according to a single national law."5 Instead, I propose
rium on TRIPS nonviolation complaints, which may test the outer boundaries of the
WTO dispute settlement system, expired on January 1, 2000. See infra note 105 (dis-
cussing the history of the non-iolation complaint moratorium and its status post-
January 1, 2000).
See infra text accompanying notes 165-66 (discussing international commercial
arbitration).
l' The doctrine of d~peage permits courts to apply the law of one state to one is-
sue in a litigation before it and the law of another state to a separate issue in the same
litigation. It thus recasts the choice of law exercise as an effort to select the law appli-
cable to decide an issue rather than a case. See Willis L. M. Reese, D pecage: A Common
Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 58, 58 (1973) (describing the doctrine
of d~pecage). The doctrine has recently been applied by U.S. courts in copyright
2000]
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that courts should decide international copyright cases not by choos-
ing an applicable law, but by devising an applicable solution. Interna-
tional copyright disputes implicate interests beyond those at stake in
purely domestic copyright cases. National courts should thus be free
to decide an issue in an international case using different substantive
copyright rules that reflect not only a single national law, but rather
the values of all interested systems (national and international) that
may have a prescriptive claim on the outcome. This approach to
choice of law may unleash the generative power of common law adju-
dication as a means of developing international copyright norms.
And it would accommodate the concerns of dynamic flexibility with-
out compromising the values of national diversity or pluralistic per-
spective in a way that public law-based copyright lawmaking does not.
Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. In this Article, I focus
largely on questions of process in copyright law formation. 4 To be
sure, those questions cannot be wholly divorced from the substantive
alms of copyright law, and the particular substantive rules of copyright
law that emerge are not unaffected by the process that gives birth to
them. But whether temporary copying should constitute prima facie
reproduction, whether browsing should be conceptualized as copying,
or whether database protections should include sole-source compul-
sory licenses-and many other questions raised by global digitiza-
tion-are topics worthy of separate and sustained analysis. Others are
doing that work. For current purposes, I want to explore the process
of internationalizing copyright law. That exploration will inevitably
impinge upon substantive concerns, and the conclusions that I reach
will surely be viewed by others more or less favorably depending upon
the extent to which they impede or further particular substantive
goals. But this merely highlights the importance of attention to proc-
ess in and of itself.
cases. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russ. News Agency v. Russ. Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89-92 (2d
Cir. 1998) (applying Russian law to ownership question and U.S. law to infringement
question); see also Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (acknowledging relevance of issue by issue analysis in copyright dis-
pute involving protection for United Kingdom works in the United States), aff'd on re-
consideration, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The doctrine bears some similarity to
the approach proposed in this Article in that a court may ultimately generate a result
that would not have ensued under any single national law. Even under d~pecage,
however, the forum will apply the law of a single state to each of the issues with which
it is presented (even if a different national law might be applied to a different issue in
the same analysis).
14 Cf. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 796 (1999) (attempting to "shift the focus of
private international law scholarship from substantive law to the lawmaking process").
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
I. THE DEMANDS OF COPYRIGHT LAWMAKING
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Copyright law stands at the junction of powerful pressures that
may impose sometimes inconsistent prescriptive demands. Globaliza-
tion requires that problems be addressed as an international matter.
Technology, by significantly altering the means by which copyrighted
works are created, the ways in which they are distributed, and the
manner in which they are used, has yoked the content of copyright
law to fast-changing developments. And these changes have brought
questions of copyright more directly into the lives of a greater number
of people and into the business affairs of a greater number and range
of commercial concerns. In this Part, I outline these pressures and
the nature of the demands that they impose upon copyright lawmak-
ing.
A. Internationalization
Almost every significant reform of U.S. copyright law over the last
twelve years, since the United States belatedly joined the Berne Con-
vention ' 5 in 1988, has reflected international influences. 6 The nature
and extent of the influence has varied: explicitly implementing treaty
obligations; 7 embracing (somewhat) more fully the spirit of obliga-
tions that were previously accepted with marked reluctance;' respond-
b Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The first version of the Berne
Convention was concluded in 1886. See generally SAMI RICKETSON, THE BERNE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERAPm( AND ARTIsTIC WoRKS: 1886-1986
(1987) (tracing the development of the Berne Convention).
P" This is not to say that domestic developments prior to 1988 did not also reflect
international considerations. Indeed, many of the significant reforms effected by the
1976 Copyright Revision Act, such as revisions to the copyright term or moderation of
the consequences of publication without copyright notice, were motivated by the de-
sire to bring the United States closer to compliance with the Berne Convention. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135-36 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (identifying
adherence to the Berne Convention as an argument for reform of U.S. copyright law).
17 See, e.g., Digital illennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (implementing the W4IPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994) (implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements); Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (revising provisions nec-
etsa , to permit adherence to the Berne Convention).See, e.g., Renewal Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264
(1992) (eliminating a number of formalities formerly required for copyright renewal);
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(providing creators of certain works of visual art with moral rights protection); Archi-
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ing to reciprocity-conditioned foreign laws that, absent U.S. legisla-
tion, might disadvantage U.S. producers internationally;' and, some
have suggested, even using the cover of international expectations (or
expansive interpretation of certain international obligations) to
achieve particular domestic substantive copyright policy goals.' ° Do-
mestic legislative debate has necessarily occurred in the shadow of in-
ternational events. And the picture is no different with pending copy-
right legislation.1
This phenomenon may reflect a trend in national legislative activ-
ity generally, but there are good reasons for this impulse in the copy-
22right context. First, adequate protection for copyrighted works
within the United States is a function of more than U.S. levels of pro-
tection; effective international protection has become essential, rather
than merely preferable, for U.S. producers of copyrighted works. To
be sure, the forces of globalization currently holding sway in the
economies of the world do not represent the first wave of internation-
alization that mankind has encountered. The Industrial Revolution
precipitated similar upsurges in technological advances and manufac-
turing productivity, and similarly made distance less significant. The
tectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5133
(1990) (making express provision for the protection of architectural works as such).
19 See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the term of copyright); see also Council Directive
93/98/EEC, 1993 OJ. (L 290) 9 (harmonizing the copyright term at seventy years post
mortem auctoris throughout the EU, but conditioning the extended term for non-EU
nationals on equivalent protection in the relevant non-EU state); Berne Convention,
supra note 15, art. 7(8), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 37 (permitting signatory nations to apply the
rule of the shorter term, that is, to limit foreign works to the term of protection of-
fered in their country of origin).
20 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property And The Digital Economy: Why The
Anti-circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TEcH. LJ. 519, 530-33
(1999) (discussing implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty); see also Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 369, 373-74 (1997) [here-
inafter Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda] (discussing the conclusion of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty).
21 See, e.g., Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. REP. No. 106-349, at 10-
11 (1999) (noting the relevance of international protection of databases to legislative
debate); see also Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 March 1996, on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter
Database Directive] (affording sui generis protection to databases of information
compiled by non-EU nationals only where reciprocal protection is available for EU na-
tionals under third country laws).
For a view that a substantive policy preference of altering copyright's existing
"cultural bargain" lies behind the reasons offered by the Clinton Administration for
the move to the international stage, see Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant
(and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in
CQopright Law, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595,599 (1996).
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completion of the first comprehensive multilateral copyright conven-
tion, the Berne Convention in 1886, can be traced in part to a devel-
oping international market in the distribution of books. 3 But, under
the current manifestation that we call globalization, producers of
copyrighted works are largely unable to resist expansion to the inter-
national stage of product exploitation simply because a protective le-
gal framework is not yet in place abroad. Globalization is partly
driven by users and consumers of copyrighted goods. Users of copy-
righted works have greater capacity to control the materialization of
intangible works, and thus to affect where such materialization oc-
curs."4 Domestic distribution of a work effectively means international
distribution, regardless of a producer's wishes, which in turn (because
of the easy appropriation of intellectual goods) becomes competing
domestic distribution. The foreign market is no longer a serial exten-
sion of the domestic market; they are one and the same. The ability
of a single nation-state to implement autonomous cultural and infor-
mation policies is diminishing; national policymakers need the coop-
eration of other nations if they wish to realize a particular goal (such
as to ensure a secure environment for the creation and distribution of
copyrighted works).
24 See RCKETSON, supra note 15, at 18-19 (discussing the growth of nineteenth-
century international copyright relations); STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS § 1.16, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1989) (noting the
.commercial necessity" of international copyright in the nineteenth century).
24 From the perspective of U.S. producers, the internationalization of markets re-
flects more than a response to the intangible nature of copyrighted works. It also re-
flects an enhanced demand abroad for products of the U.S. copyright industries. This
demand, which is at once a commercial opportunity for U.S. producers and a contrib-
uting cause of their loss of control, can be attributed to a variety of factors. First, re-
cent international cultural assimilation has tended in the direction of American cul-
ture, perhaps by virtue of U.S. domination of the internet as a medium of access to
works and the sheer volume of American culture made available via satellite television.
But see Pokmania v. globophobia, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, at 36 (challenging the
inevitability of the domination of American pop culture as a result of globalization,
and discussing the phenomena of Pok~mon, from Japan, and Harry Potter and the
Teletubbies, both from the United Kingdom). Second, there has been a rise in the use
of the English language, facilitated in part by its being the predominant language on
the internet, and the most prevalent language of internet search engines. See UNITED
NATIONS, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 6 (Oxford Univ. Press. 1999) (re-
porting that 80% of web sites are written in English, although less than 10% of the
world's population speaks English). Finally, political liberalization (particularly in
Central and Eastern Europe) and higher levels of education internationally have
opened up new markets to U.S. works.
See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
AND. L REV. 51, 112 n.279 (1997) (noting that "the Administration's main argument
for moving so far and so fast rests largely on the supposed difficulties of enforcing ter-
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Second, divergent national laws impose significant costs on the
producers of copyrighted works. Revising production and distribution
practices to accommodate different national requirements burdens
the producer not only with additional administrative expense, but also
with escalated uncertainty about protection that will be reflected in a
risk premium passed on to users. This premium must be accounted
for not only in the pricing of works intentionally distributed via the
global information infrastructure;16 the widespread capacity to digitize
ritorially grounded intellectual property rights in cyberspace"). Some of these difficul-
ties may be addressed technologically, and some commentators have placed faith, in
part, upon such developments as a means of avoiding conflicts problems. SeeJack L.
Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Teritorial Sovereigny, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 484-85 (1998) (noting the role of technology in re-
establishing borders). That is, one way of avoiding the conflicts precipitated by trans-
national events is to ensure that all acts occur in a purely national setting. This can be
pursued by legal regulation that increases the cost of foreign activity over any potential
gains, or by technological erection of borders. See Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce:
Control over Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at C4 (reporting that the response of
ICraveTV.com to complaints concerning its activities, permissible in Canada but pro-
hibited in the United States, was to pursue technological measures that would bar U.S.
users from accessing the Canadian web site, and thus to create "country-area net-
works"). But even were such technological solutions possible, see id. (noting difficulties
of creating such effective technological measures), it is uncertain whether encouraging
them is advisable. Technological territorialism would discard the social gains of glob-
alization in terms of enhanced access to a greater variety of material and frustrate the
declared purpose of the leading international copyright convention, namely to pro-
mote the international dissemination of works of authorship. But cf Goldsmith, supra,
at 485 ("[T]here is nothing sacrosanct about... a foreign content provider's right to
send information everywhere in the world with impunity."). And the gains of interna-
tional access to information are not lightly to be discarded. Beyond the inherent value
of access to a greater and more diverse universe of creative works, a value implicit in
the instrumentalist notion of copyright, access to and understanding of the social and
cultural conditions of others can only lead to enlightened international relations and
deeper understandings of social problems. One might argue that these gains of glob-
alization are not worth the costs that are generated, cf Le Cyber Challenge, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2000, at 55 (noting that the internet, and its early domination by
the English language, had interfered with the "cultural policing" efforts of the
Acad6mie Franqaise to defend the French language, and that Francophone policy is
now to embrace the internet and encourage the spread of cultural diversity by promot-
ing the spread of French sites on the internet), but difficult choice of law questions
resulting from an unduly constrained methodological mindset hardly seem a persua-
sive cost to invoke. Surely, the potential gains of globalization command more hard
thinking on the part of legal scholars than efforts to reimpose technologically the terri-
torialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
26 The risk of inadequate international protection is, of course, not entirely exter-
nally generated if the copyright owner digitizes the work itself and hence facilitates the
copying and transmission of the work abroad. But the hand of the copyright owner
may effectively be forced not only by the capacity of users, noted in the text, to digitize
works distributed by the copyright owner in analog format, but also by the develop-
ment of digital distribution mechanisms by others, including by persons other than
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analog copies of works, on a popular as well as commercial level, re-
quires such premiums to be reflected in the pricing of copyrighted
content generally. Moreover, the chilling costs of uncertainty may
also settle (although with more questionable practical effect) 2' on cer-
tain users of copyrighted works, who cannot be sure of the applicable
rules governing their conduct in the inherently international envi-
ronment of the world wide web.
Third, the developed world possesses a comparative advantage in
the production of intellectual goods." That is, the trade significance
of copyright industries has encouraged the developed world to ad-
dress copyright law as a matter of international relations. If free
copyright owners. For example, although recording companies are working to facili-
tate the online distribution of sound recordings (with appropriate technological pro-
tections), this is, in large part, a response to the widespread availability of unauthor-
ized recordings in MP3 format. See Frank Rich, Stephen King's Week of Terror, N.Y. TriMES,
Mar. 25, 2000, at A19 (describing the response of record labels to the Napster software
that facilitates the identification and downloading of files in MP3 format).
;7 SeeJack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1217 (1998)
(noting that, for almost all users, there will be no threat of extraterritorial legal liability
because their lack of physical presence or assets in those jurisdictions precludes effec-
tive enforcement). Of course, users may still experience the effects of such uncertainty
indirectly via related cyberactors (such as their internet service providers) who have
such a presence or assets and whose conduct (and prices) will be affected by the un-
certainty of applicable laws.
The extent to which this advantage will hold up in the digital economy is not
entirely clear. While a digital divide clearly still exists both domestically and interna-
tionally, there is some evidence that the developing world is "catching up" in the de-
velopment of internet technologies at a rate that would not have been conceivable in
the offline context. See Charles Clark, Net Law: A Cyberspace Agenda for Publishers, 3 J.
WORLD INrEIL. PROP. 97, 97 (2000) (suggesting that "China will become one of the
world's largest internet markets by as early as 2003"); Thomas Crampton, Internet Ex-
pected to Offer Big Boost to Developing Nations, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 24, 2000, Special
Report, at 24 (suggesting that new technologies will enable developing countries to
"leap frog" over several stages of economic infrastructure development, an area in
which developing countries have traditionally been disadvantaged). Copyright has al-
ways, in theory, been a more egalitarian sstem of property. We each (subject to un-
even, but not determinative, conditions of health and education) possess the tools of
copyright production. But this may be particularly true with respect to internet tech-
nologies, where manufacturing facilities are relatively unimportant to the creation of
intellectual products. Cf Romesh Ratnesar & Joel Stein, Everyone's a Star.com, TmE,
Mar. 27, 2000, at 70 (noting effects of the internet on development and distribution of
entertainment products by uncapitalized individuals); Rich, supra note 26 (suggesting
that the ease of production and distribution of content on the internet is "a prescrip-
tion either for the greatest democratization of the arts in the history ... or a dumbing
down that may make the advent of public-access cable TV look in retrospect like the
Renaissance").
0 See Reichman, supra note 8, at 346 (explaining that the impulse of the developed
world toward the adoption of enforceable international standards reflected "the grow-
ing capacity of manufacturers in developing countries to penetrate distant markets for
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trade is understood solely in terms of an ability to exploit comparative
advantage, the failure of other nations to protect intellectual property
can be rationalized as an intrusion upon free trade.
The degree to which international considerations now affect do-
mestic U.S. copyright law is perhaps most graphically demonstrated by
the brief filed by the federal government in the recent challenge to
the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act in Eldred Press v. Reno.Y The government argued that the domestic
constitutional purpose of promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts was rationally furthered by the grant of twenty extra years
of copyright protection to existing works because, inter alia, such a
rule ensured greater harmonization with the laws of the European
Union (the "EU").3' Although the Eldred Press court upheld the stat-ute without reaching that argument, that it was advanced by the gov-
traditional industrial products," thus forcing "the developed countries to rely more
heavily on their comparative advantages in the production of intellectual goods than in
the gast").
See J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
Risks of the GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 757 (1989) (explaining
the comparative advantage argument); see also Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compli-
ance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 393 (1996)
(noting that the stated premise of the incorporation of intellectual property protection
within the GATT mechanism was that a failure to protect intellectual property of for-
eigners amounted to a trade barrier). Some scholars have expressed the purpose of
the TRIPS Agreement in language more suggestive of exploitation by the developed
world. See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POLY 109, 140-41
(1995) (arguing that "the chief aim of the agreement is to secure from [developing]
countries and societies the full monopoly benefits that western intellectual property
laws offer"). Interestingly, however, while the accession of the developing world to the
TRIPS Agreement may indeed have been significantly influenced by reciprocal trade
benefits of immense social and economic importance to those countries, many of the
first ratifications of the WIPO Copyright Treaty have been by developing countries. See
Actions in Respect of Treaties Administered by WIPO Not Yet in Force, at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/doc/u-page30.doc (July 15, 2000) (listing nations
that have ratified the WIPO copyright treaty). Yet, these ratifications have not been
made upon pain of trade penalty. It may be that, as suggested above, an increasing
number of developing countries have been persuaded of the internal (as opposed to
external trade) benefits of copyright protection in the digital age. See supra note 28.
31 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the stat-
ute). The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended the term of copyright
for twenty years both prospectively and with respect to existing works. Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). The con-
stitutional challenge focuses on the extension of protection for existing works.
32 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Plead-
ings, Eldred Press (No. 99-0065), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
eldredvreno/jop-memo.html (last modifiedJuly 7, 1999).
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emnment emphasizes a salient point: internationalization is an inte-
gral component of U.S. copyright lawmaking.
B. Technology
In addition to international considerations, other forces play sig-
nificant roles in the formation of contemporary copyright law. In par-
ticular, the content of copyright law is necessarily hostage to techno-
logical developments, as to some extent it always has been."5 Just as
printing by movable type spurred the first copyright-like law in Eng-
land in the sixteenth century,'4 and just as copyright legislation in re-
cent decades has tackled questions raised by the photocopier, satellite
television, the home video recorder, digital audiotape, and computer
software, so too copyright law is now heavily driven by the need to ad-
dress the new digital environment of the internet. To which tradi-
tional copyright concepts, if any, can we analogize browsing, linking,
framing, downloading, webcasting, or even forwarding of e-mail mes-
sages?
The rapidity of current technological change, promoted in par-
ticular by widespread popular use of the internet, requires a copyright
lawmaking process receptive to constant adaptation. Much recent
lawmaking in the United States'5 and the most recent international
copyright negotiationsS reflect the need for copyright law to address
i See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) ("From its be-
ginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in tech-
nology."); Hon. Marybeth Peters, The Spring 1996 Horace S. Manges Lecture: The National
Infornation Infrastructure: A Co2pyright Office Perspective, 20 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 341,
341 (1996) (noting the role of technological advances in the historical development of
copyright law).
4 See HARRY RANsoM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 17-53 (1956) (discussing the
role of The Stationers' Company in giving "quasi-legal status to literary property" in
England during the period from 1559 to 1601).
_,- See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2863-64 (1998) (enacting various reforms, including a prohibition against the circum-
vention of technological copyright protection systems); see also WHITE PAPER, supra
note I (discussing the reforms necessary to adapt copyright law to the digital age).
Federal database legislation has been pending since 1996 and remains before Con-
gress. See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999)
(prohibiting unauthorized extraction of a substantial part of certain collections of in-
formation).
J" See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, art. 11, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty] (clarifying the ba-
sic principles of copyright law in light of technological developments and, inter alia,
requiring signatory states to enact protection for authors against the circumvention of
technological measures designed either to restrict access to works or to protect works
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challenging issues presented by new technological innovation. While
legislative consideration of these issues has been bitterly contested
and drawn-out, the courts in the interim have developed solutions
based upon the underlying principles of copyright law. 7
It is not new, of course, that the enactment of copyright legislation
takes time; the last comprehensive revision of U.S. copyright law, re-
sulting in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, can fairly be described
as a twenty-year process. But the need for the legislative process to be
more responsive to technological developments has arguably in-
creased, thus magnifying the gap between the ideal and the real.3 1 It
is a continuing challenge for copyright law to keep pace with the
technology that assists in the production, distribution, and use of the
works whose creation it encourages. And it is a recurring question,
against copying); Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Databases to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) (proposing sui generis protection for compilations of
information), at http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/6dc._all.htm.
37 For example, the courts were in the process of developing principles under
which service providers might be held liable for the transmission of infringing material
by third parties using their services. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that pas-
sive transmission of infringing material created and sent by others does not give rise to
liability absent proof that once notified of the transmission, the service provider re-
fused to remove it from the server, in which case contributory liability might attach);
see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploit-
ers, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1492-94 (1995) (discussing
various decisions addressing the copyright liability of internet service providers). The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, enacted in 1998 after four years of intense negotia-
tion, now provides certain safe harbors for service providers, see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp.
IV 1998), but the same issues are likely to be relitigated under general copyright prin-
ciples if a service provider fails to comply with the many detailed conditions required
to avail itself of the safe harbors.
38 Although the length of time that it takes to legislate copyright law is not merely a
function of the technological nature of an issue, the goal of rapid lawmaking is not
furthered by the fact that new technologies have brought new players into the legisla-
tive process. Not only does this make compromise more difficult, but it also introduces
personnel with accumulated experience in laws quite different from copyright. Media
consolidation and technological change have brought the likes of telephone compa-
nies, for example, into copyright legislative deliberation, which introduces a group
more used to extensive and detailed regulation than reliance on judicially imple-
mented general standards.
39 Others have cautioned against precipitous reform of copyright law in response
to the technology of the day. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Aus Der Neuen Welt, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 195, 212-13 (1998) (suggesting caution in revising copyright law in a hasty man-
ner to reflect current technological developments). I do not take issue with the con-
cern about premature articulation of a legislative scheme that is immediately overtaken
by technological events. Such calls for caution speak more forcefully in the legislative
context, since the legislature acting alone is profoundly unsuited to the task of map-
ping copyright law to the daily cascade of new technological issues. But if the legisla-
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not peculiar to copyright, but particularly acute in this context,
whether courts or legislatures-or what mix of the two-can best pro-
duce law that competently accommodates such technological change.
Moreover, it is a question to which a different answer might be given,
or to which the answer might come with more or less ease, when the
choice between legislative and judicial lawmakers is moved to an in-
ternational plane.40
ture actively co-opts the courts in the enterprise, by establishing a scheme with suffi-
cient flexibility to permit courts to deal creatively with the technological copyright is-
sues dujour, participants in the affected industries and communities can be furnished
prospective guidance without fossilizing copyright law. This makes improvident recent
congressional efforts to micromanage the copyright industries through extensive, de-
tailed legislation. For a suggestion of the causes of the detailed legislative scheme, see
supra note 38.
4, Some scholars have, not surprisingly, detected substantive copyright policy pref-
erences behind debates regarding the preference for courts or legislatures. For exam-
ple, Jerry Reichman and Par Samuelson have suggested that, with regard to recent
debates on the wisdom of federal database legislation:
[i]f one believes that the federal courts can apply existing copyright law to the
new technologies with relatively little friction, then one has implicitly opted
for a wait-and-see approach or at least for a minimalist approach, based on
case-by-case judicial decisions and a minimum amount of tinkering with the
statute as it stands.... This approach leaves the traditional exemptions for
scientific and educational users intact, but subject to case-by-case evaluation.
If, in contrast, one believes that gaps in the law leave online publishers too
much at risk, then proposals for statutory reform easily escalate into a cam-
paign to rid the emerging information infrastructure of allegedly anachronis-
tic vestiges of the cultural bargain that had heretofore protected users and
second comers of works in print and other media.
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 25, at 111 n.275; see also Robert C. Denicola, Some
Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Lkw & CONTEmNp. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 75, 80 (noting that, with respect to the
development of domestic trademark law, U.S. courts have proven to be more hospita-
ble places than legislatures in which to achieve balanced intellectual property rights).
A preference for lower protection is not an intrinsic characteristic of judicial lawmak-
ing, however, nor do I understand Reichman and Samuelson to suggest otherwise. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law,
84 IowA L. REv. 611, 739 (1999) (noting the judicial tendency to protect against free-
riding by favoring "an originator over an imitator"). And other variables may affect
one's preference. For example, one might have, for any number of reasons, a prefer-
ence for constructing an approach based upon articulated standards rather than rules,
which may tend to shift institutional power to dispute resolution tribunals rather than
legislators or treaty drafters. More important than any particular point of debate,
however, is the basic proposition that the international context may alter the analysis.
Joel Trachtman has noted, for example, that "in the trade context... treaty-making
would be subjected to intense domestic scrutiny while application of a standard by a
dispute resolution process would be subjected to reduced scrutiny." Joel P. Tracht-
man, The Domain of 117O Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L LJ. 333, 352 (1999) (citing
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Or-
ganizations, 42J. CONI.Fcr RESOL. 3 (1998)). Accepting Trachtman's analysis, which
an unfavorable N%7O decision in an election year might severely test, see generally, e.g.,
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C. The Reach of Copyright Law
The range of stakeholders for whom copyright law has direct and
immediate importance has significantly increased both in number and
variety over the last few years. 41 The first U.S. copyright law accorded
protection only to "maps, charts and books."42 From this beginning,
copyright protection has gradually been conferred on an ever-
expanding list of works. As copyright protection has regulated the
products of an increasing number of industries, however, crafting leg-
islation that reflects the idiosyncracies of those disparate industries
has become more challenging. And it has not been a task to which
Congress has readily assigned political priority; historically, the United
States was a net copyright importer, and because for many years it re-
mained outside the principal international copyright agreement, it
exercised only minimal power internationally.4 3 In this climate, the
influence of the Copyright Office and the affected copyright indus-
tries was great. Indeed, a decade ago, the U.S. Supreme Court com-
mented that the 1976 Copyright Act, "which almost completely revised
existing copyright law, was the product of two decades of negotiation
by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, super-
vised by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress."
United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WAT/DS108/AB/R
(Feb. 24, 2000) (holding that certain U.S. tax laws were inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of the United States under the Agreement on Agriculture), at
http://www.wto.org, it is doubtful that domestic court decisions would receive a similar
pass. Domestic judicial opinions, other than those grounded in the Constitution, do
not provide the same political cover for domestically unpopular (perhaps overly inter-
nationalist) policies. See infra text accompanying note 107 (discussing political cover of
WTO dispute settlement decisions).
41 See DIGrrAL DILEMMA, supra note 2, at 51 (noting the diversity of stakeholders
affected by the "growing use of the information infrastructure").
42 See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
43 Although the United States joined the premier international copyright ar-
rangement (the Berne Convention) in 1988, it has, since 1954, been a member of the
less significant Universal Copyright Convention. See Universal Copyright Convention,
opened for signature Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised by 25 U.S.T.
1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 193 (1971). The Universal Copyright Convention established a sys-
tem structurally not unlike the Berne Convention, namely, national treatment plus
substantive minimum standards. See Ringer, supra note 3, at 1061-62 (describing the
significant provisions of the UCC); see also infra text accompanying notes 57-60 (dis-
cussing structure of the Berne Convention).
44 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989); see alsoJessica
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 857, 860-61
(1987) ("[M]ost of the statutory language was not drafted by members of Congress or
their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved through a process of negotiation
among authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests in the property
rights the statute defines."); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
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Yet, a quarter century later, the notion that copyright policy might
be settled by traditional interindustry negotiation without excluding
the perspectives of a significant number of interested parties is fanci-
ful, to cast it in the most generous light. Copyright is now omnipres-
ent. Since the 1976 Act, which itself regulated a wide range of differ-
ent works, the protected categories have been extended yet further
to include, for example, computer software and the architectural de-
signs of buildings. 6 There is little that a citizen can do today that does
not affect, or is not affected by, a copyright-protected product.47 Al-
lied to this, copyright affects a wide array of new industries (many of
which do not yet understand this).48 The digital economy is founded
on industries invested in, and more crucially dependent upon, protec-
tion for intangible information-based products. And in the digital age
the delivery of a book could implicate, for example, not only the pub-
lisher, but also the telephone companies whose facilities are used to
distribute the work" (and incidentally copy the work, unlike the deliv-
Change, 68 OF. L. REV. 275, 311-17 (1989) (describing the role of industry representa-
tives and the absence of similar representatives of the public in the creation of the
1976 Copyright Act).
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (according protection generally to "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," and providing a diverse
illustrative list of works of authorship). Since 1994, quasi-copyright protection has been
extended further to live musical performances not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (codifying reforms introduced by the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994).
4 See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)) (expressly providing for copyright protection for
computer software); Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994)) (de-
fining "architectural work" and expressly providing for its protection under copyright
law).
47 SeeJessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 29,
34 (1994) (commenting that modem copyright law "touches everyone and every-
thinj").
For example, a business that wants to engage in secure digital commerce may
confront questions regarding the extent to which it wants to use, and to protect the
integrity of, technological measures to regulate access to the works it distributes.
These questions cannot be addressed without consideration of recent provisions con-
tained in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998)
(prohibiting circumvention of technological measures that restrict access to copy-
righted works).
41 Online delivery of commercially attractive novels may not be far away. Stephen
King recently distributed his latest novella, Riding The Bullet, exclusively via the inter-
net. See Rich, supra note 26 (discussing the cultural implications of King's distribu-
tion). Although technical constraints may limit the widespread use of intemet delivery
for full-length novels or other copyrighted works that occupy huge digital files, see id.
(noting that the distribution of the King novella caused the web sites of net booksellers
to crash), these constraints are likely to become less significant in the near future. At
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ery company that used to distribute books). 0
Finally, recent developments have caused copyright law to intrude
more directly into the personal and private affairs of citizens.' At the
time of the 1976 Act, the public obtained access to copyrighted works
such as books, newspapers, motion pictures, or television shows,
largely on terms that could be dictated by the copyright industries or
their distributors. To regulate the dealings in and control of such
works, Congress needed simply to address the conduct of those per-
sons. The public could do little to interfere with the practices of the
copyright industries. The availability of home copying devices and
digital access to (as well as delivery of) copyrighted works transformed
this arrangement. Users are now in a position to copy and deal in
copyrighted material. To regulate the control of copyrighted works, 2
Congress therefore must now seek to regulate the public in a far more
direct fashionY
that point, the only remaining resistance to online delivery may be cultural rather than
technological. Yet, cultural habits have already been reconfigured by online delivery
of sound recordings, and it may be that consumers, especially those weened on online
delivery of products, will more readily cast off the attachment to physical copies of
works than we assume. SeeJane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works:
The Development of Access Rights in U.S. copcight Law, in U.S. INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY.
LAw AND POLICY (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on file with
author) (discussing how U.S. copyright law has responded to distribution patterns that
place less significance on the material "copy" of a work).
50 The U.S. courts have adopted a very low threshold for what amounts to repro-
duction for the purpose of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading a work into the
random access memory of a computer constitutes reproduction).
51 See Amy Waldman, Policing Cyber Music, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at WK2 (sug-
gesting that if the pending lawsuit filed by the recording industry against the distribu-
tors of the Napster computer program, which enables users to find and download un-
authorized sound recordings in MP3 format, is ultimately unsuccessful, "the music
industry may have to sue the college students who are Napster's most avid users").
52 To the extent that Congress may wish to regulate extraterritorial conduct with
local effects in the United States because, for example, the extraterritorial actors are
not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, it may be required to focus more on
end-users. See Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 481-83 (discussing ways in which nations
may regulate local effects of foreign conduct).
Some scholars have suggested that the right to control access to a work that is
effectively vested in copyright owners by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV 1998) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."), may become cen-
tral to the ability of authors effectively to secure rights in their works in the digital age.
See Ginsburg, supra note 49 (manuscript at 10) (noting that "[a] ccess controls make it
possible for authors to offer end-users a variety of distinctly-priced options for enjoy-
ment of copyrighted works"). See generally David Nimmer, A Rff on Fair Use in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 684-92 (2000) (discussing the anti-
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). In such an envi-
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The effect of these changes on the legislative process is not yet
ftilly clear, and indeed may continually evolve. But recent legislative
battles suggest that any negotiated compromise will necessarily in-
clude a far broader range of industries, which makes agreement more
difficult to reach. It may also change the nature of copyright legisla-
tion, as industries accustomed to micro-regulation resist traditional
copyright reliance on broadly worded judicial standards in favor of de-
tailed statutory provision. The recently enacted Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, intended primarily to implement two treaties and to
address the copyright liability of internet service providers, increased
the size of the Copyright Act by one third. On the other hand, as
copyright becomes more central to the lives of voters, and more cru-
cial to the trade balance of the United States, one would expect
greater political oversight by Congress. In short, the lawmaking proc-
ess must now accommodate a greater range of different perspectives,
even if the effect that this will have on the nature and substance of
copyright law is far from clear.
II. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAWMAKING
If some degree of international copyright lawmaking is desirable
and/or inevitable, the question that next confronts us is how best to
internationalize copyright law. In answering that question, each of
the competing demands noted above-dynamic lawmaking, national
autonomy, and pluralistic perspective-must be borne in mind. The
looming presence of globalization as the dominant social and eco-
nomic force of our time may tend to obscure and minimize other con-
siderations. But if those competing considerations seem irreconcil-
ronment, copyright law directly controls the private activities of the individual user be-
cause those activities now determine the ability of the author to control the exploita-
tion of her work. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act thus puts in place a set of
rights and exceptions designed to delineate what the user sitting at her computer ter-
minal can do to circumvent technological measures restricting access to the work. See
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (setting the scope of permissible unauthorized circumvention). It
may be, however, that the effectiveness of this balance of rights and exceptions will be
determined as much by the prohibition on the sale of devices designed to facilitate cir-
cumvention of access controls (to which the privileges granted the user are not ex-
tended), and by the willingness of courts to develop a roving exception to the access
right analogous to fair use in the traditional copyright context. See Ginsburg, supra
note 49 (manuscript at 15) (discussing the role of a "fair access" exception in ensuring
a proper balance between copyright owners and users in the digital environment). But
cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(restricting fair use defense to an action for copyright infringement proper rather than
action for violation of section 1201 anti-circumvention provisions); Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
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able with international copyright lawmaking, we may need to recon-
sider the depth of our commitment to internationalization as a driv-
ing force in the formation of copyright law. Before reaching that is-
sue, however, in this Part, I explore changes in the primary means by
which international copyright norms have been developed heretofore,
namely, through state-to-state negotiation of international agree-
ments.
A. The Classical Model
The Berne Convention, concluded in 1886, represented an effort
by several copyright-respecting nations, prompted by the growing in-
ternational market in books, to construct a mechanism for the protec-
tion of their citizens' works abroad.54 But the classical model of public
international copyright lawmaking that the Convention established,
and which it has come to epitomize, intruded only marginally on the
autonomy of signatory states to establish national copyright policy. At
the time of the first intergovernmental meeting in 1883 to form the
Berne Union, attempts were made, particularly by the German delega-
tion, to institute an internationally uniform system of copyright that
would apply in each member state. 5 Proponents of this universalist
vision were rebuffed, however, because of the substantial changes to
national laws that would have been required to implement such a
scheme. 6
Instead, pragmatism prevailed, and the Convention embodied a
two-pronged approach to international copyright law.5 7 First, the par-
ticipating countries agreed that their national laws would adhere to a
cluster of minimum substantive standards. For example, the Conven-
See RICKETSON, supra note 15, at 19-21 (discussing motivations for the Conven-
tion).
5 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, The Role of National Copyright in an Era of International
Copyright Norms 3-4 (Sept. 9, 1999) (unpublished draft, on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing the 1883 intergovernmental conference and the
resolutions adopted by the three Congresses of Authors and Artists that preceded the
intergovernmental conference).
See id. at 4 (suggesting that "[a]lthough most participating countries viewed the
proposition as a desirable one, they voted against it because it would have required
great modifications of their domestic laws, which many countries could not implement
all at once").
57 Rejection of the universalist efforts also consolidated the principle of territorial-
ity. That is, copyright laws are national in scope. An author who publishes a work in
France receives protection in France according to French copyright law and receives
protection in the United Kingdom separately according to the rules of U.K. copyright
law. She owns a French copyright and, separately, a U.K. copyright.
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
tion listed the types of works that a signatory state must protect and
the minimum term of copyright protection. Signatory states could of-
fer greater protection; they were obliged only to satisfy these mini-
mum levels. These standards were hardly exacting. 8 The less de-
manding the obligations, it was thought, the more countries were
likely to become members of the Union and enforce basic notions of
copyright.5q The group of copyright-respecting nations, in which
authors' rights were protected, would thus be enlarged. Second, and
central to the Berne system, member states agreed to the obligation of
national treatment.60 That is, signatory states undertook to provide
authors from, or works first published in, other signatory states with
protection as generous as that afforded domestic authors and works.
Although the universalists made periodic inroads into this
model throughout the twentieth century in the form of serial upwards
revision of the minimum standards, there remained significant lati-
tude for signatory states to develop distinctive national copyright poli-
cies tailored to their own cultural or economic priorities. For exam-
ple, countries remained free to define the "author" of a work, and
thus the initial owner of the copyright, in a fashion consistent with the
philosophical grounding of their copyright system either in individual
personality or in instrumentalist financial incentives.6 Thus, U.S. law
reflects its predominantly instrumentalist orientation by recognizing
employers as authors of works prepared by employees within the
scope of their employment, 2 whereas French law links ownership to
the personality of the individual author by treating the employee as
the author in the same circumstance.r" Similarly, the Convention af-
4 See RICKETSON, supra note 15, at 53, 73-74 (discussing the substance of the 1886
text and drafts upon which it was based).
See id. at 73-74 (explaining the choices that were before the countries negotiat-
ing the original text).
- See Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 5(1), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 31 ("Authors
shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respec-
tive laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.... .").
,, Cf. STEWART, supra note 23, § 4.46 (noting latitude under the Berne Convention
for national laws to determine the ownerof the copyright).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (providing that the employer or commissioning
party is the author of a work made for hire); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work
made for hire" as a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment
or certain categories of specially commissioned works where the parties agree in writ-
ing that the work is made for hire); see also Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988,
c.48, § 11(2) (Eng.) (granting employers rights in works prepared by an employee
within the scope of the employee's employment).
13 See Law No. 92-597 ofJuly 1, 1992 on the Intellectual Property Code, art. L-113
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forded countries generous scope to create exceptions to copyright
that effectuated national attitudes to free speech or other countervail-
ing social policies."' For example, U.S. copyright law accords users
broad latitude under the rubric of fair use to make unauthorized
parodies of copyrighted works65 and provides a series of specific ex-
ceptions that permit, for example, the unauthorized public perform-
ance of a musical work at a horticultural fair 66 or in face-to-face class-
61room instruction. Civil law countries tend to favor only the latter
approach (so-called "closed systems"), each providing different lists of
narrow exceptions tailored to its own social and economic priorities.6
Although these different approaches inevitably privilege many similar
acts-such as core educational or research uses, or uses implicating
free speech concerns-many also reflect the exigencies of national
cultural policy (or political demands) .
The process of public international copyright lawmaking tended
to be slow and unwieldy because it operated by way of consensus
among, ultimately,7° countries with a diverse range of social and eco-
(amended Mar. 27, 1997) (Fr.) (providing for copyright ownership by employers only
with respect to software).
64 See Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 369, 370 (1998) (noting that "[em] ore variety exists in delineating the pre-
cise scope of rights through exceptions and limitations, although certain general cate-
gories are common"); Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyfight: Its Proper Limitations
and Exceptions: International Conventions and Treaties, 1999 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56, 93
(1999) (noting the flexibility given to national legislators by international treaty provi-
sions on exceptions and limitations); Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 14-15 (discussing lati-
tude for exceptions).
rZ See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding that a
rap music group's commercial parody was a transformative use favorably regarded un-
der the fair use doctrine).
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that such performances do
not give rise to copyright liability for infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive
right of public performance).
67 See id. § 110(1) (providing that such performances do not give rise to copyright
liability for infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right of public perform-
ance).
For example, Italy provides an exception permitting military musical groups and
bands to play copyrighted music in public without paying compensation to the owner
of the copyright in the musical work. See Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, Gazz. Uff., art.
71 (amended July 29, 1981), translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (Supp. 1987-1988) (Italy).
69 For a discussion of the different exceptions found in national laws, see Jaap H.
Spoor, General Aspects of Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright: General Report, in THE
BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT 27 (Libby Baulch et al. eds., 1999).
70 The majority of the twelve participants at the 1886 convention were European
and thus reflected less diversity than is now the case. See RICKETSON, supra note 15, at
79 (listing the countries participating in the negotiation of the 1886 convention). By
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nomic perspectives. Those agreements that it produced were, in large
part, codifications of commonly held, and already nationally imple-
mented, copyright policies, and thus had a backward-looking per-. 72
spective. They constituted the received wisdom of the participating
countries, rather than prospective solutions to new problems. This
relationship between national and international lawmaking is perhaps
best exemplified by the approach of the United States in 1908 when,
although not yet a party to the Berne Convention, it
was invited to attend [the revision conference] with "full freedom of ac-
tion," but the delegate, Thorvald Solberg, the Register of Copyrights, was
sent as an observer only. Mr. Solberg explained to the Conference that
the United States found it impracticable to send a delegate authorized to
commit it to actual adhesion to the Berne Convention since some of the
questions to be discussed there were pending before the Congress and
premature action at the Convention might embarrass the legislative
branch of the Government.73
Similarly, as noted above, the rejection of the universalist position
at the 1883 intergovernmental conference was based in large part
upon the significant modification of domestic laws that the adoption
of a universalist approach would have mandated.74
the time TRIPS was concluded in 1994, however, the Berne Convention had been re-
vised five times, and 130 countries from around the world had joined. See Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, at http://wvw.wipo.org/
eng/ratific/doc/e-bern.doc (listing current Berne ratifications).
71 Some degree of compromise has been achieved over the years. See STEWART,
supra note 23, § 1.16, at 9-10 (noting the compromises between civil law states adhering
to a system of droit d'auteur and common law countries following a copyright approach
to authors' rights); Davies, supra note 1, at 965 (noting that the Berne Convention had
"provided a bridge" between the systems of copyright found in common law countries
and the droit d'auteur systems of civil law countries); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND
ORIGINS: ESSAYS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 131 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994)
(suggesting greater congruity between U.S. and French literary property regimes than
conventionally understood). The most significant advances requiring changes in na-
tional legislation occurred at the Berlin revision conference of 1908. See RICKETSON,
supra note 15, at 96 (calling the Berlin Act a "significant advance towards an interna-
tional copyright codification").
,4 This is not invariable. Some provisions of the Berne Convention are intention-
ally receptive to changing circumstances and are cast in language that admits of evolu-
tion over time. For example, Article 9(2), governing permissible exceptions to certain
rights of the copyright owner, includes concepts such as "normal exploitation of a
work" that appear consciously designed to change with and reflect the times. Neil W.
Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settle-
ment, 37 VA.J. INr'L L. 441,470 (1997).
7$ Ringer, supra note 3, at 1057.
71 See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 268-69 (explaining why the 1883 and 1885 Confer-
ences did not adopt a "comprehensive and universal copyright law").
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This perspective was ensured not only by the rather deliberate na-
ture of multiparty, international diplomacy and the consensual modus
operandi, but also by exclusive reliance on the quasi-legislative process
of treaty revision as a means of updating the Convention. Although
later versions of the Convention permitted the referral of disputes re-
garding compliance with the Convention to the International Court of• 76
Justice," this mechanism was never used.76 Authoritative contempo-
rary interpretation of the Convention and its application to new issues
thus never occurred outside the slow-moving process of multiparty
77treaty revision.
Yet, as noted above, technological pressures demand a rapidity of
lawmaking, a dynamic disposition, and a forward-looking perspective.
Thus, while globalization suggests a need for international lawmaking,
the classical model hardly seems appropriate for such fast changing
climates.78
B. The New Model
If the classical model of public international lawmaking did not
effectively reconcile these different demands, one strategy would be to
alter the nature of the public international lawmaking process. I ar-
gue that this has already happened, and in this part of the Article I
will discuss the changes that lead me to that conclusion. In Part II.C, I
will further suggest why these changes are insufficient in themselves to
address the diverse exigencies of copyright lawmaking. Throughout
this discussion I focus in particular on three aspects of the new public
75 See Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 33, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 50 (establishing
thejurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice).
Moreover, no "state invoked the doctrine of retaliation and retorsion theoreti-
cally available under international law for violation of international minimum stan-
dards of intellectual property protection." J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Pro-
cedures ofthe TRIPSAgreement, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 335, 339 n.17 (1997).
77 There are records of the deliberations at diplomatic conferences resulting in the
conventions, but these reveal only static meaning. And although the WIPO and na-
tional authorities periodically have expressed their views on the meaning of the con-
ventions, no centralized source, let alone one that was effectively binding, offered con-
temporary interpretations. The WIPO has no authority to issue official interpretations
of the conventions that it administers. See William R. Cornish, Genevan Bootstraps, 19
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 336 (1997) (criticizing the WIPO for issuing reports and
comments on model laws that purport to offer interpretations of international conven-
tions).
78 SeeJ.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared
Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 763, 765 (1995) (not-
ing that "both the strengths and weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement stem from its es-
sentially backwards-looking character").
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international model: efforts to enable international institutions to re-
act more quickly to new developments without the need for diplo-
matic conferences or complete consensus; a less unidirectional rela-
tionship between national and international lawmaking, resulting in
an essentially integrated and more forward-looking lawmaking proc-
ess; and the adoption of an effective dispute settlement system among
states to ensure compliance with internationally agreed-upon stan-
dards. This final aspect of the new model will receive particular atten-
tion in Part II.C.
The primary institutional actor in the classical public international
model was the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").
Most of the major multinational intellectual property agreements es-
tablish unions consisting of all states that have adhered to the treaty in
question. The unions assist in the review and revision of existing
agreements. Although the unions are governed by assemblies of the
adherent countries, the WIPO was (and remains) the administrator of
most major unions and treaties and is thus principally responsible for
the daily operations of those unions. But the limits of the classical
model discussed above persuaded many countries, and in particular
developed countries, to consider additional vehicles for international
copyright lawmaking. In the late 1980s, the EU undertook an ambi-
tious series of legislative initiatives in the field of copyright and other
intellectual property rights. These measures, ostensibly in the pursuit
of harmonization of the national laws of EU member states, largely re-
suited in the enhancement of intellectual property rights.79 At a
broader geographic level, the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotia-
tions was expanded to include intellectual property rights, resulting in
the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994.
Both the EU initiatives and the TRIPS negotiations added new
dimensions to public international copyright lawmaking. The direc-
tives"' adopted by the EU did not require the agreement of all mem-
7, See W.L Cornish, 1996 European Community Directive on Database Protection, 21
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1, 13 (1996) (noting the EU belief that "intellectual property
rights should be set at the maximum which is decently achievable").
.' A directive is a legislative instrument of the EU (properly, the European Com-
munity ("EC")), but is not directly applicable in the member states. Its provisions
normally require positive implementation in the domestic laws of the member states,
although certain provisions of directives may be treated as directly creating rights in
member states under the doctrine of "direct effect". See TRFATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMtUNnr, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3, 278, art. 249 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter EC TREATY] ("A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved .... but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."). See generally
P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNI'IT'Y LAw 90 (5th ed. 1993) (dis-
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ber states of the EU."' The European Commission" may bring (and
has brought) actions before the European Court of Justice against re-
calcitrant states to compel implementation of the standards in the di-
rectives. 83 And, although the EU directives have addressed issues
(such as copyright term) upon which member states had well-
developed policies, a number of the directives addressed issues
roughly contemporaneously with the first serious national attention to
the same issues. Thus, the EU has promulgated detailed directives
cussing the nature and effect of directives); 5 HANS SMIT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNTY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREAT
§§ 189.11, 189.14 (1994). Other legislative measures resulting in the creation of uni-
tary EU-wide intellectual property rights, rather than harmonization of national laws,
do require unanimity of the member states, but these have involved industrial property
rights. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protec-
tion in the European Union, 24 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 611, 636-37 (1996) (dis-
cussing why measures proposed pursuant to ex-Article 235-now Article 308-can be-
come law over the objections by the European Parliament). The unitary Community
Trademark is now in existence, the legislation creating the unitary Community Design
Right is pending, and the European Commission recently announced proposals for
the creation of a unitary Community Patent. See Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 De-
cember 1993 on the Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1 (establishing the
Community Trademark); Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation
on the Community Design, COM(93)342 final at 1 (1993) (proposing the creation of a
unitary design right); Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Innovation
through Patents, The Follow-Up to the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the
Patent System in Europe (1999) (recommending the creation of an EU-wide unitary
patent), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/intprop/indprop/
8682en.pdf. These reforms have been effected through regulations. A regulation of
the European Community has general application, is binding in its entirety, and is di-
rectly applicable in all member states. See EC TREATY art. 249. See generally 5 SMIT &
HERZOG, supra, at § 189.09-.10. EC regulations do not require national implementing
legislation to become effective in Member States. See MATHIJSEN, supra, at 89.
81 See EC TREA Y art. 95 (authorizing legislation to achieve approximation of laws
where necessary to complete the internal market).
82 The European Commission is central to the European project because it initi-
ates all EU legislation. The Commission is based in Brussels, has twenty appointed
members, two each from the five largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom) and one from each of the other ten member states. See id.
art. 213.
83 See id. art. 226 (providing that the Commission may bring action against a mem-
ber state that fails to fulfill an obligation under Community law); see also Copright-
Failure to Implement CouncilDirective 92/100 Within Specified Time Limi EUR. CURRENT L.,
Nov. 1999, at 36 (describing Commission v. Ireland, which upheld a Commission action
against Ireland for failure to implement Rental Rights Directive, Council Directive
92/100, and rejected the Irish defense that implementation was awaiting full-scale re-
view of Irish copyright legislation). This action will normally be brought by the Com-
mission, but may also be brought (under Article 227) by another member state. See EC
TREATY art. 227 (providing that a member state may bring action against another
member state for violation of its obligations under Community law).
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addressing copyright dilemmas such as the protection of computer
programs and databases, and satellite transmission of copyrighted
works.8' Finally, the European Court ofJustice is available to interpret
the directives in light of new technological developments, and thus to
maintain the currency of the laws.
To be sure, this more forward-looking perspective can be traced to
the different goals of the European project, namely, the eradication of
differences in national laws that might impede the free flow of goods
within the EU. This objective requires a willingness to address the
most important types of goods currently trading within the EU, in-
cluding those embodying or being carried by new technology. And
harmonization of laws within the EU is different from the strategy of
minimum standards pursued by the drafters of the Berne Convention.
Common market-driven harmonization requires more tightly-defined
obligations and necessarily intrudes to a greater extent on national
sovereignty. It is not limited to a declaration of commonly held fun-
damental norms, such as the need to protect literary works against
unauthorized reproduction. Finally, to lock EU member states into
this more far-reaching and more urgent public law endeavor, each
member state has formally ceded some of its sovereignty to a standing
set of governmental institutions. Although the reasons for these dif-
ferences can thus be explained, a new public international copyright
dynamic has clearly been forming among EU states. It is one that ap-
pears, at least superficially, to address some of the deficiencies of the
classical model.
The TRIPS Agreement is further evidence that the model of pub-
lic international copyright lawmaking is changing. Although the
TRIPS Agreement itself is in large part backward-looking, constructed
on the Berne model of minimum standards and national treatment,'6
84 See Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Coordination of
Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 OJ. (L 248) 15 [hereinafter
Cable and Satellite Directive]; Database Directive, supra note 21; Council Directive
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991
OJ. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Software Directive].
.' For a comparative discussion of harmonization efforts in the EU and the United
States, see HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL,
FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS--THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERIKA [sic] COMPARED (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996).
- The approach of the TRIPS Agreement has been referred to as "Berne plus."
See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 8, at 370 (discussing the "Berne plus" formula of the
TRIPS Agreement). The "plus" part of this formulation refers primarily to additional
minimum standards that TRIPS added beyond those found in the Berne Convention.
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it too arose in an institutional setting more conducive to expeditious
and prospective lawmaking.87 The incorporation of TRIPS within the
broader institutional structure of the GATT permitted cross-sectoral
concessions, and thus greater room for maneuver. And the inclusion
of TRIPS within the enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms
of the WTO appears at first to mirror events unfolding within the EU
because it holds out the potential (or danger) of prospective lawmak-
ing by adjudicatory panels.
This additional activity should not, however, conceal the continu-
ing centrality of the WIPO to the public international copyright law-
making process. In 1995, the WIPO and the WTO entered into an
agreement under which the WIPO will provide technical assistance to
the WTO.ss And, in 1996, two new multilateral copyright treaties were
concluded under the auspices of the WIPO. 9 But the WIPO would
appear to have taken on board the EU developments and TRIPS.
Those treaties-the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty-were an attempt to develop copyright
law prospectively for the digital age; some dubbed the treaties the
87 From the standpoint of the United States, the effort to remedy the slowness of
the treaty ratification mechanism was addressed by the creation of fast-track authority
(which has since expired). Both the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAF'A") and the GATT were negotiated and their implementation legislation en-
acted under this authority. In Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp.
2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999), a federal district court held that the NAFTA Agreement was
validly enacted and that the fast-track legislative process did not unconstitutionally cir-
cumvent the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1317-23. The Treaty Clause
gives the President the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, ci. 2. The fast-track procedure limits Congress's debate time, permits the House
and Senate only to vote for or against the agreement in its entirety, without amend-
ment, and enacts the agreement on the basis of simple majority votes in each chamber.
The court concluded that the Treaty Clause was not the only mechanism by which an
international agreement could be created and approved, citing particularly Congress's
broad Commerce Clause authority and the President's authority to conduct foreign
affairs. See Made in the USA Found., 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1317-23 (upholding NAFMA and
the NAF1A Implementation Act as constitutional exercises of authority granted under
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988).
Agreement Between World Intellectual Property Organization and World Trade
Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754, 756-57 (agreeing upon the availability of
WIPO resources to WTO members). The TRIPS Agreement expressly contemplated a
continuing role for the WIPO, both in the context of TRIPS Council activities gener-
ally, see TRIPS Agreement art. 68, and in the periodic reviews of TRIPS implementa-
tion for which the TRIPS Council is responsible under Article 71.
89 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 36; WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 23, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
"WIPO Internet Treaties."" More important, perhaps, this interna-
tional attention to, and development of, new rules for digital copy-
right occurred in advance of-or simultaneously with-significant na-
tional legislative consideration of the same issues. The WIPO
Copyright Treaty, in particular, looked afresh at the problems of the
digital environment (for example, it contained the first rules on the
circumvention of measures designed to protect copyrighted works),
and it is now being implemented in national laws throughout the
world:
This last statement might suggest an inversion of the unidirec-
tional vector that I identified as emblematic of the classical model,
namely, the elevation of the national rule to an international norm.
But this would be an oversimplification of the new model. To be sure,
an international treaty negotiation may now represent one of the early
aspects of the lawmaking process on a topic rather than an accommo-
dation or codification of established national policies. But, so too,
domestic U.S. copyright policy has cast its shadow on recent foreign
and international developments. Indeed, national, regional, and in-
ternational developments may have a profound influence on each
other. The relationship is increasingly complex and multidirectional.
WMihdly Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WPO "Internet" Treaties, 21
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 197, 199 (1997)."I In addition, the WIPO has recognized the need for more responsive interna-
tional lawmaking by restructuring itself to create standing committees on a range of
topics. See Report of the Director General of WJPO on Activities of the Standing Committee on
the Law of Patents (SCP), the Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs
and Geographical Indications (SCT) and the Standing Committee on Information Technologies
(SCIT), WIPO Doc. WO/GA/23/1 (Sept. 4, 1998) (noting the establishment of stand-
ing committees and discussing their activities). And, at least in other areas of intellec-
tual property, the proposals of the standing committees have been adopted by member
states as nonbinding resolutions of the General Assemblies of the Union in question
rather than as formal treaty documents. See Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Provisions on the Protec-
tion of Well-Known Marks, Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
known Marks 3, WIPO Doc. A/34/13 (Aug. 4, 1999) ("[Tjhis creates no legal obliga-
tion for any country, but following such a recommendation would produce practical
benefits." (citations omitted)), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/document/
govbody/wo.gb.ab/pdf/a34_13.pdf; see also Proposed Joint Resolution Concerning Provi-
sions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, General Report of the Assemblies of the Member
States of WIPO, 34th Annual Series of Meetings 1 171-83, WIPO Doc. A/34/16 (Sept. 29,
1999) (reporting national interventions in the debate on the proposed solution). In
essence, the WIPO is recognizing that its objectives might better be pursued by the
creation of "soft law" than by conclusion of formal treaties. On the role of "soft law" in
public international law, see A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and
Soft Law, 48 rNT'L& COUP. L.Q. 901 (1999).
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A variety of instruments-formal and informal,92 national and interna-
tional-can play different roles in the lawmaking process on different
occasions. Copyright agendas may now be pursued simultaneously or
serially in domestic and international fora.
93
The allure of this new international lawmaking model, with its
fluid and unpredictable interrelationship among national, regional,
and international laws, may have a significant impact on national laws
even where international institutions are presently silent. The content
of national or regional measures adopted independently of active
treaty deliberation is frequently devised with an eye to the possible de-
velopment of international standards. This phenomenon takes the
most direct form of reciprocity-conditioned rights, such as the data-
base rights in the EU Database Directive and the extended term of
copyright in the Term Directive, both of which prompted legislative
reaction in the United States (and may yet generate international
914agreements). But, when the influence of the interrelationship be-
92 Professors Reichman and Samuelson suggested, for example, in their discussion
of the flurry of database protection initiatives that have arisen in the last few years, that
"[i]n this climate, it is literally possible for an as yet unimplemented legislative initia-
tive of one government to become an international minimum standard for other gov-
ernments before most people affected by it... even know that proposals for new intel-
lectual property rights have been put on the table." Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 25, at 76. Despite the fears expressed by Reichman and Samuelson, the database
treaty proposals were tabled in 1996 and have not become an international standard,
suggesting perhaps that there is sufficient international vigilance to prevent the reali-
zation of such fears.
93 Reflecting the multidirectional nature of the process described above, under this
dynamic, the negotiation of an international treaty containing provisions that might
previously have been controversial if enacted domestically may influence later congres-
sional consideration of the same measures. See, e.g., Samuelson, The U.S. Digital
Agenda, supra note 20, at 373-74 (suggesting a relationship among the Clinton Admini-
stration White Paper, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the treaty implementing legisla-
tion that would have developed had early drafts of the WIPO Copyright Treaty been
adopted); cf. Netanel, supra note 72, at 443 n.13 (noting, unfavorably, that the Clinton
administration was likely to pursue in Congress an agenda upon which it had failed to
secure international agreement in the negotiation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
Netanel's observation inverts the complaint of Reichman and Samuelson, who are
concerned that national governments might try to achieve internationally that which is
controversial at home. See supra note 92. Each of these criticisms ignores the reality
that, in the current climate of necessary internationalization, the international and
domestic processes are inevitably intertwined, and that different checks (reflecting the
structures of the different institutions) apply in each setting. The interrelationship
should not be troubling, although the strategic use of one merely to influence the
other might have adverse consequences. See infra text accompanying note 95 (discuss-
ing the creation of "cards" for use in future negotiations).
94 The reciprocity requirements are intended to prod other countries to follow
suit. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 25, at 97 n.201 (noting statements of EU
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tween national and international lawmaking becomes apparent, as it
has to the EU and to some in the United States, it clearly affects the
content even of domestic laws that lack reciprocity conditions. For
example, the European Commission candidly justified recent design
law reforms because of the ability of such legislation to strengthen its
hand internationally.1 National laws become cards to play in forth-
coming negotiations.
C. Dispute Settlement in Public International Copyright Law
1. The Apparent Potential of the WTO
Despite exhibiting some characteristics of the new public interna-
tional copyright lawmaking model, TRIPS is still primarily backward-
looking.+6 The ordinary method of amending the TRIPS Agree-
ment-approval of a TRIPS Council proposal by a two-thirds majority
of a Ministerial Conference-is somewhat time-consuming."' And
even the expedited process contemplated by Article 71(2), whereby
the TRIPS Council may by consensus vote "adjust [the agreement] to
higher levels of protection of intellectual property rights achieved,
and in force, in other multilateral agreements and accepted under
those agreements by all members of the WTO," requires the predicate
officials %ith respect to the Database Directive); see also Jean-Franiois Verstrynge, The
European Commission's Direction on Copyright and Neighboring Rights: Toward the Regime of
the Twenty-First Century, 17 COLUrM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 187, 205 (1993) (discussing the
role of reciprocity in developing copyright law).", See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Legal Pro-
tection of Industrial Design, Working Document of the Services of the Commission, at
1 3.5.2, Doc. No. lll/F/5131/91-EN (1991) ("Unifying the Community legislation in
this field would automatically strengthen the negotiating position of the Community in
the international framework."); see also Press Release of Directorate-General on Media,
Information Society and Data Protection, Dec. 8, 1999 (noting that "in some areas [the
proposed e-commerce Directive] provides for solutions that may serve as a model at
the international level, thus reinforcing Europe's influence on the development of an
international legal framework")..11 See Reichman, supra note 30, at 765 (describing the structure and orientation of
the TRIPS Agreement).
.,7 See Abbott, supra note 10, at 667-68 (describing the process of TRIPS amend-
ment). The Council for TRIPS (or "TRIPS Council") meets at least five times a year in
Geneva, and each member state of the NTO may send a representative. The Council
has oversight responsibility for the TRIPS Agreement, and thus monitors the operation
and implementation of the Agreement. It is in this forum that countries will first seek
informally to resolve differences regarding interpretation or implementation of the
Agreement. See generally Matthijs Geuze & Hannu Wager, TJ'O Dispute Settlement Prac-
tice Relating to the TRIPS Agreement, 2J. INT'L EcON. L. 347, 382-84 (1999) (describing
the role of the Council for TRIPS).
2000]
502 UNJVERS1TYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:469
of a concluded multinational agreement."
The TRIPS Agreement was, however, one of the agreements sub-
sumed within the newly minted WTO dispute settlement mechanism."
One of the objectives, and achievements, of the Uruguay Round of
the GATT was to make proceedings that formerly took place before
GATT panels more adjudicatory in nature.'O° The diplomatic model
of the GATT gave way to the judicial model of the WTO, reflecting an
attempt to shift from a power-based to a rule-based procedure. 01 On
its face, the addition of WTO enforcement mechanisms would appear
to permit the TRIPS system to evolve beyond the 1994 text, and thus
to address in a dynamic fashion new technological issues as they arise.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism may therefore appear to
complete the transformation of public international copyright law-
making in such a way that the competing concerns identified in Part I
of this Article can be accommodated.
Certainly, the switch from a diplomatic to an adjudicatory model
has generated an increased level of state-to-state litigation. The num-
ber of WTO panels convened thus far outpaces the rate of resort to
98 TRIPS Agreement art. 71(2); see Abbott, supra note 10, at 668-69 (describing the
expedited process). This expedited process itself reflects a substantive bias of the
TRIPS system, namely that only changes in favor of higher protection are facilitated.
This follows, of course, from the premise of TRIPS that distortions in trade flow occur
as a result of inadequate intellectual property protection (rather than inappropriate
protection, whether too much or too little). See TRIPS Agreement art. 1(1); Berne
Convention, supra note 15, art. 20.
99 For a superb analysis of potential issues raised by WTO adjudication of TRIPS
disputes before any cases were filed, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement
Together, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
100 See id. at 316 (situating the existence of the Appellate Body within the prefer-
ence for ajudicial model of dispute settlement). For discussion of the reform of the
prior GATT system effected by the change to the WTO panels under the DSU, see
Kenneth Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private Interests
System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111 (1992), Miquel MontafiA I. Mora, A
GA7T with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 128-46 (1993) (setting out changes to the dispute set-
tiement system discussed during the Uruguay Round), and Michael K. Young, Dispute
Resolution in the Uruguay Round. Lauyers Triumph over Diplomatz 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 396-
400 (1995) (discussing reforms of the dispute resolution mechanism).
101 See Adrian T.L. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 171 (1998) (describing the shift to a rule-based model of dispute
settlement within the WTO); Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO Understanding
on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1223,
1224 (1999) (describing the ways in which the Uruguay Round changed the nature of
the dispute settlement process from a power-based to a rule-based procedure).
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GATT panels prior to 1994;'02 and while sixteen cases have been filed
under TRIPS in the five years since the conclusion of the WTO
Agreement, no claims for violation of international intellectual prop-
erty laws were brought before the International Court of Justice dur-
ing the period when such recourse was available under the Berne
Convention."3
2. Resisting an Activist Interpretive Philosophy in the WTO
The temptation to embrace an activist WTO as part of this new
model of public international lawmaking should, however, be resisted,
for the several reasons discussed in this Part. First, the constitutive
documents of the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding ("DSU") envision a more restrained judicial
role. Second, despite its juridicization, the WTO dispute settlement
process is, in terms of representational legitimacy, far removed and
insulated from appropriate democratic pressures (both by inherent
institutional place and by current rules on transparency of process).
Third, that process is likely to produce norms of copyright law skewed
in favor of particular values and interests: the state-initiated and in-
tentionally trade-centered nature of the process may result in a nar-
rower perspective of copyright issues than might otherwise be the
case. Finally, the WTO dispute resolution process will generate rules
of international effect that are immediately, upon first articulation,
embedded as norms of a fundamental, higher level with preemptive
effect on alternative generative mechanisms. This last factor has sev-
eral adverse consequences. If the WTO were to assume a role in ar-
ticulating idealized rules of international copyright law rather than
minimum standards, the flexibility necessary to accommodate cultur-
ally and economically contingent copyright policies would be lost to
the detriment of both individual countries and the international sys-
tem. Moreover, it would deny the opportunity for particular national
or regional institutions with varied interests to develop alternative so-
lutions and act as laboratories for ultimately internationalized stan-
dards. The backward-looking nature of the existing public interna-
tional copyright law is both a weakness and a strength. Its weakness is,
as discussed above, its inability in and of itself to supply the means by
I,, See Chua, supra note 101, at 172 (reporting in 1998 that "GATr dispute settle-
ment panels resolved more than 100 cases between 1947 and 1994, [while s]ince the
implementation of the DSU in 1995, the WTO has received over 100 trade disputes
with 28 cases proceeding to a dispute settlement panel" (citations omitted)).
V3 See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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which to ensure the internationalization of copyright law. However,
in adopting a backward-looking posture, the classical model of public
international copyright law preserves other values equally worthy of
attention.
a. The Agreements Contemplate No Dynamic Lawmaking Role for
WTO Panels
The DSU, under which the panels of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") operate, makes clear that rulings of that body "cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."'0 4 This provision would appear to be an attempt to con-
strain judicial activism. If signatory states begin to file complaints in
gray areas, however, particularly with the expiry of the moratorium on
non-violation complaints, 105 an institutional momentum could develop
within the WTO to develop international copyright law. Moreover,
some TRIPS provisions use broad language that we would typically de-
106
scribe as standards rather than rules. This may reflect an agreement
by countries to disagree, or it may reflect a desire by the signatory na-
tions to leave tough decisions to other institutional arrangements
(such as WTO panels) that are subjected to, or insulated from, differ-
ent political or other pressures.1'1 The extent to which a panel might
104 SeeDSU art. 3(2).
105 In a nonviolation complaint, which is a concept that was developed under the
prior GATT, a signatory state argues that an objective of the Agreement is being im-
peded by a measure applied by another member state, whether or not it strictly con-
flicts with the terms of the Agreement. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, art. XXIII (b)-(c), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex IA [hereinafter
GATT] (recognizing complaint for actions that nullify or impede benefits received by
a member state under the GATF or impede the attainment of the objectives of the
Agreement). It is, in essence, a violation of the spirit rather than the letter of the
Agreement. Article 64(2) of the TRIPS Agreement imposed a moratorium on nonvio-
lation TRIPS complaints untilJanuary 1, 2000. SeeTRIPS Agreement art. 64(2). At the
March 2000 TRIPS Council meeting, several countries suggested that the moratorium
should remain in effect until new provisions on the "scope and modalities" of nonvio-
lation complaints are agreed upon as contemplated by the TRIPS Agreement. Daniel
Pruzin, European Countries Call for Negotiations on Geographic Indications at Farm Talks,
[Mar. 24, 2000] Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at d4. The United States took the position
that the moratorium expired automatically on January 1, 2000, but indicated that it is
not preparing nonviolation cases for the near future; it would, for the moment, restrict
TRIPS complaints to violation cases.
106 See; e.g TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 41(2) (requiring that enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights should be "fair and equitable").
107 See Trachtman, supra note 40, at 351 (noting that "[i ncompleteness of specifi-
cation" may be to "avoid the political price that may arise from immediate hard deci-
sions" or "to cloak the hard decisions in the false inevitability of judicial interpreta-
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elaborate upon the standards, and develop more specific rules
through litigation, may depend upon the reason that it perceives for
the adoption of the standard.09 Any such developments should, how-
ever, be checked, and invocation of Article 3(2), with its somewhat
self-serving declaration of a confined judicial role, is probably insuffi-
cient in and of itself.
b. Procedural and Representational Legitimacy of WTO Panel Rulings
The dispute settlement model now found in the DSU is not wholly
"legalized," reflecting in several ways the vestiges of the diplomatic
heritage of the GATT. For example, country-to-country consultations
are a prerequisite to the filing of a claim, briefing documents are kept
confidential, and hearings are not open to the public. These attrib-
utes all assume the method of mediation, negotiation, and concilia-
tion that characterized the diplomatic model."' This suggests that we
should be cautious before endowing WTO panels with expansive law-
generating powers. The power to create norms that govern our lives
should be conferred only upon institutional mechanisms with proce-
dural transparency." ' We must look beyond the WTO for such
mechanisms; the GATT is not the world constitution, and the WTO is
not the World Supreme Court. They both fail to adhere to some of
the essential standards required of institutions that would claim to ex-
ercise prescriptive authority over individuals throughout the world"'
don").
JoN For example, if the use of a standard reflects an agreement to permit individual
member states the flexibility to pursue their different approaches, the development of
a rigid universal rule would run starkly counter to the drafters' intent, and thus panels
are unlikely to develop rules in such a context. In contrast, where the openness of the
language is clearly attributable to the political difficulties that national governments
would have encountered in the alternative event of narrowly drawn language, panels
may see the development of rules as the implementation of the wishes of the drafters
and thus adopt a more activist rulemaking posture.
See David Palmeter, National Sovereigny and the World Trade Organization, 2 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 80-81 (1999) (distinguishing the 'WO's diplomatic model
from a legalistic model).
1,, Both the United States and the EU have urged greater external transparency
(principally, open hearings and removal of restrictions on publication of the parties'
submissions) as part of the ongoing ministerial review of the DSU. See Van der Borght,
supra note 101, at 1238-41 (describing current procedural problems with the DSU).
The review was scheduled to be completed within four years of the establishment of
the XWTO, see Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1259, but has been extended because of the volume of proposals.
I Although a single, universal model of procedural legitimacy would be hard to
realize other than by statement in relatively abstract terms, cf. JfTJRGEN HABERMAS, THE
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Moreover, the representational legitimacy of the WTO panels is
less than ideal." To be sure, any unelected adjudicatory body pos-
sessed of lawmaking powers is, to some extent, insulated from demo-
cratic pressures. Indeed, insulation from majoritarian influence
might be one reason for using an unelected body. But even with
unelected tribunals, some level of democratic accountability usually
exists; citizens whose lives are regulated by lawmakers typically have
some nexus to those lawmakers. This nexus, and hence accountabil-
ity, can be asserted through, for example, political powers of ap-
pointment, confirmation, or removal."' Whether these powers are
exercised directly, or by an official politically accountable to the citi-
zenry, they establish some necessary connection between the gov-
erned and the governing.
WTO panels lack any such connection. Panel members are se-
lected from a pool of persons who have served in their own govern-
ments, or in other capacities in the GATT, by the Director-General of
the WTO, in consultation with the Chairman of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body.14 The selection process is at best unclear, and no demo-
cratically accountable official is involved, except at several points re-
moved from the process.11 Of course, the closeness of any
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITIcAL THEORY 239-52 (Ciaran Cronin &
Pablo De Greiff eds., Ciaran Cronin trans., MIT Press 1998) (1996) (discussing a pro-
cedural model of democracy called "deliberative politics"), the reform of characteris-
tics identified above as vestiges of the diplomatic model, such as the lack of transpar-
ency, would surely be an essential part of any institution claiming a prescriptive
authority over individuals. And the lack of representational legitimacy in the VAITO,
discussed below, merely confirms that the WTO and the dispute settlement panels
should not yet have such power conferred upon, or assumed by, them.
11 The WTO is not the only international institution of which these questions must
be asked. As new institutions of global governance arise in a variety of fields to assume
greater influence in the lives of citizens of nation-states, these institutions will be
pressed to conform to universal standards of democracy and legitimacy. See THOMAS
M. FRANCK, DEMOCRACY, LEGITIMACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LINKAGES 15-20 (N.Y.
Univ. School of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Pa-
per No. 2, 1999) (noting such challenges for new institutions of global and regional
governance), available at http://papers.ssm.com.
1 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the President of the United
States to nominate and appoint federal judges upon confirmation by the U.S. Senate);
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (authorizing the conduct of impeachment proceedings before the
U.S. Senate).
14 See DSU art. 8 (providing the requirements for composition of panels).
115 The role of elected (national) officials is quite attenuated. The WTO Secretar-
iat proposes the panel members to the disputant parties, and the DSU imposes few lim-
its on the Secretariat's discretion. But see DSU art. 8(3) (providing that panelists gen-
erally cannot be from disputant country); id. art. 8(10) ("When a dispute is between a
developing country Member and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the
developing country Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a develop-
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representational nexus is always difficult to maintain in the interna-
tional context, absent direct elections to the international body."r6
This has bedeviled the EU since its inception,1 " and has been the ral-
lying cry for the successive enlargement of the legislative and oversight
powers of the European Parliament, the only directly elected EU insti-
tution.' The EU continues to struggle with this issue,"9 but it has at
least balanced the powers of the unelected Commission with those of
the Council of Ministers (comprising representatives of the nationally
accountable governments) and the Parliament.'20 And, as graphically
demonstrated in 1999, the directly elected Parliament has the power
to force the resignation of the unelected Commission.'
2'
ing country Member."). If the parties oppose the nomination, which they should not
do absent compelling reasons, see id. art. 8(6), and agreement cannot be reached
within twenty days after the date of the establishment of a panel, the Director-General
determines the panel composition in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and
the Chairman of the Council on TRIPS. Id. art. 8(7). To assist in this process, the Sec-
retariat maintains a list of individuals from which panelists may be drawn. The qualifi-
cations to serve on this list are broadly stated. Panelists must be:
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including
persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a repre-
sentative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a repre-
sentative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its prede-
cessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international
trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
Id. art. 8(1). It is here that member states have the most direct role. Member states
may, through their elected officials, suggest persons for inclusion on the list, and such
persons will be added to the list if approved by the DSB. Id. art. 8(4).
I, See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Su-
pranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 633-34
(1999) (discussing the "democratic deficit" that exists because of the lack of electoral
responsibility of lawmakers to the "people whose 'sovereignty'" such lawmakers exer-
cise); cf Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Author-
it)v, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1555, 1578-81 (1999) (dis-
cussing the diminished accountability, and the tendency of legislators to pursue their
own self-interest, that results from the less direct connection between international
lawmakers and those who are governed thereby).
17 See Stephan, supra note 116, at 1580 (discussing the accountability of different
institutions of the EU).
IN See id. at 1580 (commenting that the European Parliament has little influence
in lawmaking even though it is the only directly elected body of the EU).
W. See Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, Speech to the
European Parliament (Nov. 10, 1999) (emphasizing the importance of agreeing upon
institutional reform by the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference in Decem-
ber 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int.
11" See Lindseth, supra note 116, at 672-74 (discussing the development of lawmak-
ing procedures in the EU).
- See Katherine Butler, EU in Crisis: Eurocrats at Last Face the New Reality, THE
INDEP. (London), Mar. 18, 1999, at 16, available at 1999 WL 5989107 (describing the
immediate reactions to the European Commission's mass resignation).
20001
508 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:469
c. Insufficiently Inclusive Perspectives
i. In the Initiation and Conduct of Claims
In litigation before the WTO, the parties are formally member
states of the WTO, and not the real parties in interest, namely, copy-
right owners, users, and competitors. State initiation of complaints,
especially through the offices of a trade representative, may represent
a significant filter that could alter both the type of cases filed and the
conduct of litigation pursued." The immediate trade interests of a na-
tion may not properly reflect the interests of broader groups of com-
petitors or users. For example, the United States, as the current larg-
est producer of software, arguably benefits from the highest level of
copyright protection that can be achieved123 In that climate, it is diffi-
cult (although not impossible) for advocates of lesser protection to
impress upon the Trade Representative arguments for a position that
might provide a more appropriate scope of domestic protection but
extract less revenue for U.S. producers abroad. 4 And arguments
grounded in considerations other than trade, such as privacy or free
speech, are even less likely to carry weight. Yet such trade-blinkered
positions may easily become the position of the United States in in-
ternational litigation.lss
122 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 282 (noting that "[t]here will be
continuing issues on how states will choose which practices to challenge, which cases to
use as vehicles for these challenges, and which states to sue").
123 Many copyright scholars would disagree with the contention, but it is clearly
one that would have some appeal to the U.S. Trade Representative. Indeed, the ap-
proach of the U.S. Trade Representative to balanced limits on software protection in
other countries confirms this assumption. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, RESULTS OF SPECIAL 301 ANNUAL REvIEW (1999) (assessing proposed
reforms in Australia and the Philippines).
124 Some scholars have suggested that the appropriate balance between protection
and public access pursued in the domestic context might be replicated in the interna-
tional arena by the contest between the developed and developing countries. SeeJ.H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement,
29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 25-26 (1997) (noting parallels between search for bal-
ance of protection and competition in both domestic and international spheres). To
be sure, unbalanced positions will not go unchallenged by countries whose practices
are questioned. But the mere resistance to such positions in adversarial proceedings
does not alter the effect that this mindset will have on the content and direction of
VWTO cases.
125 The decision of the WTO Appellate Body, see United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, I 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body, Oct.
12, 1998), reprinted in 8 WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT DECISIONS 301, 333 (1998) (inter-
preting Article 13 of the DSU), permitting panels to accept amicus briefs and other
submissions by interested persons other than governments, will help to ensure that a
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Moreover, the types of countries that are parties to INTO litigation
may, as in all systems of common law lawmaking, affect the way in
which the law is developed. The alignment of parties in TRIPS cases
to date has resulted in greater opportunity for developed countries to
be heard as parties, in part because only developed countries were re-
quired immediately to be in compliance with TRIPS."" Developing
countries were afforded the benefit of transitional periods with re-
spect to most (though not all)' 7 obligations under TRIPS. Develop-
ing countries could, of course, immediately bring actions as com-
plainants against developed countries; but these suits have not
happened in part because of the more mature state of intellectual
property laws in the developed world, and in part because of the re-
sources involved in pursuing a claim.'2
But this party alignment has also, because of current panel com-
position procedures, resulted in greater developing country represen-
tation on panels. Nationals of disputant countries generally do not sit
in cases involving their own country;'2 the effect of this provision has
been particularly significant because the involvement of the EU as a
party has been construed as excluding panelists from any EU member
state.'" Either of these variables, party alignment or panel composi-
broader range of views are included within the process. But strict standing rules per-
sist in narrowing, and skewing, the range of arguments that will be presented (and the
range of interests represented) in the first place. See DSU art. 4 (11) (outlining the role
of third party member states in consultations); id. art. 10(2) (delineating the role of
third party member states in proceedings before the panel); id. art. 17(4) (permitting
participation of third party member states before the appellate body, but without a
right of appeal to that body).
12,. See TRIPS Agreement, arts. 65-66 (providing different moratoria and grace pe-
riods for different groups of TRIPS countries).
127 See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
NN'T/DS50/AB/R (NITO Appellate Body, Dec. 19, 1997) (interpreting article 70.8 of
the TRIPS Agreement and finding India to be in noncompliance notwithstanding the
transitional periods applicable to full patent obligations), at http://ww.wto.org.
UI Indeed, the developing countries have asked, as part of the ministerial review of
the NTO system, that additional resources be made available to assist in the prosecu-
tion of claims. The DSU currently provides developing countries with legal assistance
from the UTO Secretariat, see DSU art. 27(2); proposals from developing countries
have focused on enlarging the Secretariat to increase that assistance. See Van der
Borght, supra note 101, at 1230-32 (underscoring that developing countries often lack
the experience or resources to pursue their claims effectively).
12" See DSU art. 8(3) (providing that nationals of parties should not be appointed
to a panel unless the parties agree); cf. id. art. 8(10) (allowing developing countries
litigating against developed country to request that at least one of the panelists before
whom they appear will be from a developing country).
IV, This was anticipated in a foomote to the text of the DSU. See DSU art. 8(3) n.6
("In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute, the
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tion, may affect the decisional direction of WTO TRIPS jurispru-
dence.13
ii. In the Resolution of Disputes
Copyright law implicates more than trade. To varying degrees in
different countries, copyright is seen also as an instrument of national
cultural policy, a protection of personal identity, and a means by
which to enhance and further democratic ideals. 32 Yet, issues before
WTO panels will be largely (and possibly exclusively) refracted
through a trade prism. The philosophical perspectives of WTO panel
members,5 5 the institutional objectives of the trade body by which
they are appointed, and the purposes of the trade treaty that they in-
terpret, are each likely to alter the nature of WTO copyright discourse
and the results that follow. TM Although some scholars have raised
[exclusion of panelists from such parties] applies to citizens of all member countries of
the customs unions or common markets.").
131 The EU has proposed that the ad hoc panels be replaced by a standing body,
not unlike the Appellate Body, comprised of between fifteen and twenty-four mem-
bers. On the basis of a rotation mechanism, the Panel Body would itself form a cham-
ber of three to deal with each new case as it arose. SeeVan der Borght, supra note 101,
at 1240 (quoting the terms of the EU proposal to create a rotating panel body).
13 See STEWART, supra note 23, at 4-12 (discussing varied justifications for copyright
in countries with differing political systems); David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of
Harm in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'v (U.S.A.) 421, 427 (1982-1983) ("Copyright ... is intended to support a sys-
tem.., in which authors and publishers compete for the attention and favor of the
public, independent of the political will of the majority, the powerful, and above all
the government, no matter how unorthodox, disturbing, or revolutionary their experi-
ence, views or visions."); Netanel, supra note 72, at 455-58 (noting that Berne's aim of
ensuring high levels of protection "has been tempered by a long tradition of limiting
authors' rights where necessary to further education and the free flow of informa-
tion").
133 Fred Abbott suggests that international officials with a background in intellec-
tual property law have a history of skeptical public policy analysis of intellectual prop-
erty rights while trade specialists do not have that background. Abbott, supra note 10,
at 675-76. Although those appointed to TRIPS panels are likely to be experts in the
intellectual property field, the standing Appellate Body (which is intended to provide
some continuity and consistency in the WTO system) will not necessarily possess com-
parable knowledge. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 322 (discussing the
composition of the dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body respectively).
See generally Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L. ECON. L. 295, 300 (1996) (arguing
that if the wro "forces countries to reform their laws so as to exalt the value of free
trade over other values, the empirical legitimacy of national laws could be eroded");
Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 658 (1996) (warning that
overemphasis on free trade, without consideration of other national and societal values
may undermine support for the international trade regime).
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
creative (and plausible) arguments as to how W7O panels might jus-
tify reference to the broader objectives of copyright law through vari-
ous interpretive devices of the Vienna Convention, 3 the text of TRIPS
and the institutional structure of the WTO provide little comfort that
broader visions of the role of copyright law in contemporary society
will be considered. International copyright law might thus develop
without reference to the full set of values that inform its development
in national courts throughout the world."'
While the legitimacy of WATO panel decisions rests upon not ad-
dressing matters outside the trade agreement to be interpreted, and
thus upon confining the panels' legal jurisdiction to their competence
in trade issues, copyright does receive affirmative treatment in TRIPS.
WTO panels, therefore, may consider some copyright values without
exceeding their jurisdiction. This is different from panels faced with
the choice of balancing trade with environmental or labor values, for
the policies underlying the latter receive no expression in the
GATT. 137 Despite this, however, TRIPS remains an incomplete picture
of copyright values into which neighboring trade values (and not oth-
ers) will bleed with some influence upon the color of analysis.'3
) ,: See Helfer, supra note 1, at 360 (arguing that dispute settlement panels will find
better solutions by looking to international courts and tribunals rather than by looking
solely within the WTO); Netanel, supra note 72, at 497 (arguing that "[e]specially after
[the conclusion of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, INTO panels] cannot see copyright
simply in terms of comparative economic advantage and world trade").
This is particularly problematic if a proper social balance of incentive and ac-
cess is calibrated by reference to principles strictly situated outside the confines of
copyright proper. See Lucie Guibault, Limitations Found Outside Copyright Law, in THE
BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 69, at 42 (noting limits on copyright imposed
by consumer protection law, competition law, and constitutional free speech con-
cerns). Because copyright issues are increasingly likely to arise in connection with mat-
ters wholly outside the panels' competence or jurisdiction-such as competition law,
principles of freedom of expression, and issues of privacy--the trade-centric nature of
the NITO'sjurisdiction may become even more troubling. See Paul Edward Geller, In-
tellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlementi, 29 INT'L
LAW. 99, 115 (1995) (expressing concern over the trade orientation of TRIPS panels in
light of the fact that intellectual property "will increasingly develop and be exploited
worldwide within telecommunications networks").
.N See Trachtman, supra note 40, at 364-67 (suggesting ways in which WTO panels
might approach the trade/environment interaction).
m Other principles could only be brought in through another interpretive device
found in Article 3(2) of the DSU. See DSU art. 3(2) (affirming that dispute settlement
is intended "to preserve the rights and obligations of [m]embers under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law"). These rules of
interpretation are found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and in-
clude principles of customary international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
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d. Premature Entrenchment of Fundamental Norms
Although this Article explores ways to address the concern that
public international lawmaking is an unwieldy process which does not
easily address new technological issues, it may be that public interna-
tional copyright lawmaking is inherently and appropriately limited in
this regard. As I suggest in Part III, the solution may partially lie out-
side of the public international lawmaking process. Several further
critiques of using WTO panels to supply the missing elements of effec-
tive internationalization reinforce such a conclusion. These critiques
flow from the fear that, notwithstanding the lack of formal adherence
to stare decisis, 39 dynamic panel interpretation of new technological
issues may prematurely entrench a particular rule of copyright law as a
Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (providing rules for the in-
terpretation of treaties). Treaties, such as those administered by the WIPO, can be
used to evidence an emerging norm of customary international law. It is upon this
provision that Neil Netanel carefully constructs his argument for a broader perspective
in WTO copyright litigation. See Netanel, supra note 72, at 475-79 (concluding that
free speech values must be considered by WTO panels when evaluating copyright dis-
putes since such values are part of customary international law).
139 The GATT system never treated the decisions of GATT panels as binding
precedent and that has carried over into the WrO system, notwithstanding the move
from a diplomatic to adjudicatory model. See Chua, supra note 101, at 171 (analyzing
the legal effect of panel decisions); Geuze & Wager, supra note 97, at 351 (discussing
the precedential effect of the first TRIPS panel and Appellate Body Report). The Ap-
pellate Body of the WTO has thus far declined to treat panel decisions as binding
precedent; it has noted only that because earlier decisions create "legitimate expecta-
tions among WTO Members" they should be taken into account when relevant to later
disputes. See WTO Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, VrT/DS8/
AB/R, WT/DSlO/AB/R, WT/DSll/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996), 1 WTO Dispute Settlement
Decisions 193 (discussing whether the adoption of a panel report should be treated as
subsequent practice, defined by the Appellate Body as "a 'concordant, common and
consistent' sequence of acts or pronouncements ... sufficient to establish a discernible
pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"), available
at http://www.wto.org. Even without the formal status of precedent, however, it is
clear both that decisions will serve as persuasive authority before subsequent panels
and the Appellate Body and that states will feel pressure to follow decisions on like is-
sues lest a parallel complaint is filed against them. If a state decides to disregard a
prior dispute settlement body ruling on a similar issue, it is more likely to be in the be-
lief that no other country will file a complaint or that any sanctions that it might suffer
are a cost worth bearing rather than that the prior ruling is unpersuasive. For a thor-
ough discussion of whether Appellate Body adjudications are binding precedent and
whether a system of stare decisis does in fact operate before the WTO, see Raj Bhala,
The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WVTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL. 1 (1999). Bhala contends that "[a]bnegation of stare decisis in
international trade law is foolish," and concludes that the "WTO Appellate Body be-
haves very much like a high court (or the highest court) in a common law jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 2, 4; see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845 (1999) (discussing the role of
stare decisis in international trade).
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
fundamental (and hence mandatory) norm of international copy-
right. Indeed, the unwieldy nature of the treaty revision process re-
quired in order to reverse such a decision only exacerbates this con-
14t1
sequence.
i. Erosion of Appropriate National Autonomy
Because a decision of the DSB has the practical effect of articulat-
ing a rule of public international law, it effectively circumscribes na-
tional lawmaking options on the issue addressed. It embeds the pre-
ferred policy choice as a fundamental norm of international copyright
law and may preempt national efforts to develop copyright policies tai-
lored to particular social, cultural, and economic conditions. Of
course, DSB determinations do not of themselves directly affect na-
tional copyright law and policy because signatory states retain their
sovereign power to decide whether to conform their law to the inter-
national standard or to adhere to a different, indigenous approach.1
4
1
The latter choice, however, carries with it the risk of significant trade
sanctions.
While classical public international lawmaking established a
minimum threshold based upon the common copyright experience of
a range of diverse states, it consciously reserved for national determi-
nation those issues upon which experience demonstrated divergent
national priorities. The rush to force commonality on new copyright
standards-understandable for the reasons canvassed in Part I of this
Article-prevents appropriate assessment by member states of the
need for distinctive national policies. For example, different coun-
tries with varying educational practices and literacy rates may permit
or prohibit quite different copying practices. The manner in which
authors are compensated may differ from country to country depend-
ing upon established labor and employment practices. The ways in
which works are exploited, and thus need to be protected, may hinge
upon social customs unique to particular countries. The extent of
reasonable copying privileges may reflect the level of access to public
libraries. Commitments to free expression, and hence use of a work
in that cause without the need for permission, may vary in intensity
14 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98; see also Thomas Cottier, Remarks at the
Review of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding. Which Way?, 1 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 447, 464-65 (1999) (noting that the "cumbersome" nature of the process of in-
ternational negotiation eliminates any real legislative check on judicial power).
1 See Palmeter, supra note 109, at 89-91 (arguing that the possibility of being sued
before the WXTO does not diminish a nation's sovereignty).
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depending upon the political development of the society in ques-
tion. Unqualified respect for the integrity of artistic works might be
affected by different notions of property. And market mechanisms
necessary to support schemes for compensating authors might be
more feasible in certain cultures than in others.
To be sure, these are the tough cases. They force us to consider
under what circumstances we are willing to tolerate different national
copyright laws, and on which occasions it is more important that in-
ternational standards are observed. It may be that, for the reasons
discussed in Part I, international uniformity must now weigh more
heavily in the equation. And because of cultural convergence across
countries, nationally delimited copyright laws may carry less normative
force as an instrument of cultural policy. In other words, in a world
where culture is less nationally driven, national solutions may have lost
some of their appeal. This claim would, however, be contested by
those who view globalization as enhancing the need to assert distinc-
tive and autonomous national cultural policies. 4 3 At the very least,
premature abnegation of the means by which nations make this de-
termination is unhelpful. In addition to muffling cultural diversity,
precipitous, mandatory, universal rules, possibly produced with input
from only two litigating countries, might frustrate basic compliance
with international standards.144
ii. Foreclosing the Laboratory Role of Nations
The development of alternative national policies also serves an
important role in the international lawmaking process. Different na-
tional approaches to novel issues function as helpful experiments in
designing a new international standard. For the reasons identified in
142 Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (finding flag burning to be
speech protected by the First Amendment) with Hong Kong Special Admin. Region v.
Ng Kung Siu, FACC No. 4 of 1999 (Dec. 15, 1999), http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/
guide2cs/html/cfa/udmt/facc_4_99.htm (upholding a conviction for defacing a flag
based upon the newness of the "one country two system" principle, reasoning that at
this stage in Hong Kong's history this was a restriction necessary to preserve legitimate
social interests and thus consistent with Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).
143 See, e.g., Satvinder S. Juss, Book Review, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 371, 380
(1998) ("The very factors that cause a sense of borderlessness also force communities
to look inwardly and determine what control they retain over their destinies.").
144 Cf Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 306-07 ("Setting a worldwide stan-
dard on [fair use] would.., reduce flexibility and produce a kind of cultural homog-
enization that might either induce noncompliance or turn the world into a much less
stimulating environment.").
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Part I, at some point the different experiments should ideally con-
verge toward common understandings (and the need for this has ar-
guably become more urgent). But experimentation enables the
common understanding (the international standard) to be forged by
experience, which should assist in identifying an appropriate stan-
dard. Copyright-rich countries are obviously reluctant to allow na-
tional experimentation with different levels of protection before
bringing the issue to an international arena. By hastening the adop-
tion of an international norm through an assertive WTO (or any
other) process, however, an important benefit to the international
lawmaking process is forfeited.
iii. Problems of TRIPS Interpretation
TRIPS presents an interpretive challenge with which domestic
courts faced with new copyright issues are not confronted: it does not
purport to state ideal standards or principles from which a panel
might develop new rules. It merely imposes a set of minimum stan-
dards. We have had no experience in copyright law of imbuing mini-
mum standards with enforceable meaning, because prior to the TRIPS
Agreement, there was no effective means of enforcement. This may
affect in several ways the capacity of the WTO dispute settlement pan-
els to accomplish the international lawmaking that some might wish.
First, do the usual devices that courts use to interpret legislative text
work in this arena? Given that the stated standards are not intended
to operate as the most efficient or most balanced, or optimal rule,
what weight is to be given to methods of reasoning that are informed
by those values?"5 Of course, the minimum standards approach em-
bodied in TRIPS, as in the Berne Convention before it, does not re-
flect a desire to promote suboptimal rules of copyright law. Rather,
the varied social, cultural, and economic conditions of different coun-
145 Copyright law is frequently analyzed by reference to economic efficiency. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989) (discussing "to what extent copyright law can be
explained as a means for promoting efficient allocation of resources"). More specifi-
cally, it is often calibrated by reference to the optimal balance between incentive and
access. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial
Law Collide, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1686 (1996) ("[C]opyright law attempts to strike
a balance, promoting economic efficiency when it maximizes the benefits from the
creation of new works minus the losses from limited access and enforcement costs.");
see also Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (canvassing
different considerations that determine the appropriate scope of copyright protec-
tion).
20001
516 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:469
tries may require deviations from a single standard; the whole notion
of an "optimal" law is politically, culturally, and economically contin-
gent.146 If we wished to divine from TRIPS a universal optimal rule of
copyright law, we would have to assess those contingencies in a global
context. This interpretive dilemma merely confirms TRIPS' properly
more limited role: it does not announce, and does not of itself pro-
vide the grounding for, universal rules of copyright law.
Second, the approach of articulating minimum standards of pro-
tection and permitting any higher (but not lower) level of protection
means that TRIPS 47 (properly interpreted) has very little to say in ad-
dressing the most contested issues presented by current technology.
The predominant national approach to digital copyright issues
throughout the world has been to classify most acts by users as within
the prima facie exclusive control of the copyright owner, and then to
create a proper balance by enacting exceptions and limitations to that
general principle. Yet, international copyright treaties rarely ad-
dress exceptions and limitations on the rights of an owner"' other
14 See Harms Ullrich, GA7TT Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Develop-
ment in GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY 127, 146-59 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1989) (discussing the dangers of identical protection in differently situated countries).
147 This is true of any current global multinational copyright treaty, for each adopts
the minimum standards approach. The EU Directives, in contrast, do contain substan-
tive maxima, that is, mandatory exceptions to, or limits on, copyright. See, e.g., Soft-
ware Directive, supra note 84, art. 6 (creating a decompilation exception); Common
Position Adopted by the Council with a View to the Adoption of a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 5(1) (Sept. 14, 2000), at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/00/st9/09512enO.pdf [hereinafter Pro-
posed Information Society Directive Common Position] (requiring exceptions from
scope of copyright for certain temporary acts of reproduction with no independent
economic significance).
148 This is implicit in most recent legislative enactments. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512
(Supp. IV 1998) (providing safe harbors for service providers); Proposed Information
Society Directive Common Position, supra note 147, art. 2 (requiring that member
states provide authors "the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit direct or indirect,
temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in
part").
1 The Berne Convention does include various provisions delineating permissible
exceptions to the exclusive rights of an author. See Berne Convention, supra note 15,
art. 10, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 38 (permitting quotations and use of literary and artistic
works by way of illustration for teaching purposes, provided that such quotation or use
is compatible with fair practice); id. art. 10bis, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 38 (allowing exceptions
for the reporting of current economic, political, or religious events). The Convention
also permits, but does not require, certain compulsory licenses. See, e.g., id. art.
1I bis(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 38 (permitting member states to subject the broadcast right
to a compulsory license); id. art. 13(1), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 39 (permitting member states
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than to the extent that they are not allowed.'50 Exceptions and limita-
tions are areas where national autonomy has heretofore been given
relatively free rein.'51 This might have been justified when those ex-
ceptions were truly expressions of national cultural policy.' 2 But
where exceptions become as integral to the balance of copyright as
they must be when broad prima facie protection is conferred, greater
internationalization must be pursued than can be provided by mini-
mum standards. In the interim, this confirms that TRIPS would pro-
vide little basis upon which WTO panels could extract and develop a
useful approach to new technological issues.
Third, and again made important by the likely emphasis on ex-
ceptions and limitations in the digital environment, WTO panels are
ill-equipped to develop nuanced solutions or finely tuned balances of
the rights and privileges of producers and users. Formally, since WTO
complaints will be based upon legislative deficiencies or (possibly) a
collection of case law revealing a pattern of nonenforcement, the
IVTO panel often will not decide particular factual disputes, but
rather assess abstract rules of law. The calibration of exceptions (such
as fair use) is a notoriously fact-specific exercise. Although the extent
to which breaches of obligation based upon national court decisions
to allow third parties a compulsory license to record musical works previously re-
corded).
See TRIPS Agreement art. 13 ("Members shall confine limitations or exceptions
to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder."); Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 9(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 37 (permitting
legislatures to enact exceptions permitting certain reproductions of literary and artistic
works).
ill See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the generous room
granted member states to create exceptions to copyright under the Berne Conven-
tion).
"I" See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 306 (arguing against worldwide
standards on fair use because "[t]he extent to which fair use is considered necessary
depends upon fundamental national values such as the importance and extent of free
speech, on artistic traditions, and on aesthetic sensibilities"); Ginsburg, supra note 55,
at 3, 23 (commenting that "exceptions to copyright present a more difficult, but po-
tentially persuasive, case" for reservation to national norms, and concluding that
"[s]everal considerations . . . point toward discrete territorial application of local
norms limiting copyright, even for digital transmissions").
)' It is perhaps unsurprising that two of the first four TRIPS reports handed down
by the WTO dispute settlement panels, including the only copyright dispute upon
which a report has been issued to date, involve exceptions to intellectual property
rights. See WTO DSB Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
Doc. No. WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000); WTO DSB Panel, Canada-Patent Protection
of Pharmaceutical Products, Doc. Nr/DS14/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
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will require a pattern of activity remains unclear,"" WTO panels will
not be presented with cases in a fashion that permits development of
international standards regarding the scope of exceptions to copy-
right because WTO dispute settlement proceedings will likely focus on
a state's systematic failure to uphold its obligations.
In sum, these final critiques suggest that WTO panels should not
actively develop international standards beyond those clearly pre-
sented in the TRIPS text.5 5 The nature of the TRIPS Agreement, and
the posture of the cases with which they will be confronted, means
that panels are poorly equipped to do so. Moreover, such efforts
would adversely affect the role of national autonomy in recognizing
cultural differences and adopting fully tested approaches as interna-
tional standards.
D. Rejecting Internationalization?
These last observations regarding the WTO dispute settlement
process suggest that there is a danger in overemphasizing the need for
154 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 282 (noting that "[t]here will be
continuing issues on how states will choose which practices to challenge"); cf. WTO
DSB Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTYDS160/R
(June 15, 2000), at 1 6.138-.144 (looking at the practices of a "vast majority" of U.S.
courts as evidence of the meaning of the statutory provision and declining to consider
how analysis of U.S. TRIPS compliance might be affected were, as the EU hypothe-
sized, a series of U.S. courts to adopt generous interpretations of the statutory Ian-
guage), at http://www.wto.org.
My critique of an aggressive use of WTO panels should not be taken as a lack of
support for strict enforcement of the substantive copyright obligations clearly under-
taken by TRIPS signatories. The availability of WT'O dispute settlement procedures
and the concomitant enforcement mechanisms has transformed international intellec-
tual property law in important and generally beneficial ways. I view the obligations of
TRIPS as setting external boundaries (both floors and, ideally in the future, ceilings)
for permissible copyright protection, within which member states have latitude to de-
velop indigenous approaches to copyright. These boundaries would converge over
time as consensus develops on fundamental norms of contemporary copyright law.
Public international law should represent the rough filter in a process of internation-
alization. The finer filter, as I argue below in Part III, should be the process of private
international copyright lawmaking. This process should facilitate more nuanced solu-
tions that will generate the common understanding necessary for later implementation
as public international law standards. This approach allows room for initial experi-
mentation. It also reflects concerns about the legitimacy of the WTO process; if a
broad consensus has developed on an issue, that consensus will serve as a surrogate for
the ideal representational state that might otherwise support more intrusive wTo
lawmaking. The forms of private international lawmaking discussed in Part III, with
their more direct tie to political and democratic legitimacy and their susceptibility to
prompt legislative reversal, have a much stronger claim to immediate application over
the lives of global citizens.
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internationalization, or at least a danger in seeking to internationalize
too promptly. Yet, at times the current trend to harmonize national
copyright laws seems inexorable. Even if the substance of particular
initiatives has been questioned, the process has been largely welcomed
as an important means of nourishing the political and economic glob-
alization to which law increasingly has become servant.
Dissenting voices have been raised, however, both by scholars of
copyright law and those in other disciplines. The copyright scholars
in question have largely bemoaned the process as being subverted to
what they view as narrow economic ends.157 Other legal scholars have
launched more direct attacks on the current processes of internation-
alization. Paul Stephan, for example, has expressed skepticism as to
whether unification and harmonization of international commercial
law is necessary or helpful. ' " Stephan's indictment of the process
arises from observations of international commercial law (in the form
of model laws and conventions), which he criticizes as producing ei-
ther open-ended rules that confer unfettered discretion on domestic
decisionmakers, or precise rules that benefit discrete interest
159
groups.
Stephan's first criticism, of futility, is an important one. But, even
151 The process of globalization itself has been the subject of significant criticisms
by scholars in other fields of intellectual inquiry and by popular commentators. See
generally WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997) (analyzing the "global industrial revolution" of the late
twentieth century and concluding that the logic of commerce and capital was over-
whelming consideration of the consequences of this "revolution"); MIcHAEL P. RYAN,
KNOIALEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1998) (discussing the political development of international intellectual
property law and policy).
7 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property
Rights or Cultural Progress? 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 118 (1998) (arguing that
international harmonization "has brought distinct change to U.S. law in ways contrary
to the fundamental purposes of copyright law and its social objectives"); Jaszi, supra
note 22, at 598-99 (complaining that arguments grounded in "traditional visions" of
copyright were being ignored by Congress and that TRIPS-implementing legislation
was instead animated by a new vision of copyright, namely "to improve the competitive
position of companies that have significant investments in inventories of copyrighted
works").
Stephan, supra note 14, at 744.
See id. at 767-68 (detecting the "fingerprints" of special interests on precise rules
regarding sea transport); id. at 774-79 (suggesting that the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods contains rules that "allow virtually unbounded discretion to the
decisionmaker who must apply them"). Stephan attributes the flaws in the products of
these gatherings of experts in international and comparative law to the "inherent limi-
tations in the process that generates international agreements for national implemen-
tation." Id. at 744.
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baseline rules are transgressed-a series of negotiated settlements of
copyright TRIPS disputes bears witness to such transgressions."' And
copyright is, for many countries, a more recent legal innovation than
such notions as contracts of sale. Even the general, basic norms con-
tained in treaties emanating from the classical public international
copyright lawmaking process may be of significant effect as countries
construct copyright laws for the first time."' Stephan's second criti-
cism-that precise rules emanating from the international lawmaking
process benefit discrete interest groups-is also serious, though the
extent to which such a phenomenon differs from that at play in de-
veloping national legislation is not entirely clear.' 6
As we engage in international copyright lawmaking, futility and
rent-seeking are certainly criticisms that should be borne in mind,
along with concern for national autonomy, the role of national laws in
developing international standards, and accommodating the diverse
range of interests now affected by copyright. The concerns noted ear-
lier in this Article-namely, the costs of insufficient protection inter-
nationally and the need for copyright law to address new technologi-
cal issues-are, however, also important. Therefore, the limits of the
public international lawmaking process should not constrain our
search for other means of internationalizing copyright law. 6 ' Having
160 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESULTS OF SPECIAL
301 ANNUAL REVIEw (1999) (discussing settlement of disputes with Sweden and Den-
mark).
161 Blatant violation of uncontested norms may happen not only in countries with-
out established copyright regimes but also in countries where short-term domestic po-
litical pressures make this an attractive option. Indeed, the availability of TRIPS dis-
pute resolution may paradoxically embolden national legislators under pressure to
succumb to the short-term arguments with the knowledge that the long-term position
will be rectified by the WTO.
162 Paul Stephan himself has considered that question. See Paul B. Stephan, Ac-
countability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT'L L.
& BuS. 681, 682-83 (1996-1997) (considering differences in accountability between in-
ternational and national lawmakers). He consciously draws on earlier work by Robert
Scott and Alan Schwartz in the domestic context of the drafting of the UCC. See Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Pivate Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 595, 597 (1995) (examining "how large private law-making groups" work); Robert
E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1803-22 (1994) (suggesting that
"the U.C.C. lawmaking process functions like a private legislature").
163 Stephan's analysis, like this Article, seeks to go beyond traditional models and
considers the recent spate of activity in international "private legislatures." See
Stephan, supra note 14, at 756-57. For the reasons mentioned in the text, Stephan
questions whether these bodies can add to the process of creating international com-
mercial law. See id. at 761 (doubting the value of past efforts to achieve unification and
harmonization).
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suggested desirable and inevitable limits on the capacity of public in-
ternational models, either classical or new, to serve as the sole mecha-
nism of international copyright lawmaking, I next consider whether
private law alternatives might contribute to that process.
III. PRrATE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAWMAKING
Further progress toward the formulation of international norms
might be possible, without implicating as directly the problems posed
V4 Stephan's solution to what he sees as the futility of harmonization as an instru-
ment of international lawmaking is instructive. He would encourage parties contrac-
tually to agree upon a national law to govern their international commercial transac-
tion (and reduce the policing of such choices by courts). See id. at 789. And there may
be good, practical reasons for greater deference to choice of law clauses in interna-
tional transactions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187, cmt. f
(1971) (suggesting that greater latitude be afforded parties' choices of law in the in-
ternational context). Thus, in common with my proposal in Part III below, Stephan is
willing to involve private parties more fully in responding to the pressures of interna-
tionalization. But he repudiates the goal of international standards, instead preferring
to facilitate international commerce by contractual localization. Other scholars have
also sought to elevate party autonomy as a means of addressing the increasingly large
volume of conflicts problems. See, e.g., Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics
to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1151 (2000). O'Hara and Ribstein draw
heavily upon arguments of jurisdictional competition. To be sure, there may be sig-
nificant efficiency gains to be garnered by recognizing party autonomy, so that only
minimal policing of choice of law clauses might be warranted. Indeed, to some extent,
my discussion below of the potential of international copyright arbitration is based
upon relatively unquestioned enforcement of forum (i.e., arbitral tribunal) selection
clauses and choice of law (lex informatica) clauses. But the nature of copyright prevents
overreliance on this device for resolving copyright conflicts. Arguments based upon
competitive markets (or state experiments, depending upon how one justifies this ap-
proach) are persuasive only if the effects of state choices as to the content of law can
be confined to that state. One can assess the effects of experiments only if external
variables are controlled and all "background noise" is filtered out. See Bledsoe v. Crow-
ley, 849 F.2d 639, 646-47 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Williams, J., concurring) (considering the
systemic interests of states' experimentation as part of choice of law analysis). If State
A relied on a wholly free market system, rather than copyright, to generate new crea-
tive endeavors sufficient to keep its citizenry educated and informed, the effect of that
choice cannot be measured if the citizenry can easily, and does in fact, obtain access to
information from other states pursuing different information policies. Similarly, State
A's choice will, by virtue of the nature of intangible works, infect other states' experi-
ments. For example, if State A relied on the free market, producers in State B would
suffer widespread infringement and uncompensated use in State B as a result of the
laws in State A. Consequently, the producer in State B would have to raise its prices for
reasons unrelated to the content of laws in State B. Cf. William W. Bratton &Joseph A.
McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 219-43 (1997) (discussing limits of competitive fed-
eralism model). Thus, although recognition of party autonomy may assist in develop-
ing a lex informatica through international arbitration, such choices may warrant some
policing in part because of their inability to generate the gains claimed.
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by public international lawmaking, if the articulation of those norms
took a different form. In particular, in this Part of the Article, I con-
sider two private law mechanisms that might contribute to the interna-
tional copyright lawmaking process: copyright arbitration using in-
ternational norms, and the adoption of a new choice of law method-
the substantive law method-by courts deciding international copy-
right infringement cases.
A. International Copyright Arbitration
In international commerce, parties frequently agree to submit
disputes to arbitration. In that context, arbitrators may decide cases
(and parties may argue cases) according to the customs and standards
of international commerce rather than the norms of any national le-
gal system. Parties may in their contract expressly reference these
standards as applicable to any dispute under the contract, but these
standards may also inform decisions when the parties make no con-
tractual provision for choice of a national law. 65 These standards,
known as lex mercatoria, are accepted by many participants in interna-
tional commerce and, though developed by private law adjudication,
contribute to the recognition and development of norms of interna-
tional commerce. Could the arbitration of international copyright
disputes, by reference not to national copyright laws but to a version
of the lex mercatoria, enable the recognition and development of inter-
national copyright norms? Some authors believe that this is at least
possible, or even advisable, in the particular context of the internet,
where a lex informatica might prevail.'66
Several variables affect the likelihood that this might occur,
165 See Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM.J. COmP. L. 129, 145-46 (1998) (noting the
possibility of applying lex mercatoria "'when the parties have not chosen any system or
rules of law to govern their contract'" (quoting OLE LANDO & HUGH BEALE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CoNTRACr LAw Art. 1.01 (3) (b) (1995))). In practice, it may
also occur when parties have selected an applicable law. See id. at 140-42 (detailing the
application of lex mercatoria principles in a Dutch-Turkish arbitration specifying Dutch
law (unpublished ICC-Award No. 8486 of 1996)).
1% See, e.g., Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 223-37 (1997) (examining the possibility of a lex in-
formatica developing for the internet); see also I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime
for "Cyberspace", 55 U. Prr. L. REv. 993, 1019-25 (1994) (discussing the parallels be-
tween Law Merchant and rules governing in cyberspace); David R. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387-91
(1996) (discussing the rise of a separate law of cyberspace).
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whether in the internet context or offline. 67 First, in the past, arbitra-
tion between private parties of a claim of copyright infringement has
rarely occurred. Disputes may come before arbitration tribunals in
two ways: by ad hoc submission to arbitration after a dispute arises, or
by enforcement of an ex ante contractual arrangement. Ad hoc sub-
mission of a copyright dispute to arbitration will rarely occur in in-
fringement cases absent, perhaps, the desire for a continuing relation-
ship between the parties."' Facilities such as the WIPO Arbitration
Center, which offer copyright arbitration expertise, have thus been
somewhat underused. Contractually agreed arbitration of copyright
infringement claims has also been rare. Traditional copyright litiga-
tion can be divided into three basic types: actions by copyright owners
against pirates; actions by copyright owners against legitimate com-
petitors (and, increasingly, assertive users); and, copyright owners in
disputes with co-exploiters or putative co-owners. This third setting is
essentially a contract dispute which could be litigated as a copyright
complaint if framed as owner-privileged conduct occurring without
authorization. It is here that arbitration could be most significant in
the traditional bricks-and-mortar context, because it is only in this set-
ting that ex ante contractual arrangements are likely to be in place.
Second, it is unclear what effect private arbitration of copyright
disputes might have upon setting the boundaries of cultural or social
policy. Arbitration need not be public; indeed, one of the advantages
it may offer participants is secrecy. In order for the lex mercatoria to
assist in the development of the norms of international commercial
conduct, in addition to providing a basis for adjudication of disputes,
it must cast a discernible shadow over relevant actors. International
10 Various private efforts at articulating standards of international commercial law
can be identified. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, UNLDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORD. L. REV. 281, 282 (1994).
Some scholars have recently sought to develop an international copyright code. See,
e.g., J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPraIGHT LAw 709-11 (1998) (suggesting that policy-
makers move toward a "unified global system of copyright"); JAL. Sterling, Interna-
tional Codification of Copyright Law. Possibilities and Imperatives, Paper Presented to
Eighth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy,
Fordham University School of Law (April 2000) (copy on file with author) (exploring
the possible content of a world copyright code). And the WIPO has developed a series
of model provisions that might provide guidance. Indeed, their use in this context
may have greater legitimacy than as purported interpretations of public international
obligations. See Cornish, supra note 77, at 337-38 (discussing the role of the WIPO in
interpreting treaties).
Arbitration involving copyright issues does, however, occur in the regulatory
context of establishing royalty rates under compulsory licenses. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-
803 (1994) (establishing Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels).
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commercial actors must be aware that their conduct will be judged by
the standards of the lex mercatoria. Its effect will also be enhanced by
the administration of proceedings by a repeat administrator, such as
the WIPO Arbitration Center, or the systematic publication of deci-
sions and reasoning. Until international copyright arbitration accord-
ing to norms of international conduct becomes frequent and public,
its potential for contributing to international lawmaking will be lim-
ited.
Finally, since the cases most likely to be arbitrated involve disputes
between co-exploiters or co-owners under agreements containing an
ex ante contractual arrangement of substantive obligations, as well as
selection of an arbitral forum, decisions rendered in such cases may
reflect the scope of private contractual understandings rather than
public-interest motivated rules of copyright law. Only if a significant
number of cases without substantive contractual overlay were arbi-
trated would such proceedings have the capacity to develop interna-
tional copyright policy.
In these different facets, one must distinguish between, on the
one hand, arbitration of copyright disputes and, on the other, the ar-
bitration of disputes between trademark holders and domain name
registrants under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Pol-
icy ("UDRP") recently implemented by domain name registrars
authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN").'69 The latter procedure has significant potential
for the creation of international trademark norms:'17  the domain
169 ICANN is the nonprofit corporation established in 1998 to oversee, inter alia,
the domain name management system. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, at http://www.icann.com. For the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy, see http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. ICANN is an-
other international organization that has been criticized for lack of transparency and
accountability and the organization continues to grapple with issues of representa-
tional and procedural legitimacy. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY,
DOMAIN NAME MANAGEMENT POIiCY (2000), available at http://www.cdLorg/
dns/icann/study (last visited Aug. 15, 2000) (studying the ICANN at large election and
raising issues of major concern); Jeri Clausing, The Internet's Naming Agency Agrees to
Modify Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, at C14 (discussing revised plans for direct
election of ICANN board members by individual net users); Jeri Clausing, What's in a
Name?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at C9 (discussing a report by two public interest
groups concluding that the proposed system for electing the ICANN board failed to
ensure accountability and risked being influenced by special interests).
170 The extent to which this is jeopardized by the enactment of arguably inconsis-
tent national protection, such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -552, recently enacted by the U.S.
Congress, is beyond the scope of this Article. Decisions of panels convened under the
UDRP are not binding on national courts. See BroadBridge Media L.L.C. v. Hy-
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name registration procedure provides an opportunity to impose obli-
gations to arbitrate; the decisions of arbitrators are published on the
ICANN web site;" and there exists, by virtue of U.S. government su-
perintendence of the internet, 72 a centralized mechanism-ICANN-




percd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1426, 1428-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the pendency
of an arbitration under the UDRP does not foreclose a concurrent court action under
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act); Weber-Stephen Prod. Co. v. Armit-
age Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766, 1768 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("We
conclude that this Court is not bound by the outcome of the ICANN administrative
proceedings."); see also INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS
(ICANN), UNIFORM DOMAIN NAMfE DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICv § 4(k), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-polic-24oct99.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2000)
(providing that panel decisions do not prevent the parties from pursuing lawsuits
against one another in national courts). Therefore, differences between national law
and the UDRP are likely to be exploited by litigants. And it is not yet clear from the
early arbitration panel opinions whether panels will regard the provisions of the UDRP
as self-contained or requiring regard to certain national laws under traditional choice
of law analysis. See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Rule
15(a), at http://wNw-w.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2000) ("A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and docu-
ments submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and
principles of law that it deems applicable."). Moreover, these tensions will only in-
crease if (and when) the UDRP is extended, either by ICANN mandate or expansive
arbitral interpretation, to more contentious issues. See Press Release, World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO), WIPO To Probe New Issues Relating to Domain
Name Abuse (July 10, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.org/eng/pressrel/
2000/p235.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2000) [hereinafter WrIPO Press Release] (an-
nouncing, at the request of various member states, a study of whether the scope of the
UDRP should be broadened to address cases such as those involving personal names of
celebrities or geographical indications of origin).
171 See The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, List of Proceed-
ings Under Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (2000), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/
proceedings-list.hun (last modified Nov. 10, 2000) (providing the text of all decisions
handed down by ICANN-approved dispute settlement providers under the UDRP).
For the text of the first decision handed down under the UDRP, see World Wrestling
Fed. Ent., Inc. v. Bosman, No. D99-0001 (Admin. Panel, Jan. 14, 2000), at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domalns/decisions/html (last visited Aug. 27, 2000). In the
first nine months of the UDRP, almost 2000 cases were filed with the dispute settle-
ment providers, the majority of which were arbitrated under the auspices of the WIPO
Arbitration Center. Before the implementation of the UDRP, the WIPO Arbitration
Center was almost unused. For an up-to-date statistical analysis of cases filed and de-
cided, see The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Statistical
Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (2000), at
http://ww .icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last modified Nov. 10, 2000).
172 This supervisory authority is rooted in practical power rather than legal author-
ity. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain
Name Case Study, 74 IND. LJ. 587 (1999) (explaining source of regulatory authority
over the internet).
176 The UDRP applies (by mandate of ICANN) to all disputes involving names reg-
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Although the domain name arbitration procedures present a
more probable context for the development of international norms
through private party arbitration, new technological means of deliver-
ing copyrighted products and the culture of a new copyright envi-
ronment '74 may enhance the likelihood of similar developments oc-
curring with respect to copyright disputes. If contract were ever
dead,' 75 the internet has given it a Lazarene revival. To be sure, the
widespread contractualization of copyright law raises many difficult
176 . . 177questions, but it may also present solutions and opportunities.
istered in the generic top level domains. These domain names can be owned by per-
sons throughout the world. Moreover, the UDRP has already been voluntarily adopted
by certain managers of country-code top-level domains, and the recently announced
WIPO review of the UDRP will likely encompass the extension of the UDRP to disputes
involving country-code top-level domains. See WIPO Press Release, supra note 170
(noting the request of certain member states for WIPO to "draw up a list of best prac-
tices to help administrators of country[-code] top level domain registries ... prevent
and resolve domain name disputes").
174 The culture of the online environment may include a significant commitment
to principles of visible community justice and less adversarial forms of dispute settle-
ment. See Ethan Katsh, Digital Laryers: Orienting the Legal Profession to Cyberspace, 55 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 1141, 1155 (1994) (comparing levels of conflict in exchanges of informa-
tion between lawyers online and offline). See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Reso-
lution in Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993) (discussing how ad-
aptation of contract law might deter potential and resolve actual disputes arising in the
"electronic network communities").
175 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974) ("We are told that
contract, like God, is dead. And so it is.").
176 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Authors as "Licensors" of "Informational Rights" Under U.C.C.
Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945 (1998) (addressing the possible clash between
copyright law and contract); Jessica Litman, The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY
TEcH. LJ. 931 (1998) (discussing the tension between contractual rights validated by
the proposed Article 2B of the UCC and current copyright law). Some scholars have
argued for an international treaty provision restricting the absolute freedom of con-
tract in copyright matters. See, e.g., Wilhelm Nordemann, Toward a Basic International
Regime of Copyright Contracts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 217, 221 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard
J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998) (advocating an international agreement restricting contrac-
tual derogation of authors' rights and guaranteeing authors certain rights of remu-
neration).
Arbitration has been most comfortably enforced with respect to matters contractu-
ally agreed upon between private parties; party autonomy is recognized as a dominant
consideration in the contractual setting. Arbitration of matters impinging upon "pub-
lic law regulation," such as private actions alleging securities fraud or tort claims such
as copyright infringement, has historically been more problematic. But the U.S. Su-
preme Court has for several years now appeared willing to give some latitude to the
notion of "disputes arising under the contract," and to treat that term as encompassing
traditional "public law issues," particularly when the dispute has an international com-
ponent. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-17 (1974) (upholding an
arbitration clause and stressing the international nature of the dispute in support of
that conclusion); cf ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LrIGATION AND THE
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Digital commerce may facilitate the use of standard form contracts
with arbitration clauses and U.S. courts thus far appear willing to en-
force forum selection clauses in standard click-on contracts.178
It is unclear whether content providers or other participants in
the information industries might be willing to subject themselves to,
and thus formally to recognize or generate, international norms by
submitting disputes to arbitration, either without specification of a
single national law or with conscious choice of international stan-
dards.' 5 It may depend upon the content of national copyright alter-
QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS: ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-5 (1996) (dis-
cussing this distinction in the context of the application of foreign law by national
courts).
177 For example, in the internet context, "all users (authors and infringers) are
connected by means of service provider agreements, [and] those agreements can re-
quire submission of disputes to arbitral tribunals that will apply the lex informatica."
Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 15 (citing Michel A. Jaccard, Securing Copyright in Transna-
tional Cyberspace: The Case For Contracting With Potential Infringers, 35 COLuM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 619 (1997)).
UA See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999) (holding that a forum selection clause contained within an electronic
membership contract to which customers must agree before they receive services, was
valid and binding). This trend may depend upon the extent to which the courts are
willing to monitor click-on contracts for adhesive or abusive aspects, but the trend in
U.S. law is to take a relatively unintrusive attitude to forum selection clauses, even in
consumer contracts. See Carniva Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)
(upholding forum selection clause in a standard form consumer contract where there
was no indication that the forum was chosen as a means of discouraging the pursuit of
legitimate claims or that the agreement had been obtained by fraud or overreaching);
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (holding that a forum selection
clause should be enforced unless the party seeking to set it aside can "clearly show that
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such
reasons as fraud or overreaching"). The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
July 1999, contains provisions on both forum selection and choice of law clauses. See
NAT'L CONE. OF COMM'R ON UNIF. ST. LAMWS, UNIFO1M COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 109-10 (regulating choice of law and forum selection clauses,
respectively), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blI/ulc/ucita/citalOst.htm. The
model Act, which is the remnant of the joint NCCUSL/ALI efforts to draft Article 2B
of the UCC, has recentiy been enacted by Virginia, the first state to do so. Under sec-
tion 110(a), "the parties in their agreement may choose an exclusive judicial forum
unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust." NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'R ON UNIF. ST.
Liws, UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 110 (a).
17', The extent to which arbitrators may be likely to dispense with the application of
a single national standard and, instead, apply international norms may also be affected
by considerations of affinity. Online arbitration of internet disputes may enable arbi-
trators to discard more easily their national allegiance. That is, to the extent that tri-
bunals have a tendency to do what comes naturally and apply their own law, cf. Erwin v.
Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 459-60 (1973) (describing application of lex fori in multistate
case as doing "what comes naturally"), that tendency may be repressed by the looser
national attachments that might come from the use of an international arbitration
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natives that develop, and the extent to which those national laws favor
content providers and can reach the conduct of potential defen-
dants.'80 The calculus will also be affected by whether courts permit
parties to provide contractually for rights not available under the de-
fault rules of copyright law.18 ' Finally, the outcome will also hinge
upon the coherent development of a set of international standards
that are sufficiently predictable to allow commercial actors to order
their affairs. On this question, the particular internet context may
prove more troublesome than international copyright disputes gener-
ally; one of the attractions of the internet may be its predictable lack
of predictability, and the resistance of users to conformity or regula-
tion. ' This should not, however, prove an insuperable obstacle to the
application of a copyright lex mercatoria even in the online context,
provided that internet-user custom is not the sole desideratum in the
recognition and development of international norms.8 3
B. Choice of Law Analysis in Copyright Litigation
1. The Territoriality of Copyright Law
If there remains uncertainty over whether private arbitration
might supply an additional impetus to international copyright law-
making, it would, under traditional analysis, appear quite certain that
national court decisions could not provide any such stimulus beyond
articulating national policies for international negotiators to consider.
Copyright laws operate territorially.'8 As a general rule, copyright
administrator such as the WIPO Arbitration Center.
80 See supra note 170 (discussing U.S. cybersquatting legislation).
81 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
a cause of action to enforce a contractual obligation prohibiting acts of copying per-
mitted by the Copyright Act was not preempted).
182 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 177, 178-84 (1997) (discussing the characteristics of the
internet that make it resistant to state regulation).
183 For example, under the rules of one online dispute settlement provider, absent
party selection of an applicable law, the arbitrator will apply the national law with
which the dispute has the greatest connection. But, regardless of whether the choice is
made by the parties, the arbitrator shall "take into account the contract and prevailing
cyberspace practices." Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting
CYBERTRIBUNAL, BAsic RULES OF CYBERTRIBUNAL art. 17); see also Frank A. Cona, Appli-
cation of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFFALO L. REV. 975, 987
(1997) (describing the now-closed Virtual Magistrate Project).
18 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154
(1998) (GinsburgJ., concurring) (citing with approval the proposition that copyright
protection is territorial); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d
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disputes are litigated in and under the laws of the country in which
the act of infringement is alleged to have occurred.
U.S. courts have, however, become involved in international
copyright disputes. Copyright law may be territorial, but the exploita-
tion of copyrighted works is increasingly international. Thus, U.S.
courts have granted relief in respect of acts of overseas infringement
where a predicate act of infringement occurring within the United
States enabled further reproduction abroad•5 And courts have found
claims arising under the U.S. copyright statute-sometimes via the
concept of contributory infringement-where the foreign conduct
was clearly intended to, and did, have an effect in the United States. '86
1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("[T]he United States' copyright laws have no
application to extraterritorial infringement .... .").
See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters T.V. Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.
1998) (permitting recovery of damages for unauthorized transmission abroad of a
work first copied and transmitted without authorization in the United States); Update
Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the
court had subject matterjurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for damages arising from the
distribution in Israel of copies of a poster made in the United States); Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939) (awarding plaintiff prof-
its from both U.S. and Canadian exhibitions of an "infringing [motion] picture" where
a copy of the motion picture had been made in the United States and then shipped to
Canada for exhibition), afffd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). Courts applying this theory have
not analyzed the question whether the acts abroad were infringing under the foreign
law in question. See, e.g., Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52 ("We need not decide whether the law
of those countries where the negatives were exploited recognized the plaintiffs equi-
table interest."). But cf Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91, 93-94 (2d
Cir. 1981) (declining to order delivery up of negatives and prints when it was unclear
whether domestic infringer had the right to show the films in question abroad).
Courts have, however, been insistent that the U.S. activity truly be a predicate for the
foreign acts. See Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that noninfringing rehearsals in the United States were not a predicate
for unauthorized live performances in Canada and that thus the Canadian perform-
ances should not be included in a calculation of damages under U.S. copyright law);
Gaste v. Kaiserman, 683 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (declining to award damages
for unauthorized live performances of a song in France because those performances
did not flow from any act of unauthorized reproduction in the United States), affd
863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988).
1W, See, e.g., Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding that jurisdiction may exist over the defendant's foreign acts to the ex-
tent that the defendant could be liable contributorily or vicariously for subsequent in-
fringement within the United States); Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen
(USA) Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that acts in Canada
could provide the basis for liability under U.S. copyright law because "a defendant can
be liable for contributory infringement, even for acts committed outside the United
States, by inducing or contributing to another's infringement occurring in the United
States .... provided the defendant knew or should have known that the other would or
could reasonably be expected to commit the infringement"); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v.
California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 864 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that "it
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Under each of these theories, courts have decided the interna-
tional copyright dispute by applying U.S. copyright law.18 7 Indeed, the
willingness of the U.S. courts to manipulatess these two theories in
order to apply U.S. law to international disputes has caused one lead-
ing commentator to suggest that effectively "U.S. courts may well favor
the lexfori in transnational copyright cases." 89 In some respects, any
is possible for a defendant to commit acts outside the United States sufficient to find it
contributorily or vicariously liable for acts of infringement committed by others within
the United States"), rev'd on other grounds, ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass'n, 3 F.3d
1289 (9th Cir. 1993); GB Mktg. USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.
Supp. 763 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (assuming jurisdiction on a theory of contributory in-
fringement over acts of copying in Germany that were undertaken with the "knowl-
edge and intent" that the infringing products would be exported to the United States
by the direct infringer in violation of the copyright owner's importation right); see also
Metzke v. May Dept. Stores Co., 878 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that defen-
dant could be liable where it supplied samples of the product at issue to copier in Tai-
wan if it knew or should have known that unauthorized copies made in Taiwan would
be distributed in the United States).
187 Foreign copyright law was occasionally applied by some courts, without analysis,
to issues such as ownership of copyrights. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (listing cases).
18 Although the predicate act theory may seem to be an example of a multilateral-
ist philosophy to choice of law in the U.S. courts, localizing the transnational dispute at
the point of origin, Jane Ginsburg has noted that U.S. courts "appear to apply it pri-
marily when it justifies the application of U.S. law by U.S. courts." Jane C. Ginsburg,
Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights
Transmitted Through Digital Networks 39, WIPO Doc. GCPIC/2 (Nov. 30, 1998), available
at http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/1998/gcpic/pdf/gpic._2.pd£.189P
Ginsburg, supra note 188, at 39; see also Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and
Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23
CoLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTs 1, 3 (1999) (noting that "United States courts have employed
a number of choice of law strategies to enable application of U.S. copyright law to alle-
gations of copyright infringement based on acts that have occurred abroad"). This
may-if only slightly-overstate the case law. U.S. courts have not been uniformly as-
sertive in recent years regarding the application of U.S. law. Recent U.S. case law, both
in matters of choice of law and forum non conveniens, suggests that while theoretical
bases for extensive applications of U.S. copyright law can be discerned in and ex-
tracted from a number of different opinions, some courts have been respectfully cau-
tious. For example, in Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095, an en banc panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit overruled its decision of eight years earlier in Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin
Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), and held that mere authorization
in the United States of foreign infringing conduct cannot be actionable under U.S.
copyright law because the direct act of infringement abroad was not actionable in the
United States. Other courts are divided on whether to follow Subafilms. Compare Arm-
strong; 91 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (noting repudiation of Peter Starr), and Fun-Damental Too
Ltd. v. Gemmy Ind. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1427 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following Subafilms),
with Expediters Int'l of Washington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 995 F.
Supp. 468, 477 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that "the mere authorization of infringing acts
abroad constitutes direct infringement and is actionable under United States Copy-
right Law"), and Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
(same). Similarly, in Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 704
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tendency of the U.S. courts too readily to apply U.S. law to transna-
tional disputes may simply reflect what Andreas Lowenfeld called the
"public law taboo," namely, the unwillingness of a forum to displace
its own public laws or to apply the public laws of another nation."'
That taboo rests, however, upon a public/private distinction that is
now frail, and in several cases (mostly within the last two years) U.S.
courts have entertained complaints alleging acts of copyright in-
fringement under a collection of foreign laws.'9'
(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds a copy-
right infringement case involving U.S. and Singapore copying and deferred instead to
the Singaporean courts. See also Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir.
1996) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal). And in Allarcom Pay TV. Ltd. v.
General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit rejected the ar-
gument that U.S. copyright law governed the unauthorized transmission of works from
the United States to Canada. This is not to say that the doctrinal basis for more aggres-
sive applications of U.S. law has not been developed; as these scholars note, the bases
exist. And the predicate act theory-what some of these scholars call the root copy
theory-may present significant temptation in the internet context, where a U.S. copy
or U.S. performance should not be hard to find. See infra text accompanying notes
213-14. But the theories have thus far not fully been used by all courts, in part because
of the recent internationalization efforts of the executive and Congress. See infra note
228.
1 .J See LOWENFELD, supra note 176, at 3-5; see also PhilipJ. McConnaughay, Reviving
the "Public Law Taboo" in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 256 n.2
(1999) (identifying Lowenfeld's 1979 work, Public Law in the International Arena: Con-
flict of Laws, International Law and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES
COURS, 311,322 (1979), as the source of the term).
See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d
481, 484 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing district court's dismissal of claims under foreign
copyright laws on forum non coveniens grounds); Carell v. Shubert Org., 104
F. Supp. 2d 236, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (permitting claims based on foreign copyright
laws to proceed notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to specify in her complaint the
particular countries under whose laws the claims were made); Armstrong 91 F. Supp. 2d
at 637-38 (entertaining claims based on unspecified foreign copyright laws on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction and pendent jurisdiction); Frink America, Inc. v. Champion
Road Mach., Ltd., 961 F. Supp. 398, 402-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to dismiss claim
under Canadian copyright law); London Film Prods. v. Intercont'l Communications,
580 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (agreeing to hear claims under several foreign
copyright laws). But see ITSI T.V Prods., Inc., 785 F. Supp. at 866 (declining to enter
the "bramble bush" of foreign copyright law). The English courts have recently recog-
nized that certain foreign copyright claims might be adjudicated before them. See
Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [1999] 1 All E.R. 769, 784-804 (CA. 1999) (hearing claim
for infringement of Dutch copyright). This is a consequence of United Kingdom
membership in a European convention, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See Convention onjuris-
diction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77, 78-83, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2,
3-9, 29 I.L.M. 1417 (1990) (establishing jurisdictional guidelines for countries that are
signatories to the Convention). The basic tenets of the Brussels Convention may soon
be replicated at the global level under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Pri-
20001
532 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:469
Yet, even in these cases, each distinct claim was (or would have
been) tried under the separate national copyright law of the country
where infringement allegedly occurred. 9 2 Judicial resort to separate
national laws in international litigation reflects the territorial nature
of copyright protection. There is no such thing as an international
copyright By virtue of the premise of territoriality underlying inter-
national copyright relations, the creation of a copyrighted work results
in the grant of a separate copyright under, and according to the prin-
ciples of, each country recognizing copyright protection."" The in-
ternational obligation of national treatment ensures that works re-
ceive protection in countries other than their country of origin. But
that protection is a function of the laws in those other countries, in-
fluenced to some extent by the minimum substantive standards re-
quired by the Berne Convention and TRIPS.
The Berne Convention embodies these basic principles in Article
5. Article 5(1) provides that:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected un-
der this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this
vate International Law. See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (adopted by Special Commission on Oct.
30, 1999) (proposing rules of private international law regarding inter alia jurisdiction
in civil disputes), available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html. The
draft Hague Convention addresses both jurisdiction and recognition of judgments:
this is intended to permit a compromise under which the European countries would
liberalize their recognition policies and the U.S. would limit its more expansive no-
tions ofjurisdiction. For an analysis of the convention debate, see Kevin M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 89 (1999). A diplo-
matic conference to adopt the convention had been scheduled for late 2000, but the
United States indicated its unease with the current draft (which is closely modeled on
the Brussels Convention that operates within Europe) and adoption will not occur un-
til 2001 at the earliest. SeeJeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Interna-
tional Law, U.S. Department of State, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Represen-
tatives (June 29, 2000) (describing major obstacles preventing immediate conclusion
of the Convention), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm (last
visited Aug. 14, 2000).
192 See, e.g., Care1, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59 (rejecting claims to apply standards
found in international conventions).
193 See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting a motion for an antisuit injunction preventing the plaintiff from pursuing
claims in France for infringement of its French copyright notwithstanding that the de-
fendant had prevailed when similar claims had been brought under U.S. copyright law
in a U.S. court).
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Convention.14
It is commonly understood that this explicit principle of national
treatment "implicates a rule of territoriality."9 5 And Article 5(2),
which provides that "the extent of protection, as well as the means of
redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed" is
also said to embody (although more enigmatically) the principle of
territoriality.'46
In sum, the principle of territoriality upon which the Berne Con-
vention is founded requires courts to apply national laws even to in-
ternational disputes. And, to the extent that U.S. courts have been
willing to localize an international dispute in a single country, they
have invariably localized to the United States and thus have applied
U.S. law.
2. Traditional Approaches to Choice of Law in Copyright
If public international law establishes the basic framework and en-
vironment in which international institutions and states can develop
international solutions, 97 choice of law rules and methodologies ar-
guably do the same in the context of private international litigation.9 8
As noted above, the language of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention,
and the broader principle of national treatment, were widely thought
to cement in place a choice of law rule based upon territoriality.'"
V14 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 5(1), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35.
I,- Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
P-5 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 5(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35. Textually, Ar-
ticle 5(2) could be read to institute a rule of lexfori because the forum is "the country
where protection is claimed." But the accepted reading of the provision is that it refers
to the country in respect of which protection is claimed-that is, where infringement is
alleged to have occurred. See e.g., Austin, supra note 189, at 24-25 (discussing accepted
inte rretations of Article 5 (2)).
See Trachtman, supra note 40, at 349-50 ("[P)ublic international law serves the
function that a constitution serves in the domestic legal system: it is a fundamental
component governing the production of the remainder and of the institutional envi-
ronment for international organizations and for states.").
.- Cf Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 280 (observing that "[c]hoice of law strategies be-
come increasingly important as copyright disputes range over multiple territories").
lv,, See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.
1995) (commenting that "national treatment and territoriality are choice of law prin-
ciples"); Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097 (acknowledging the accepted view that although
copyright treaties do not discuss choice of law, "the national treatment principle impli-
cates a rule of territoriality," and noting that "'the applicable law is the copyright law of
the state in which the infringement occurred, not that of the state of which the author
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Many courts and scholars assumed that this simplified copyright• 200
choice of law questions 2-apply the law of the place where the copy-
ing or other allegedly infringing act occurred-and thus the issue was
rarely litigated. 01
This illusion has been rudely disturbed by digital technology and
global commerce, and copyright choice of law has received increased
attention of late both in the literature"' and in the courts.2°' The eco-
nomic premises underlying the international copyright conventions-
namely, creation and exploitation of copyrighted works nationally
and, if internationally, serially on a country by country basis-have be-
is a national or in which the work was first published'" (citation omitted)). The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has correctly noted that:
[T] he principle of national treatment is really not a conflicts rule at all; it does
not direct application of the law of any country. It simply requires that the
country in which protection is claimed must treat foreign and domestic
authors alike. Whether U.S. copyright law directs U.S. courts to look to for-
eign or domestic law as to certain issues is irrelevant to national treatment, so
long as the scope of protection would be extended equally to foreign and
domestic authors.
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 n.8 (2d Cir.
1998).
200 See 3 PAuL. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.2 (Supp. 1999) (providing an overview
of the territoriality principle); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 17.05 (2000) (addressing conflicts in copyright law); cf. Reichman & Sa-
muelson, supra note 25, at 112 n.279 ("From a legal perspective, these developments
raise daunting problems of conflicts of law, a field that has never found it easy to ac-
commodate intangible property.").
201 See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 88 ("Choice of law issues in international copyright
cases have been largely ignored in the reported decisions and dealt with rather curso-
rily by most commentators.").
202 SeeAustin, supra note 189, at 6 n.15 (listing recent scholarship).
203 The Itar-Tass court commented that "the Nimmer treatise briefly (and perhaps
optimistically) suggests that conflicts issues 'have rarely proved troublesome in the law
of copyright."' Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 89 (citation omitted). For other recent cases, see
Shaw v. Rizzoli Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (following
Itar-Tass's treatment of choice of law, and finding that the United States was the coun-
try with most significant relationship to photographs in question); Bridgeman Art Li-
brary Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering the applica-
ble law governing the issue of copyrightability in a claim of infringement of the
copyright in U.K. works), affid on reconsideration, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Cranston Print Works Co. v. J. Mason Prods., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (applying U.S. law to determine the ownership of copyright in design because,
applying Itar-Tass, the United States was the place of first publication and hence the
country with the closest connection to the work). One European commentator has
captured recent developments nicely in the title to a short comment on copyright
choice of law issues. See Paul Torremans, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues in United
States Intellectual Property Cases: From Dodging the Bullet to Biting It, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q.
372, 373-78 (1999) (discussing choice of law issues related to internet copyright in-
fringement cases).
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come detached from social and economic reality. The place where an
act of alleged infringement "occurs" has become difficult to deter-
mine in the digital environment; concepts such as "place" of publica-
tion or "country of origin" lose meaning in a global and digital world,
204where geography holds less significance.
Moreover, the range of international copyright cases coming be-
fore the courts has resulted in closer attention to the supposedly sim-
ple choice of law rule. Thus, in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Rus-
sian Kurier, Inc., the Second Circuit noted that international copyright
conventions were not self-executing and thus declined to extract a
205choice of law rule from Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention alone.
Finding no generally applicable rule in the Copyright Act,06 the court
developed a choice of law rule as a matter of federal common law.207
As a threshold matter, the court acknowledged that the conventional
statement of the copyright choice of law rule-law of the place of in-
fringement-was too broad, and that different laws may apply to dif-
ferent issues in a copyright litigation.0  On the question of copyright
ownership, the court rejected a rule-based approach to choice of law,
emblematic of the First Restatement of Conflicts, and instead looked
to the policy-based approach of the Second Restatement. In particu-
lar, the court applied the general test of the Second Restatement, un-
2,14 For a full and insightful discussion of these problems, see Jane C. Ginsburg,
Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law Questions of the Global Infonnation
Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'1Y 318 (1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Elec-
tronic Rights and the Private International Law of CopVright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
165 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of
Technological Change, 273 RECUEIL DES couPS 239 (1998); see also Geller, supra note 136,
at 101 (noting that "[t]here are more and more cases in which it is difficult to localize
the origin or the infringement of intellectual property territorially"). But see Gold-
smith, supra note 27, at 1201 (arguing that cyberspace presents conflicts issues that are
no more difficult from those that occur outside cyberspace).
153 F.3d at 89-90.
Section 104A(b) of the Copyright Act, which restored copyright in certain
works that were in the public domain because of noncompliance with formalities of
U.S. law, does provide that ownership of copyright in a restored work vests "in the
author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of the source coun-
try of the work," which the statute then defines. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (1994). But the
court refused to draw general significance from this provision. See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at
90 n.10 (noting that section 104A(b) neither establishes a general copyright conflicts
rule nor suggests that it is an exception to any general conflicts rule).
;. 7 As this suggests, the federal courts have significant latitude to develop an ap-
proach to choice of law in international copyright cases. See discussion infra Part
III.B.3 (proposing a new approach to choice of law in international copyright cases);
see also infra note 342 (discussing means of implementing this proposal).
., The court thus recognized the doctrine of d6pecage. See sources cited supra
note 13 (outlining the doctrine).
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der which the law of the place with the most significant relationship to
the parties and the transaction is typically applied.2 Swayed in par-
ticular by the nationality of the authors, and the place of first publica-
tion, both of which were Russian, the court applied Russian law to de-
termine the ownership of the copyright.210 On the separate question
of which law applied to determine questions of "infringement," the
court concluded that the lex loci delicti would apply, whether as a fixed
rule (akin to the First Restatement) or as part of a broader interest• • 211
analysis (more similar to the Second Restatement) .
Although the Itar-Tass opinion is a fuller analysis of copyright
choice of law questions than we have seen before in U.S. courts and is
probably correct on the merits, its conflicts analysis remains somewhat
rooted in methodologies that may prove unhelpful in more complex
international (and especially) digital cases. In particular, although
the court nominally adopted the flexible policy-based approach of the
Second Restatement, it made its determination using nothing more
than a barren listing of points of attachment. 212 Moreover, the points
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws §§ 6, 145, 222 (1971) (ar-
ticulating the "most significant relationship" test and listing the choice of law princi-
ples according to which courts should determine the place with the most significant
relationship to the dispute).
210 See Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90-91 (following "law of the state with 'the most signifi-
cant relationship' to the property and the parties" (citation omitted)).
21 The attraction of the law of the most significant relationship has been noted by
several prominent scholars. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 188, at 38 (supporting appli-
cation of U.S. law to U.S.-based foreign distribution because the U.S. would be the
country "with the 'closest relationship' to the resulting harm"); see also CONSEIL
D'ETAT, INTERNET ET RFsEAUX NUM RIQuES 148-51 (1998) (quoted in Ginsburg, supra
note 188, at 38 n.128). Each of these scholars or policymakers would, however, in a
fashion consistent with different provisions of the Second Restatement, suggest points
of attachment that would presumptively be the place with the most significant relation-
ship. See CONSEIL D'ETAT, supra, at 148-51 (suggesting that the country with the closest
relationship is the principal place/residence of the "uploading entity when that coun-
try is a member if the EU," and thus has defined levels of protection). In her most re-
cent work, Professor Ginsburg has refined her proposed choice of law applicable to
infringement questions to a hierarchy of possibilities, using compliance with interna-
tional copyright standards as a necessary predicate for the application of any law, and
leaving a residual opportunity for the parties (if subjected to the exfon) to show that
the domestic law of the place where the infringement occurred is more or less protec-
tive than the forum. See Ginsburg, supra note 188, at 45 (proposing application of the
law of the place where the server hosts the allegedly infringing content, provided that
law is Berne-compliant, absent which, the law of the place of residence of the website
operator, provided that that law is Berne-compliant, absent which, the lexfri provided
that that law is Berne-compliant). This approach is immensely flexible and very pro-
author, and it will clearly require national courts to interpret substantive international
coprght standards in order to implement the proposed choice of law inquiry.
12 This is a criticism leveled at many judicial applications of Second Restatement
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of attachment that appealed to the court, namely nationality and
place of publication, may come to say little about the respective pre-
scriptive claims of interested states in more complex cases. Similarly,
the rule of lex loci delicti, if taken as a fixed rule rather than the conclu-
sion of an analysis of governmental interests, may provide little guid-
ance (or too many loci delicti) in a digital world where, for example,
publication may occur simultaneously in a number of countries.
And, by manipulation of the theories discussed above and under pre-
214vailing copyright doctrine, these places can easily be interpreted, in
most cases, to include the United States. As the U.S. Supreme Court
cautioned almost half a century ago:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor
should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant
application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a
analysis in purely domestic cases. See William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of
Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1388-89 (1997) (summarizing scholarly criticisms of the
Second Restatement); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restate-
ment (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 359-60 (1997) (comment-
ing that contacts are often "counted up... at most with conclusory and arbitrary pro-
nouncements concerning their relative value"); see alsoJames A. Meschewski, Choice of
Law in Alaska: A Survival Guide for Using the Second Restatement, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 19
(1999) (complaining that lack of guidance prevents any effective restraint on judicial
decisionmaking and results in conclusory statement of the most relevant contacts).
213 The problems raised by copyright infringement via digital distribution bear
some parallel to multistate defamation claims, for which U.S. courts have largely
adopted the single publication rule. Under this rule, the plaintiff may sue in a single
court (where jurisdiction is proper) for damages sustained in any state where damage
was suffered. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 577A (1977) (outlining the sin-
gle publication rule and its justifications). While this does not of itself avoid problems
of choice of law, see RESTATEMENT" (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 150 (1971) (ar-
ticulating choice of law rules in multistate defamation cases), the injection of federal
constitutional issues into defamation law, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment requires public figure plaintiffs in
defamation cases to establish actual malice on the part of the defendant), has in any
event resulted in the effective federalization of large parts of state defamation law. Cf
James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multi-
state Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. RE%. 381, 413 (1985) (arguing that a permissive choice
of law rule in multistate defamation cases might effectively federalize state defamation
laws). Moreover, the differences between state defamation laws within the United
States are probably less significant than the differences that exist between different na-
tional copyright laws. But cf. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 525 (4th Cir. 1999) (decid-
ing to apply the common law standards of the Second Restatement of Torts to deter-
mine whether a speech aboard a cruise ship at sea was defamatory because the diversity
of state laws would impair the principles of uniformity and simplicity underlying fed-
eral admiralty law).
• ,4 See infra note 291.
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warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American transac-
don.
215
An alternative approach to the uncertainty or overinclusiveness
that the Itar-Tass analysis might generate in a more complex or digital
environment has been developed in the European Union. Under this
approach, found in the EU Cable and Satellite Directive and the so-
called E-Commerce Directive, the EU designates a single law that will
apply to particular satellite and online issues. Thus, in the Cable and
Satellite Directive, the copyright law of the country of the uplink ap-
plies in the event of a dispute. 216 The E-Commerce Directive subjects
information society service providers in the EU to defined regulatory
laws of only the country where the service provider is "established."
21 7
215 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,582 (1953).
216 See Cable and Satellite Directive, supra note 84, art. 1 (2) (b) (defining the act of
communication to the public). This approach is largely motivated by considerations of
practicality and simplification, see id. recitals 5-7 (identifying uncertainties about appli-
cable law as motivation for the directive), but can be justified under Article 5(2) of the
Berne Convention by treating the act of "communication to the public" as occurring
only in the country from which a signal originates. Previously, the majority approach
throughout Europe was to find that an unauthorized communication to the public oc-
curred at the many places of receipt of the signal. See, e.g., Re Cross-Border Copyright
in Television Works [1992] E.C.C. 456, 468-69 (1991) (Aus.) (finding unauthorized
communication occurred in all countries of reception). U.S. courts have been incon-
sistent in their treatment of where to localize satellite transmissions. CompareAllarcom
Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing, for purposes of federal preemption analysis, that any infringement only occurs at
the place of receipt of the signal, and thus finding that unauthorized transmission
from United States to Canada implicated rights only under Canadian law), with NFL v.
Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting Allarcom and
finding that performance also occurs at the place of initiation of the signal in the
United States). The trend in the United States appears to favor finding acts implicat-
ing the copyright owner's performance rights at every "step in the process by which a
protected work wends its way to its audience." David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel,
Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also NFL, 211 F.3d at 11-12 (reciting
case law on liability of intermediate carriers). In the multinational context, this ap-
proach widely extends the reach of U.S. copyright law.
217 See Council Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information So-
ciety Services, in Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 OJ. (L
178), recital 22 & art. 3(1)-(2) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive] (adopting a rule
that, with respect to a set of listed legal obligations and issues, "information society
services should in principle be subject to the law of the Member State in which the
service provider is established" and prohibiting member states from seeking to regu-
late such services when offered by a provider established elsewhere in the EU). The
Directive does not, however, automatically adopt the place of the server as the place of
establishment. See id. recital 19 (providing several principles by which to identify
"[t]he place at which a service provider is established" but noting that the "place of
establishment of a company providing services via an Internet website is not the place
at which the technology supporting its website is located or the place at which its web-
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Several scholars have considered whether under such an approach
one could designate, for example, the law of the place of the server as
the law applicable to any copyright dispute resulting from online dis-
tribution.2 "' The rules thus identified would then be extended to the
full extent of the multinational claim under a version of the predicate
act theory used by U.S. courts (this version sometimes being referred
to as the "nerve center" theory) .2,' Absent this extension, the putative
plaintiff would still be able-and, more importantly, still be re-
quired-to bring suit in, or under the laws of, each country of alleged
infringement.
The use of a pragmatically selected state of constancy has long-
standing antecedents. In maritime cases, for example, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has acknowledged the value of applying the constant law
of the flag in cases where ships pass through many territorial waters.
site is accessible," but rather the "place where it pursues its economic activity"); cf
Robert L. Hoegle & Christopher P. Boam, The Internet and Jurisdiction: International
Principles Emerge but Confrontation Looms; 3 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. 31, 45-46 (2000)
(interpreting the country of origin rule as effectively imposing a rule of "country of
customer"). It also does not purport to establish general choice of law rules, see
E-Commerce Directive, supra, recital 23 ("This Directive neither aims to establish addi-
tional rules on private international law relating to conflicts of law [or jurisdiction]."),
and intellectual property laws are expressly excluded from the scope of this provision
of the Directive. See id. art. 3(3) & Annex (noting the fields not covered by the Direc-
tive). In earlier communications, the Commission expressed concern about extending
the approach of the Satellite Directive to the internet context, notwithstanding the at-
traction of simplicity, because (unlike with satellite transmissions) it may be difficult to
identify the single point of origin, and because the lack of general harmonization of
copyright law might encourage copyright havens. See Proposal for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the Information Society, COM(97)628 final at 12 (discussing opposi-
tion to the adoption of a country of origin choice of law rule in the case of digital
transmissions).
141 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Cooright ithout Borders? Choke of Forum and Choice of Law
for Cobight Infringonent in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 173 (1997)
(opining that typically "the court should either apply the law of the place of the server
or of the defendant's domicile"); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright:
Territoriality and Authors' Rights in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 359 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Cyberian Captivity] (noting ca-
veats).
211 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in CopVight In-
fiingement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 600-02 (1997) (discussing "nerve center" theories);
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 283-84 (discussing this argument for adjudication under a
single law). But see Austin, supra note 189, at 13-28 (arguing against such an ap-
proach).
Z"', See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584 ("[T]he territorial standard is so unfitted to an en-
terprise conducted under many territorial rules... that it usually is modified by the
more constant law of the flag."). The reasons for this rule are largely pragmatic, al-
though effectuated (as were many pragmatic common law rules) by a fiction, namely,
20001
540 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:469
This approach of pragmatic localization may be problematic, however,
because it might encourage a race to the bottom in order to attract
particular business. Thus, in the two EU Directives adopting this ap-
proach, the choice of law rule is accompanied by significant harmoni-
zation of substantive rules governing satellite transmission of copy-
righted works, and consumer protection laws applicable to service
providers, respectively. Similarly, scholars seeking to localize an in-
ternational copyright dispute at a particular point, such as the place of
the server, have incorporated in their proposed tests a range of cave-
ats to prevent such "races" from occurring.22' But these (necessary)
caveats inevitably detract from the gains in certainty provided by the
localizing rule. If certainty and predictability are the reasons for
adopting an arbitrary and inflexible rule, this approach becomes less
222
attractive when the principal advantages are imperiled.
Courts and scholars addressing this issue have done so almost en-
tirely from within the confines of accepted and broadly-applied con-
flicts doctrines. That is, although there is disagreement over whether
a transnational dispute should be analyzed under a single law using a
version of the predicate act theory or under the separate laws of each
that the ship is part of the territory whose flag it flies even when within the territorial
limits of another sovereign. The Supreme Court has noted:
Some authorities reject, as a rather mischievous fiction, the doctrine that a
ship is constructively a floating part of the flag-state, but apply the law of the
flag on the pragmatic basis that there must be some law on shipboard, that it
cannot change at every change of waters, and no experience shows a better
rule than that of the state that owns her.
Id. at 585. The same pragmatic arguments, effectuated by a similar (though perhaps
more real) fiction, might be considered in cyberspace.
221 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 188, at 45 (providing alternative tests to be used if
a country's copyright laws are not adequate).
One could repursue certainty by providing for the invariable application of the
higher level of protection. Although this will embed a substantive bias, not all scholars
are troubled by such a device. Professor Ginsburg, for example, has hinted that, in
light of the purpose of the Berne Convention, see Berne Convention, supra note 15,
pmbl., ci. 1, 1161 U.N.T.S. at 31 (articulating the purpose of the Convention as "to
protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works," (emphasis added)), choice of law determinations in treaty
countries "should be guided by the principle of favor auctoris when in doubt, follow
the conflicts analysis that will yield an author-favorable outcome." Ginsburg, supra
note 188, at 33 n.109. This approach would fit within the methodology of several con-
flicts scholars in the United States discussing noncopyright problems, namely to em-
bed substantive policy preferences explicitly in the choice of law rules. See, e.g.,
RussELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS 359-60 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing pro-plaintiff conflicts rules in tort cases); see also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLIcT OF LAWS 356 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining the scope of
his pro-plaintiff approach).
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country in which an infringement occurs,22 most courts and scholars
have either proposed adoption of localizing rules reflecting the tradi-
tional U.S. approach to choice of law embodied in the First Restate-
ment of Conflicts, or have endorsed a variant of the policy-based
analysis increasingly dominant in contemporary conflicts analysis and
found in the Second Restatement of Conflicts.
224
T-1 Territorialist scholars have argued that the basic philosophy of the Berne Con-
vention requires that the law of every country in which infringement is alleged must
separately be applied to the unauthorized acts. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 189, at 4
(arguing that "the preferable approach is for domestic courts to apply the relevant for-
eign laws to each instance of foreign infringement"); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territo-
rial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 549 (1997)
(criticizing application of U.S. law to foreign acts on the grounds that it destroys the
room for diversity implicit in the Berne approach); Andr6 Lucas, Aspects de Droit Inter-
national Privi de la Protection d'Oeuvres de Droits Connexes Transmis Par Riseaux Numbriques
Mondiaux [Private International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related
Rights Transferred Through Digital Networks 29, 34-35, WIPO Doc. GCPIC/1 (Nov. 25,
1998) (noting that "[t ] here is nothing illogical (even if it less simple) in a single act of
exploitation having its consequences in several countries being governed in a distribu-
tive manner by the laws of those countries," but concluding that, if departure from
such an approach were warranted, "the only solution is ... the cumulative application
of the law of the country of emission and the laws of the various countries of recep-
tion"), at http://www.wipo.org. There are two separate components to this debate.
First, can a single law be applied to govern similar (or, in the internet context, the
same) conduct that occurs in several jurisdictions; and, second, even if a series of dif-
ferent laws must be applied, can these claims be brought in a single court? Failure to
answer each of these questions in the affirmative will impose significant costs and un-
certainties on the international dissemination of copyrighted works. Permitting the
assertion of different foreign claims in a single proceeding would ease the difficulties,
but the difference would be a matter of degree. In any event, U.S. courts are divided
as to whether they should even hear foreign copyright infringement claims. See supra
note 191 (listing competing case law). Absent such a willingness, strict adherence to
territoriality would cause inefficient serial national litigation of almost identical issues.
See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 126 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (de-
clining to enjoin losing party in U.S. copyright infringement litigation from pursuing
parallel claim before French courts for infringement of French copyright); see also Pe-
ter Nicolas, Comment, The Use of Preclusion Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals in Transnational Intellectual Property Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
331, 365-75 (1999) (discussing the use of antisuit injunctions in multinational intellec-
tual property litigation). It is perhaps because of this that some territorialist theorists
devote significant time to explaining why U.S. courts should be willing to entertain
foreign copyright claims. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 189, at 28-46 (arguing for domes-
tic a lpication of foreign laws).
Other writers appear keen to avoid the particular problems of cyberspace by
recognizing cyberspace as a separate jurisdiction giving rise to its own set of substantive
laws. See Hardy, supra note 166, at 1052 (commenting favorably on the development of
virtual courts formed by cyberspace users);Johnson & Post, supra note 166, at 1378-81
(arguing for the development of a body of rules for the new "place" of cyberspace
apart from national laws). Although seemingly radical in result, this approach fits
within existing choice of law philosophy; it finds solution in the recognition of an addi-
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The difficulties presented suggest the need for a rethinking of
copyright law in the digital environment where copyright disputes are
inherently international. But the lessons of such an inquiry need not
be limited to digital cases. The problems of cyberspace bring these
questions into sharper focus, and it is there that they appear most
acute. But the cyber-revolution merely highlights problems endemic
to internationalization, which must be confronted more generally. "'
As I explain below, a different approach to choice of law in interna-
tional copyright cases-whether digitally based or not-may both offer
better solutions to international disputes and make a positive contri-
bution to the internationalization of copyright law.
3. A New Approach to Choice of Law in International
Copyright Cases: The Substantive Law Method
In this Part, I propose a new approach to choice of law in interna-
tional copyright cases."' Under this approach, which stakes a con-
scious claim to be part of the substantive law method, 22 a court faced
tional sovereign, but even here the approach is to identify a single sovereign (under
this theory, the cybersovereign) according to whose laws the multinational dispute will
be resolved. At this point, I should distinguish myself from these commentators, whom
Jack Goldsmith has called "regulation skeptics." Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 1199.
Regulation skeptics argue against state regulation of cyberspace both descriptively and
normatively, relying in each instance on the geographic ubiquity of cyberspace to press
their claim. That is, they contend that the borderless nature of cyberspace under-
mines both the effectiveness and legitimacy of attempts at national regulation; for
regulation to work, and for it to be accepted, it must derive from the activities of cyber-
space participants. SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 166, at 1372-75 (rejecting the le-
gitimacy or practicability of territorial regulation and suggesting that the strongest
claim to regulate online activities rests with participants in cyberspace). I join in the
critique, offered by Goldsmith and others, that this analysis draws too clear a line be-
tween cyberspace and the offline environment. To be sure, cyberspace transactions
have transnational effects, but those effects frequently are felt in offline space. Just as
inevitable multinational spillover effects from cyberspace transactions undermine ex-
clusive regulation by a single national norm, so too the inevitable spillover effects into
the analog world undermine the claim of exclusive cyberspace self-regulation.
225 It is indeed the great achievement of [the] Internet, after satellites, to have
created an obligation to rediscover the international aspects of this discipline,
too long masked, by overshooting the timid territorialism .... To quote the
words of Batiffol, it is vain to wish to remove the problems of conflict of laws
on the grounds that they are too complex, since reality will take upon itself the
task of demonstrating that problems cannot be resolved by ignoring them if
they are real problems.
Lucas, supra note 223, at 5.
26 An argument exists that this method should apply to all international disputes,
whether involving copyright law or otherwise, but that issue is beyond the scope of the
current Article.
27 For a discussion of the leading historical schools of choice of law thought, see
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with an intemational copyright dispute would not necessarily apply
the copyright law of a single state to the contested issues. Instead, it
would consider whether the international dimension implicated poli-
cies of other states or the international copyright system,228 and de-
velop (and apply) a substantive rule of copyright law that best effectu-
ates this range of policies.
a. Historical and Scholarly Support
In recent years, a few conflicts scholars have hinted at (without
fully developing) the idea that judges should develop special substan-
tive rules for multistate cases. The strongest suggestion came one
quarter of a century ago in a short comment that Professor Arthur von
Mehren wrote for the Harvard Law Review based upon a report pre-
pared for the Congress of the International Academy of Comparative
Law meeting in Tehran in 1974.29 Other indications of support for a
substantive law approach can be found in the writings of Friedrich
Juenger and Luther McDougal.2'3  As both Juenger and McDougal
Symeon C. Symeonides, General Report, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF
THE 20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 9-21 (Symeon Symeonides ed., 2000) (de-
scribing the schools of multilateralism, unilateralism, and substantivism). Unlike uni-
lateralism or multilateralism, the substantive law approach is not truly conflictual in
nature, seeking as it does to find compromise over conflict.
2 Courts in the United States have made reference to the recent bout of public
international copyright lawmaking in adjudicating copyright cases, but these refer-
ences have largely been made to support deference to treaty negotiations by the execu-
tive branch and thus to limitjudicial forays into international copyright questions. See,
e.g., Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 700-03 (9th Cir. 1995)
(referencing the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions in justifying dismissal of
an international copyright dispute on grounds of forum non conveniens); Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1098 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (noting the deleterious effect of applying U.S. copyright law to domestic
authorization of allegedly unauthorized acts abroad in light of Berne accession and
TRIPS negotiations).
i. See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems:
Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV.
347, 357 (1974) [hereinafter von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules] (noting that the
substantive rule approach raises the question "whether one should, in handling the
choice-of-law problem, work from beginning with a fundamental distinction between
situations and transactions that can, and those that cannot, appropriately be localized,
allocating regulation of the former to a domestic law and developing special multiju-
risdictional rules for the latter"); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Choice of Law and
the Problem of Justice LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 27, 38-40 (suggesting
circumstances in which conflicts of law might best be resolved by compromise of the
values of the different states involved).
"d See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTIcE 233-37
(1993) [hereinafter JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW] (supporting the substantive law ap-
proach and explaining why it has not been universally adopted); Friedrich K. Juenger,
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explain, there are historical antecedents for such an approach that
232reach as far back as the Roman Empire. But these bodies of law,
233
such as the lex mercatoria discussed above, which permitted courts to
avoid choice of law questions, declined in significance with the rise of
nation-states and with positivistic demands for a clear connection be-
tween law and a sovereign.'m The relative decline of the nation-state '3'
Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 126 (arguing for the
substantive law approach in mass tort cases); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Com-
parative Approach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1331-32 (1999) [here-
inafter Juenger, Comparative Approach] ("The substantive law approach ... merits fur-
ther exploration precisely because it is at loggerheads with fundamental tenets held
dear by traditionalists."); see also Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and
the New Law Merchant; 28 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 490-92 (1995) (identifying other
scholars who support a substantive law approach).
21 See Luther L. McDougal, III, "Private" International Law: Is Gentium Versus
Choice of Law Rules or Approaches, 38 AM.J. COMP. L. 521, 536-37 (1990) (arguing that
"in many instances the best way to take appropriate account of substantive policies is to
do so directly through the development and application of transnational laws" rather
than by application of traditional choice of law rules). Interestingly, all three of these
scholars can fairly be called scholars of comparative law. The report upon which von
Mehren based his article drew from ten different national reports on similar issues in
different countries, see von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules, supra note 229, at 347 n.*
(listing the national reports), and both Juenger and McDougal make extensive refer-
ence to comparative and historical sources in their work.
232 SeeJUENGER, CHOICE OF LAw, supra note 230, at 8-10 (discussing the develop-
ment of the ius gentium by the praetor peregrinus, starting around 242 B.C.).
233 See supra text accompanying notes 165-66. Courts in the United States currently
do apply international standards in certain narrow contexts. See M.O. Chibundu, Mak-
ing Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39
VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1080-92 (1999) (discussing the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994), which creates a cause of action for aliens in the United States based
upon violations of the law of nations); Van Alstine, supra note 5, at 761-91 (suggesting
that the Convention on the International Sale of Goods calls for the dynamic applica-
tion of its international standards, such as the requirement of good faith, in adjudicat-
ing disputes within its scope). As with the approach proposed in this Article, these in-
ternational standards are applied by national courts. Thus, although these are, as
regards their formation, "universal customary laws tied to no particular sovereign
authority," Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 1206, their application by courts is subject to
monitoring by different national legislatures that could no doubt direct their national
courts to apply different principles to such disputes. And different national courts
might interpret these so-called "universal" laws differently without recourse to a cen-
tralized adjudicatory body to resolve such differences. Thus, any detachment between
these laws and national sovereigns should not be overstated.
234 See McDougal, supra note 231, at 522, 534 (linking the decline of ius commune to
nineteenth century codification of law by nation states); Juenger, Comparative Approach,
supra note 230, at 1318-19 (noting positivist critique of supranational rules).
235 See Robert Wright, Continental Dri% NEW REPUBLIc, Jan. 17, 2000, at 18 (consid-
ering the emergence of a world government based on global economic institutions).
For two provocative analyses of the effect that the internet is likely to have on the na-
tion-state, compare Henry H. Perritt,Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts
on the Internet's Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance 5 IND. j. GLOBAL
A NEW COPYRIGHT ORDER
may perhaps sound an appropriate clarion call for their reconsidera-
tion.
b. The Basic Approach
i. Theoretical Basis
Although von Mehren was writing in part about the development
of special substantive rules in the domestic multistate context, the ex-
plicit use of this method in internal U.S. multistate cases has been
rare. Judge Jack Weinstein effectively used the substantive law method
in fashioning a solution to the Agent Orange mass torts litigation.26
Recently, though, a panel of the Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rohrer, Inc. rebuffed efforts by a district court judge to apply a com-
mon standard of negligence to a mass tort case involving parties from
different states (whose tort claims were, under traditional choice of
law analysis, governed by different laws).27 This would, according to
the Seventh Circuit, violate principles of federalism given expression
by the Supreme Court in Erie v. Tompkins.m And, to be sure, this ap-
proach bears more than a passing resemblance to the methodology of
Swift v. Tyson (an opinion authored, perhaps symbolically, by the fa-
ther of American conflicts law, Joseph Story)." 9
Even accepting the legitimacy of Erie-style federalism questions in
the domestic context, the resolution of multistate conflicts via applica-
tion of the substantive law method may be of less concern in the in-
ternational setting. The principles of federalism are no restraint on
the federal courts in international copyright cases,24° and the parallel
LEGAL STUD. 423 (1998) (arguing that the internet may strengthen legitimate national
and international governance), with David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox". The Inter-
net, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521 (1998)
(discussing how the internet erodes physical boundaries between states and unleashes
the promise of "popular sovereignty").
See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 696-99 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (justifying the development of a "national consensus law" on issues in multistate
product liability class action); see alsoJack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law in a Multinational World Communicating ly Extra-Terrestrial Satellites, 36
WILL AIETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
!7 In reRhone-Poulenc Rohrer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
23S Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that a federal court sitting
in diversity jurisdiction must apply state law as determined by the state's highest court).
lot Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that a federal court exercis-
ing diversity jurisdiction should apply general federal common law).
Federal district courts are granted exclusivejurisdiction over cases arising under
the copyright laws, and all state causes of action granting rights equivalent to copyright
to subject matter within the scope of copyright are expressly preempted. See 17 U.S.C.
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to Swift v. Tyson is less compelling structurally as well as doctrinally.
The domestic parallel is not a federal court constructing general fed-
eral law in place of applicable rules of the sovereign states (i.e., Swift).
Rather, it is a state court deciding a case not simply by the application
of the substantive rules developed for its own internal disputes, but
according to a set of broader considerations including but not limited
to its own domestic rules. The domestic analogy would thus be that a
state court may consider norms from other states and institutions in
fashioning a rule applicable to the different factual setting of a multi-
state (i.e., not purely local) dispute. This analysis of the hypothetical
domestic parallel highlights an important aspect of the substantive law
method when transferred to the international level: the sovereign na-
tion-state retains control of the formation of the special substantive
international rule because it is a rule of national law created for an in-
ternational setting.
Each national legal system embodies, and seeks to effectuate, a set
of values held by those over whom the legal system exercises control
(or at least, less idealistically, by those with an effective voice in the
creation of that law). Choice of law rules are no more than another
set of rules by which that same legal system implements the values it
wishes furthered when conduct to be adjudicated in its courts touches
the interests of another nation.2 4' Determining the choice of law rule
that a legal system follows, therefore, is simply a sovereign choice as to
the values that one prioritizes in an international or multistate setting.
Judge Posner, in Rhone-Poulenc, chided the district court judge for an
approach that would require jury instructions to be given in legal Es-
242peranto. But the critique is somewhat less withering when the state
in question freely decides that it wishes Esperanto to be its vernacular
of choice.
But why should a court wish to develop, through choice of law
§ 301 (1994) (preempting state causes of action granting rights equivalent to copyright
to subject matter within the general scope of copyright); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (giving the district courts original jurisdiction over patent, trademark,
and copyright cases).
241 In explaining his theory of comparative impairment, William F. Baxter distin-
guished between "internal" and "external" governmental objectives. See William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1963). A state's
resolution of conflicting interests in domestic contexts reflected its internal objectives,
while external objectives were defined as "the objectives of each state to make effective,
in all situations involving persons as to whom it has responsibility for legal ordering,
that resolution of contending private interests the state has made for local purposes."
Id. at 17.
2 See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300 (concluding that it would be impossible to
merge the negligence standards of fifty states into one jury instruction).
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analysis, such substantive rules of copyright law applying to multina-
tional disputes? Multilateralist theories, such as those articulated by
Story and Beale, 2" and reflected in the first Restatement of Conflicts,
emphasized avoidance of forum shopping as a central goal of choice
of law rules. Every legal relation or event, so the theory went, could
logically be assigned to a single state. As realism broke down the for-
malistic pretenses of the multilateralist philosophies, ensuring apt re-
sults assumed greater prominence in choice of law thinking (at least
in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Europe). In the United
States, this took the form of resurgent unilateralism, espoused most
forcefully by Brainerd Currie 44 and reflected in the eclectic analytical
tools of the Second Restatement of Conflicts in 1971.a Von Mehren
saw the substantive law method as a means of reconciling and accom-
modating these two competing concerns of choice of law theory,
namely, avoidance of forum shopping and aptness of results.4 6
I do not take issue either with this rationale or with the suggestion
that the substantive law method can further such an accommodation.
But I also see strategic value beyond refereeing long-standing schol-
arly disagreements about the primary objective of choice of law rules;
as I explain below, international copyright lawmaking may benefit
from decisions rendered employing the substantive law method.247
And there are several justifications that apply beyond the context of
international copyright law. First, I extend the critique of the formal-
istic claim that choice of law involves selecting between competing ju-
risdictions. As David Cavers trenchantly observed, in a conflicts analy-
sis "[t]he court is not idly choosing a law; it is determining a
,44 See JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LWS (2d ed. 1841).
See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
In Europe, there was significant resistance to Currie's unilateralist approach.
The American "Conflicts Revolution" has not been viewed kindly. See Edoardo Vitta,
The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution", 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1982);
see also 2 DIcEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 1510 (Lawrence Collins et al.
eds., 13th ed. 2000) (noting that the approach of the Second Restatement eventually
exerted some influence in English law). At the same time, however, European choice
of law theory has (like courts applying the First Restatement in the United States) de-
veloped its own tools for ensuring apt results, such as increased resort to loi de police.
See, e.g., Cass. le civ., May 28, 1991, 1991 Bull. Civ. I, No. 172, p. 113 (applying French
moral rights law to determine whether U.S. copyright owner, taking rights under a
contract executed in the United States, could colorize motion pictures first produced
in black and white).
111 Seevon Mehren, Special Substantive Rules, supra note 229, at 356-57.
247 See infra Part III.B.3.c.
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controversy. How can it choose wisely without considering how that
choice will affect that controversy? ' 48 This persuaded Cavers, and ul-
timately most courts and scholars in the United States, that choice of
law must be viewed as a choice between competing rules rather than
competingjurisdictions. But I would characterize the judicial role as
involving a choice between many competing solutions. Courts in
purely domestic cases often (and often should) generate rules, rather
than merely apply them, to decide cases and to provide apt solutions.
To do so, domestic courts frequently develop the law in a way that
does not involve the application of a single pre-articulated rule; they
should be free to do so also in multinational cases. Indeed, the le-
gitimacy of an activist approach to judging is enhanced in the multi-
state context where the competing claims of prescriptive legitimacy
are more dispersed among rival institutional claimants, i.e., national
legislatures.
What happens when a court is faced with a domestic dispute re-
garding a set of facts to which no single substantive rule of decision
provides an answer? Suppose a set of facts that falls between the two
polar extremes of existing rules. The court is not bound to decide the
legal effects of the set of facts according to one or other of the exist-
ing polar extremes. The court will decide what the appropriate rule
should be that governs this new set of facts, drawing most likely upon
the extent to which the new set of facts mirrors and implicates the
same concerns as the two existing rules. But the court is not obliged
to select one or other of the existing models. For example, a court
asked for the first time to develop the rules of contract formation
when the parties communicated telephonically might draw upon the
rules developed for person-to-person communications, on the one
hand, and for mail communications on the other. But the rule for
telephonic communications need not be the same as either. Why
should courts be more constrained when the new variable is the multi-
state nature of the transaction? If plaintiff would be awarded
$800,000 under the law of State X and recover nothing under the law
of State Y, might a cause of action implicating both State Xand State Y
entitle the plaintiff to recover $400,000 (or some other intermediate
amount) that reflects the interests of both states?
A second justification, although arguably of less force in the con-
text of recent copyright legislation, is that statutory rules enacted by a
248 David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choke-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 189
(1933).
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national legislature are rarely enacted with an eye to international
disputes or conduct. As reflected in the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality, we assume that legislatures generally seek to regulate only
domestic conduct and domestic parties. 9 Putting aside whether legis-
latures have prescriptive authority to seek exclusively to regulate mat-
ters of an international nature,2 ° it is clear that the policies underlying
statutes are largely reflective of domestic priorities. These priorities
are no less valid for being domestically oriented, but this does not
suggest that implementation of legislative direction requires routine
application of such policies in an international context.
Indeed, it is quite possible that if a legislature were consciously to
address the policies by which it would seek to regulate international
disputes before its courts, it might articulate a different policy that
took into account the competing interests of other states as well as its
own interest. Current methodologies effectively assume that the legis-
24" See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594 (1961) (noting that the
"[I]egislature ... is ordinarily concerned with enacting laws to govern purely local
transactions").
Despite the territorial orientation of international copyright law, our general
notions of prescriptive jurisdiction have moved beyond territorial borders. Prescriptive
jurisdiction may rest upon the citizenship of parties abroad, and increasingly it is as-
serted based upon effects (but not conduct) within a national territory. See generally
RESTATEMENT7 (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-03
(1987) (providing for the exercise ofjurisdiction based on effects within a territory so
long as the effect is substantial and the exercise is reasonable, subject to certain limita-
tions); William S. Dodge, Extraternitorialiiy and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998) (arguing for a unilateralist ap-
proach to international choice of law and thus endorsing an effects test). Arguments
for U.S. jurisdiction in copyright cases explicitly based on adverse effects in the United
States have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commu-
nications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (declining to exercise ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction over foreign conduct based upon the adverse effects of unau-
thorized foreign copying on the U.S. film industry, citing long-standing commitment
to territoriality in U.S. copyright law and noting the Congressional decision to improve
the position of American authors by pushing via treaty negotiation for better protec-
tion under foreign copyright laws). But cf Metzke v. May Dep't Stores Co., 878 F.
Supp. 756, 761 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that a defendant can be liable where it sup-
plied samples of a copyrighted product to a copier in Taiwan, and it knew or should
have known that unauthorized copies made in Taiwan would be distributed in the
United States). But willingness to assume jurisdiction based on authorization in the
United States, see, e.g., Curb v. MCA Records, Inc. 898 F. Supp. 586, 595-96 (M.D.
Tenn. 1995) (rejecting Subafilms and finding mere authorization within the United
States of infringing conduct abroad sufficient to state an independent claim under
U.S. copyright law), or over foreign acts of contributory infringement that lead to U.S.
infringement, see supra note 186 (listing cases finding sufficient basis forjurisdiction on
this ground), clearly flows from justifications similar to those that support effects juris-
diction.
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lature would consider only whether it would wish to apply its domestic
policy alone to the dispute or defer entirely to the application of the
domestic policy of another state.
251
Third, a method that draws its applicable rule in international
cases from an amalgam of national and international norms reflects
the complex and interwoven forces that govern citizens' conduct in a
global society. Existing choice of law methodology fails to recognize
these interacting forces by compelling courts to localize matters that
are not local and to judge disputes according to a single norm where
citizens do not act (or expect to be judged) according to that norm
alone. A substantive law method would seek to reflect rather than to
deny that reality of modern life. Congruence between legal method-
ology and societal development lends legitimacy to the law as an in-
strument of social organization because it ties the law to the values of
the society it purports to organize. The substantive law method rec-
251 Adaptation of a classic conflicts hypothetical illustrates this point. William Bax-
ter premised his theory of comparative impairment, according to which he suggested
courts should resolve choice of law questions, upon the hypothetical negotiation of an
interstate compact for the resolution of conflicts. See Baxter, supra note 241, at 7-8
(setting out the hypothetical negotiation). Negotiation of the compact would identify
the circumstances in which one state would most insist upon application of its law and
when it would be willing, in exchange, to accede to the application of the law of the
other state. This theoretical device usefully highlights the factual situations in which a
state is relatively more interested, and thus when its interest in the application of its law
is strongest. But this hypothetical negotiation could be a much more nuanced process
than Baxter presupposes. The bargain struck by the states need not be confined to
complete capitulation in one case in return for exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction in
another. Negotiating states might compromise along other fault lines. Thus, the solu-
tion might be to permit the outcome in a particular case to be determined in part by
the law of one state and in part by the law of the other state; that is, the negotiated
compact might be to take into account the laws of both states in cases that involve both
states. To illustrate this adaptation of Baxter's classic hypothetical, let us reduce the
effectuation of the domestic policy objectives of two negotiating states-State X and
State Y-to numerical values as follows. In each of five cases involving elements from
both State Xand State Y, the domestic law of State Xwould permit the plaintiff to re-
cover 100 units; recovery of 100 units represents the policy objective of State X Under
the domestic law of State Y, the plaintiff would in every instance be denied any recov-
ery; this represents the policy objective of State Y. Baxter's approach, which reflects
traditional choice of law thinking, requires that the two states negotiate over when the
plaintiff should recover 100 and when it should recover 0. Thus, State X may agree
that in cases 1-3 it will permit State Ys law to be applied, and the plaintiff be denied
recovery. In return, State Ywould agree that in cases of type 4 and 5 it will accede to
the application of the law of State Xand the recovery of 100 units. But the states could
bargain differently. The states could agree that in cases of types 1 and 2 the plaintiff
will recover 0, in cases of type 5 the plaintiff will recover 100 units, and in cases of types
3 and 4 the plaintiff will recover 50 units. Indeed, the variations are infinite.
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ognizes that congruence as a necessary part of conflicts law. 5
Legitimacy of laws is important in practical as well as normative
terms. To the extent that copyright law now implicates a far greater
number of individuals, often in private spacesy2 the question of vol-
untary public compliance should command greater attention in devis-
ing appropriate rules of copyright law. Compliance, in turn, rests in
large part upon perceptions of legitimacy.2 Maximizing the relation
between the normative impulses of citizens and the legal rules that are
2_' The argument that the United States should limit application of its purely do-
mestic copyright law to international behavior causing effects within the United States
is not fundamentally based upon the normative weakness of U.S. claims to prescribe,
nor upon the descriptive (in)ability of the United States to regulate local effects of ex-
traterritorial conduct (which is really a function of both adjudicative jurisdiction and
the presence of assets in the United States). Rather, the proposal advanced in this Ar-
ticle rests primarily upon the equal legitimacy of the claims of other nations and com-
munities to regulate the same behavior. That is, it rests upon an excess (rather than a
lack) of normative prescriptive authority. In such a circumstance, comity concerns
should counsel in favor of more cautious assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction. To the
extent that a normative attack can be launched upon the application of U.S. law to
such international settings, it can hinge only upon the inappropriateness of exclusive
U.S. prescriptivejurisdiction. But where choice of law methodologies compel courts to
select a single governing law, the decision to apply U.S. law exclusively rather than a
different national law exclusively hardly can be criticized where that different national
law also has a normative claim only to some, but not exclusive, application. Current
choice of law methods fail to recognize these normative limits (i.e., the notion that the
limits of prescriptive jurisdiction should be set by a claim to have some but not exclu-
sive application to a set of facts). The substantive law method, by giving prescriptive
effect to both laws, permits this normative limitation to be recognized. Jack Goldsmith
disputes this normative refinement, arguing that "one jurisdiction's legitimate regula-
tion of the harmful local effects of extraterritorial activity does not become normatively
problematic simply because the harm-producing activity also produces harmful effects
in many other jurisdictions and thus is subject to territorial regulation there as well."
Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 484. But cf id. at 487 ("Most normative perspectives frown
on a nation that exports the costs of its regulation to other nations whose citizens have
no voice in the enactment or enforcement of the regulation."). I would contend that
where the other national regulation affirmatively permits what the forum prohibits,
normative concerns do arise, although it might be better to phrase this as a question of
relative rather than absolute normative appropriateness. Of course, the application of
a single law to a transnational setting has always raised these concerns, and the norma-
tive validity of applying a single law has traditionally been unquestioned (the debate
largely centering on which law should be applied). But the range of circumstances in
which competing prescriptive claims arise has increased, and the substantive law
method may offer a better normative mapping, if not the only valid one, in such cases
than the application of a single law.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (describing how copyright law often
intrudes on the personal lives of citizens).
L4 See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspec-
tive, 29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 224 (1997) (arguing that, absent effective deter-
rent measures, compliance with the law must be grounded in morality and legitimacy).
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declared to govern citizens' lives furthers legitimacy and thus the level
of public compliance required for effective copyright laws. 215  We
should therefore pursue a choice of law methodology, like any other
type of law formation, that permits the closest possible coincidence
between the applicable rule and the norms that motivate human be-
havior.
Fourth, the fact that a dispute is multinational means that it impli-
cates interests that are different from those implicated in equivalent
domestic cases. If the dispute implicates substantial interests of both
State A and State B, it is inequitable to treat such facts (automatically)
in the same way as either a dispute wholly implicating the interests of
State A or wholly implicating the interests of State B.2 56
ii. Sources of Law
An essential threshold question under the substantive law method
is what sources of law, or considerations, will guide a court engaging
in this more activist endeavor. Courts are unable to generate norms
from within; once untethered from the analysis of choosing between
two existing norms, they need guidance. Without seeking to constrain
courts unduly, I consider here four basic considerations: interna-
tional agreements and practices; national and regional laws; develop-
ing post-national groupings; and conflicts values.
The constraints upon the sources of law to which judges might re-
fer in this process will, to some extent, flow naturally from considera-
tion of how to sell legitimacy in a system in which reason is the ulti-
mate force. Thus, one would expect any outcome to fit within the
boundaries established by the laws of the respective states with inter-
ests,257 and also that it would comply with any clear provisions of pub-
lic international copyright law.258
25 SeeJessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Li-
censing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 240-41 (1997) (arguing that copyright laws
that "make sense" are the only laws that will be effective).
256 See von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules, supra note 229, at 356 (recognizing
that "serious problems" arise in treating cases with multistate elements as if they were
solely domestic).
2 7 See infra note 264 (distinguishing my proposal from those advanced by advo-
cates of a separate cyberlaw governing cyberspace transactions).
25 Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld construct similar restraints on WTO panels faced with
analyzing the legitimacy of antitrust remedies that limit the exercise of intellectual
property rights. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 313 (suggesting that any
antitrust enforcement action that fell on the spectrum between the U.S. and EU posi-
tions on the relationship between competition and intellectual property should be up-
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International copyright agreements, such as the Berne Conven-
tion, the TRIPS Agreement, and the WIPO Copyright Treaty would
represent an obvious starting point for the ascertainment of interna-
tional norms.2 These different agreements, however, are not uni-
form in tone. While TRIPS is premised solely upon the notion that
inadequate protection of intellectual property constitutes a barrier to
international trade, the Berne Convention is based upon the goal of
ensuring uniformly high protection for the works of authors, tem-
pered by concerns about a scope of protection that accommodates
uses by others in the public interest. This tempering is made explicit
in the language of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, but has always been
part of the historical Berne debate. There is, therefore, ample room
for debate regarding the different import of these treaties, notwith-
standing their obvious relevance.
But examination of the substantive principles found in these trea-
ties would be a relatively new endeavor for U.S. courts. It is rare for
U.S. courts to make reference to the standards announced in interna-
tional intellectual property treaties because most have not been
treated as self-executing.2 3 Moreover, as Paul Geller has suggested,
the interpretation of the text of the Berne Convention (now incorpo-
rated in TRIPS) might vary from a public international to a private in-
ternational setting:
[T]he Paris and Berne Conventions... constitute a regime of private in-
ternational law to ensure respect for property interests in these products
held by a MWTO panel, if consistent with each of those laws, unless expressly prohibited
by the TRIPS Agreement). This interaction is not addressed by the TRIPS Agreement,
and it is therefore not surprising that one would resort to considerations that flow
from the common law adjudication process and the need to persuade.
2. Some scholars suggesting an approach to copyright choice of law other than the
substantive law method have entertained the prospect of referring to international
standards. Most notably, Professor Jane Ginsburg has described an approach that
would make some use of public international measures in applying conflicts principles
to multinational copyright infringement claims. She argues that:
Another approach ... would nominally apply the rule of territoriality, but, at
least where all relevant countries are Berne Union or WrTO members, would
presume that all affected territories adhere to Berne-TRIPS minima. Since
the forum under these circumstances would also be a Berne-NTO country,
the court might further presume that all the relevant countries' laws are like
the forum's. The court would then apply its own law to the full extent of the
claim, subject to a showing that in certain countries, local norms are either
more or less protective than the forum's.
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 284 (citation omitted).
!,. But see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. 684, 690 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
("The Lanham Act incorporates the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention and
thus creates a federal law of unfair competition applicable in international disputes.").
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across national borders. On the other hand, the [WTO], in administer-
ing the TRIPS Agreement.... will maintain a truce in an all-too-
concrete, Hobbesian war of each against all.... Paris, Berne, and related
treaty provisions need not always mean the same thing in the abstract
Cartesian universe of intellectual property as in the concrete Hobbesian
world of trade wars and truces.... Domestic courts could construe Paris-
Berne obligations differently than do TRIPS panels, resulting in juris-
prudential schizophrenia between the private and public international
laws of intellectual property.261
This makes sense; the treaties are being used for different pur-
poses in these two settings. In the private law context, they are being
used by courts prospectively to guide the ascertainment of an apt solu-
tion and the optimal development of the law; in the public law con-
text, they are being used merely to indicate what states had agreed to
undertake as minimal levels of protection. 2  National courts will
make reference to the conventions against a backdrop of national leg-
islation and canons of interpretation, and in light of other tangential
considerations that will color their analysis. The backdrop against
which WTO panels consider the same language is quite different.
National norms of interested states (and perhaps of states without
interests in the particular dispute) 263 would also clearly be relevant in
261 Geller, supra note 136, at 103-04.
262 Similarly, customary international law would be relevant, as it is potentially in
cases before the WTO. See supra note 138 (discussing the DSU). Customary interna-
tional law is, however, no less backward looking than treaty provisions. While there is
no precise definition of customary international law, the claim of a rule to such a status
is enhanced by widespread conforming state practice over a long period of time. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. b (1987) (discussing the role of state practice in establishing the content of inter-
national law).
263 Comparative analysis might inform the search for apt solutions even where the
comparative model in question is provided by a country with no direct interest in the
litigation. Indeed, some members of the U.S. Supreme Court appear willing to con-
sider as "relevant and informative" decisions of foreign courts even when interpreting
the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 463-64 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (considering the death penalty jurisprudence
of India and Zimbabwe in evaluating the claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
as cruel and unusual punishment the execution of prisoners who have spent nearly
twenty years on death row); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (having regard to how other countries with federal systems have recon-
ciled tensions between the practical need for central authority and the democratic vir-
tue of local control in determining whether federal gun regulation unconstitutionally
required state officers to execute federal laws); see also Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE LJ. 1225 (1999) (suggesting a systematic ap-
proach to learning from other countries' constitutional theory and practice); Mark
Tushnet, Returning With Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Com-
parative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325 (1998) (describing issues associ-
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developing rules applicable to international disputes.26' But whereas,
when traditional choice of law selects a national law to apply, it applies
only that one national norm, the substantive law method will seek to
examine all relevant national norms in developing an international
rule that may match no single national norm."'
Courts in international cases might also consider norms develop-
ing in postnational settings, such as might exist on the intemet 26"
Domestic U.S. courts have taken account of the social realities of
communities that transcend formal political borders.2 7 Recognizing
ated with "borrowing" and "lending" constitutional ideas); cf. Sandra Day O'Connor,
Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 13,
18 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) (suggesting that as "our domestic
courts are increasingly asked to resolve disputes that involve questions of foreign and
international law... there is great potential for our Court to learn from the experi-
ence and logic of foreign courts and international tribunals"). In the context of par-
ticular litigation, pragmatism might, however, suggest some limit on the scope of coun-
tries whose interests (as embodied in their laws) should be factored into the equation.
Comparative examination of uninterested countries, albeit with claims to provide help-
ful solutions, might thus weigh less heavily on the scales.
2'4 This distinguishes my proposal from those advanced by scholars described by
Jack Goldsmith as "regulation skeptics." The application of norms found in cyberspace
is no less arbitrary than the application of the law of a single terrestrial place; spillover
effects occur from online to the terrestrial world just as the internet causes them to
occur from one country to another. See supra note 224.
2 -' It is also possible that certain international cases might still warrant application
of a rule that closely approximates a single national rule. That is, the facts of some in-
ternational disputes may so strongly implicate the norms of a single state that the scales
would weigh more heavily in the direction of that national rule. Indeed, one would
expect the courts to develop case law on when national norms would be afforded more
weight than international norms.
The ways in which norms may be imposed in cyberspace might not always be
obvious to the legal eye. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999) (discussing the ability of computer code to regulate conduct in
cyberspace); Boyle, supra note 182, at 204-05 (suggesting that the state may effectively
and less obviously regulate cyberspace through means that are concealed if one views
law only in Austinian terms of a command backed by threats). In the context of the
internet, standards might be extracted both from the behavioral norms of actors on
the web and from written principles and guidelines found in service provider con-
tracts, "acceptable use and conduct" policies, and online "netiquette" guides. Moreo-
ver, as noted above, see supra text accompanying note 183, online dispute resolution
services consciously use cyberstandards to decide disputes, and such decisions may
(while not amounting to an official reporting system) usefully gather written state-
ments of norms in one place for more centralized reference.
'6 See, e.g., Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502,
509 & n.9 (D.C. 1985) (taking into account the "present reality of the economically
and socially integrated greater metropolitan area" around the District of Columbia in
finding a D.C. interest in protecting the rights of a Virginia citizen working in D.C.
(quoting Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1968))).
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such realities may better effectuate justified expectations of parties
""
operating in such a community,269 and may also avoid fortuitousness in
ways that rigid adherence to formal political institutions does not.
Moreover, the analytical processes of adjudication, no less than ex-
plicit lawmaking, police and filter the forms of knowledge and under-
standing that receive validation through law. Thus, when we talk of
producing or developing the norms of the cybercommunity, it may be
more accurate to say that the analytical methods of choice of law ad-
judication will assist in bringing those to a head, in rationalizing dis-
parate and divergent views of what those norms are, and in validating
some but not others. This is in many respects an important role of law
as a formal institution.270
268 Goldsmith concludes (accurately) that developments in twentieth century con-
flicts scholarship and case law mean that "ex ante notice of a specific governing law is
no longer a realistic goal in many transnational situations." Goldsmith, supra note 27,
at 1208. But this descriptive accuracy should not preclude normative assessment of the
continuing value of notice and justified expectations. Recent jurisprudential devel-
opments might have minimized the importance of these values, and recent social de-
velopments may have made their effectuation more difficult, but that should not de-
tract from their normative claim to relevance. Notice of governing laws, and a related
representational concern of a voice in the articulation and revision of such laws, re-
main values with important democratic resonance. It may no longer be (indeed, it
may never have been) a feasible lodestar for choice of law analysis, but it still makes a
stron claim to consideration.
Respecting the expectations of persons operating in international or cyberspace
transactions does not mean that regard should be had only to international or cyber-
space norms. International disputes implicate both national and international inter-
ests, and thus a national law addressing such disputes might appropriately have regard
to national as well as international considerations. Cyberspace disputes implicate both
cyberspace and offline norms, and thus adjudication of cyberspace conduct must con-
sider both cyberspace and offline norms. This is why I disassociate myself from those
scholars who seek to have cyberspace regulated solely by cybernorms. See supra notes
224, 264.
270 One concern that reference to such norms might cause is how courts are to as-
certain such norms: which postnational groupings are to be given consideration? This
problem is less significant when reference is made only to conventional, formal
sources. The validity of such sources is determined by what H.L.A. Hart called "secon-
dary rules," more particularly, "rules of recognition." H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 92-93, 97-107 (1961) (defining "secondary rules" as those rules that ascertain, in-
troduce, eliminate, or vary primary rules of obligation). But no such secondary rules
exist with respect to norms developed without reference to a traditional sovereign.
Although one could argue that the nondispositive nature of the norm of any single
grouping mitigates this concern, the legitimacy and the efficiency of my proposal re-
quires that courts develop secondary rules for determining the relevance of such addi-
tional norms. Cf. Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchan 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (discuss-
ing the conditions under which norms can fairly and efficiently evolve and how the
new law merchant can incorporate those norms). Moreover, absent such secondary
rules, there is a danger that certain communities would be accorded too much power
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Finally, so-called "conflicts principles" should be considered. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations contains a ready-made list that is not
dramatically different from considerations applied in domestic
cases.2 ' For example, it will be important to develop rules that do not
further a race to the bottom by overemphasizing the rules of a place
in which pirates can establish operations with impunity. In the mari-
time context, in Lauritzen v. Larsen,272 the U.S. Supreme Court empha-
sized that, in determining the law applicable to an on-board accident,
it would accord little weight to the place where the contract between
seaman and vessel owner was made because that would be "not un-
likely in the long run to diminish hirings in ports of countries that
take best care of their seamen."75 Similarly, choice of law analysis
should take into account the goal of ensuring uniformity of treatment.
In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he purpose of a con-
flict-of-laws doctrine is to assure that a case will be treated in the same
way under the appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous circum-
stances which often determine the forum. '74 This latter objective has
been a consideration in most, but not all, choice of law models. '7
in developing contemporary copyright law and that such power would go largely unno-
ticed. Cf Super Tuesday, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 8, 2000, at 17 (noting challenge by
the Voter Integrity Project to online voting in the Arizona democratic presidential
primary election). See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A
Skeptical View From Liberal Democratic Theoy, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000) (critiquing
claim that a self-governing cyberspace would more fully realize liberal democratic ide-
als).
271 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS Lkw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2) (1987) (providing that the determination whether the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction is unreasonable should be based on factors that include: the "link of activ-
ity to the territory of the regulating state," the character of the activity to be regulated,
the connections between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated, the existence ofjustified expectations, and the extent
of competing state interests); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the factors necessary to determine "rea-
sonableness" in the exercise of prescriptivejurisdiction).
272 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
27. Id. at 588.
274 Id. at 591.
275 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 6 (1971) (identifying the
principles by which to determine applicable law, and including "certainty, predictabil-
ity and uniformity of result"). This was not a concern of Brainerd Currie, the father of
governmental interest analysis. See CURRIE, supra note 244, at 169 (advocating a
"harder and closer look at the ideal of uniformity"). Achievement of this objective may
also be heavily dependent upon different jurisdictions applying the same choice of law
rule, providing a further reason for implementing the approach advanced in this Arti-
cle by means of an international convention. See infra note 342 (discussing the means
of implementing this proposal).
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iii. Application of the Substantive Law Method
How would this approach to copyright choice of law work in prac-
tice? At first blush, one might think that the answer is unclear be-
cause it is difficult to predict how judges in a range of countries will
develop an approach avowedly different in concept from that pres-
ently employed to resolve international conflicts of laws in most of
those countries. Yet, although the precise conflicts methodology
would be new," 6 the thought process for which it calls consciously
mimics in different ways what modem judges do both in purely do-
mestic cases and in multistate cases within the United States.277 To il-
lustrate, and to develop further some aspects of the substantive law
method discussed above, let us consider some variants on a hypotheti-
cal private international litigation.
Sam Appletart is an American artist and the owner of the copy-
right in a series of four paintings entitled "Liberty." Appletart has li-
censed the U.S. publication of the Liberty series in various formats,
including in coffee-table books of modem American art and in text-
books on American art. She discovers that a reproduction of the Lib-
erty series has been posted, without her permission, on a web site
hosted by a university in the (fictitious) European country of Caledo-
nia (which, like the United States, is a signatory to the Berne Conven-
tion, TRIPS, and the WIPO Copyright Treaty). The paintings had
been scanned into digital format by the university. The paintings are
posted on a web page established for a university course on contem-
porary North American art. The university imposes no restrictions on
access to the web page; it adheres to the view that education is the
right of all citizens and that free access to course materials is consis-
tent with this philosophy. It also does not wish to use precious univer-
sity resources on technological devices to restrict access to class mem-
bers; it has discovered from experience that students are remarkably
adept at circumventing such measures and that the cost of ensuring
effective protection is prohibitive.
The Caledonian university has a sister-university relationship with
New York University, which involves student and faculty exchanges
276 But see supra text accompanying notes 229-32 (discussing historical antece-
dents).
277 Claiming that what I require involves nothing more than the usual processes of
judicial interpretation is, of course, a standard ploy among conflict scholars. This
probably speaks more to the eclecticism of modem methods of judging rather than
any disingenuousness on the part of conflicts scholars.
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and the administration of a summer program in New York City.78 The
web site is accessible from the United States. Let us assume that the
unauthorized posting of the paintings would constitute infringement
under U.S. law (if applicable). Although the use in question falls out-
side the specific exemptions contained in the Copyright Act for edu-
cational uses,' 3 educational uses are favored under the doctrine of fair
use."' The nonprofit nature of the university would also bolster a
claim of fair use.28' But these considerations are not dispositive. s2
The posting of the paintings without further second-comer creative
activity is probably not transformative, 83 a consideration fast becom-
284ing the central question in fair use analysis. And, although the uni-
%78 This most likely makes the university subject to personal jurisdiction in New
York.
21,9 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994) (exempting performances of copyrighted works
given by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a non-
profit education institution, provided that the performance takes place in a classroom
or other place devoted to teaching); id. § 110(2) (exempting certain transmissions of
nondramatic literary works in instructional settings, conditional upon the existence of
a limited reception network).
2- See id. § 107 (including teaching as an illustrative use that might, after due con-
sideration of statutory factors, be a fair use).
See id. § 107(1) (instructing courts to consider whether a use is for nonprofit
educational, as opposed to commercial, purposes in determining a claim of fair use);
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-67 (1976) (suggesting that nonprofit educational use is a
good indication of fair use).
22 See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a large-scale reproduction by an educational service of
copyrighted works originally broadcast on television did not constitute fair use). In
Crooks, the primary market for the plaintiff's products was educational in nature, and a
licensing arrangement was available. Here, the posting of the paintings on the web
probably does not impinge upon several important primary markets for the work,
where the originals or hard-copy prints of high quality are essential.
2" A mere change in medium will not ordinarily be considered transformative. See
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
mere photocopying onto a new physical copy cannot properly be regarded as a trans-
formative use of copyrighted material); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150
F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the unaltered retransmission of a radio
broadcast by a different means designed to permit customers to listen in areas outside
the broadcast organization's reception area was not a transformative use); cf Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. FA.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1525-26 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding
unmodified posting intended to foster dialogue to be fair use). See generally Pierre N.
Leal, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (discussing the rele-
vance of transformativeness in the fair use inquiry).
UM See Laura Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doc-
trine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995) (questioning the value of focusing on transformative-
ness); Diane L. Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They Seem "Transformed":
Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46J. COP'RIGHT SOCT' U.S.A. 251 (1999) (same). But cf.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding fair use
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versity may need to post the paintings in their entirety to fulfill its ob-
jectives of art appreciation,"5 several courts have placed significant
weight, even after the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music,286 on whether a market mechanism for licensing the use of
the work is in place. The fact that Appletart has licensed the use of
the paintings in textbooks suggests that some market for the work ex-
ists. 2 8 In short, Appletart would have an arguable case that this is not
fair use. Indeed, even if the university's activities would have been
privileged in the hard-copy world (i.e., if the class members had been
given a hard copy reproduction of the paintings),21 it is not clear how
these privileges apply in the digital worldY.
Let us also assume that Caledonian law offers broad exceptions to
educational institutions to reproduce copyrighted material for instruc-
tional purposes. In an effort to encourage distance-learning-Cale-
donia is a large country with students in far-flung locales-it has ex-
tended its broad exemptions into the digital environment. Thus, if
U.S. law applies to the university's activities, the web site would be
held to be infringing. An injunction would ordinarily issue to restrain
where use was not transformative).
28 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-89 (1994) (noting that
the amount of permissible fair use copying varies with the amount needed by users to
serve their fair use purpose).
286 Id.
287 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (evaluating the extent of harm to the plaintiff's market
caused by unlicensed copying and noting that licenses could have been obtained
through existing mechanisms, namely departments maintained by plaintiffs and the
Copyright Clearance Center); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929-30 (placing weight
on the existence of a licensing mechanism operated by the Copyright Clearance Cen-
ter).
2 It would not matter, however, whether Appletart was already exploiting a par-
ticular market; the focus is on potential markets. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-98 (em-
phasizing that the owner of copyright in a rock and roll ballad is entitled to receive the
value of exploitation in both primary and derivative markets, such as the market for
rap versions of the song, and is entitled to protect such derivative markets even if he
has not yet entered them).
289 Cf. Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not for Profit Educa-
tional Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-
71 (1976) (establishing guidelines for classroom copying of books and periodicals).
2W See Spoor, supra note 69, at 40 (noting that the potential impact of digitization is
such that existing user privileges in the off-line world might not simply translate into
parallel digital privileges); D.J.G. Visser, The Netherlands National Report, in COPYRIGHT
IN CYBERsPACE 124, 130 (Marcelle Dellebeke ed., 1997) (suggesting that it was unclear
whether educational copying exceptions under Dutch law applied in the digital envi-
ronment such that "making a work available in a very small network that would only
reach (the equivalent of) one classroom might be covered by the existing educational
use exception").
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infringement. If Caledonian law applies, the university would get off
scot-free. Which law should apply?
Under a traditional analysis, one would consider the place where
the alleged infringement occurred. Although the initial act of repro-
duction occurred in Caledonia, could a U.S. court find U.S. conduct
sufficient to justify the application of U.S. law? The short answer is
that a U.S. court could almost certainly (by virtue of access to the web
site in the United States) construe the Caledonian web site as impli-
cating the publication of the work (i.e., the distribution of copies to
the public) in the United States.2' Under this reading, and adopting
a traditional approach to choice of law, U.S. law would almost cer-
tainly be applied by the U.S. court.2 9
How would this dispute be resolved under the method proposed
in this Article? A federal court in the United States would develop a
substantive rule to decide this type of international case, considering
all relevant interests-national, international, and postnational.2
1: See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ordering an Italian web site to prohibit U.S. users from gaining access
to the allegedly infringing site); see also Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instru-
ment Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995) (deciding that performance occurs at
place of receipt of satellite transmission); National Football League v. TVRadioNow
Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1831, 1834-35 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that where defendants
originated the streaming of copyrighted programming over the internet from a web
site in Canada, public performances occurred in the United States because users in the
United States could access the web site and receive and view the defendants' streaming
of the copyrighted material). For a full analysis of this argument, see Ginsburg, Cybe-
rian Captivity, supra note 218, at 354-57.
'2 See T1RadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1837-38 (declining to address whether
streaming of copyrighted programming was permissible under Canadian law because
plaintiffs sought relief against public performances in the United States that occurred
when users in the United States accessed the web site in Canada and received and
xiewed the streamed programming); Ginsburg, Cyberian Captiviiy, supra note 218, at
356-57; cf Austin, supra note 189, at 4 (suggesting an approach that would apply U.S.
law only to copyright infringements-that is, publication-occurring within the United
States).
'., It should also be recognized that the substantive law method may in appropri-
ate circumstances result in the application of purely national norms, if the courts de-
termine that the case is essentially more national than international. See supra note
265. For example, if a print for a motion picture is made in the United States and pub-
licly performed in movie theaters in six different countries, and if the authority of the
defendant to do so is challenged, then the existence of separately bargained-for rights
under different national markets might warrant an insistence upon serial application
of separate national laws. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney
Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing order dismissing claims under sev-
eral separate foreign copyright laws on forum non conveniens grounds). In such cir-
cumstances, permitting the plaintiff to sue in the United States based upon separate
foreign copyright laws might best give respect to the foreign laws. But if the predicate
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The court would first look at the national laws implicated by the dis-
pute, namely those of Caledonia and the United States. 94 Consistent
with modem American approaches to choice of law, the court would
consider not only the bare rule, but also the purposes that undergird
it. Scholars and courts have explained in great detail the need to un-
derstand the purposes underlying a rule in order to identify (and re-
spect) the interests of the states involved in having their laws applied.
And, although analysis of the purposes behind foreign laws has its pit-
falls, 9' access to foreign materials is continually improving.2  Indeed,
it may be that a full understanding of the purposes underlying a law
are even more essential to an appreciation of the meaning and import
of a foreign law than is the case with the law of a different U.S. state.
Bare words may be more readily susceptible to different (and incor-
rect) meanings when cultural and linguistic divides are crossed.
This consideration of national laws distinguishes my approach
from that advocated by cyberlaw proponents (who Jack Goldsmith has
called "regulation skeptics"2 97), namely the application of cybemorms
without regard to the physical space in which the cyberactors are situ-
ated. Just as application of U.S. law (under the traditional approach)
U.S. activity becomes more central to the transaction, the claim to apply certain aspects
of U.S. law (for example, remedies granting attorneys' fees) might become stronger.
Yet this example should not be taken to suggest that only cyberspace transactions
can be subject to the full rigors of the substantive law method. The theoretical justifi-
cations adumbrated above apply with as much normative force to any international
transaction, although the pragmatic, practical appeal of the methodology may have
more resonance in the cyberspace context. For example, if a global event such as the
Olympics is being televised around the world and a copyright dispute arises with re-
spect to the worldwide transmission of the motion picture, the law of the site of the
Olympics would indeed have a strong claim to regulate that dispute, but that claim
may need to be tempered by the recognition that the global effects may be more sub-
stantial than the local conduct.
294 One could, of course, argue that the laws of any number of countries are impli-
cated if one adopts the reading of "publication" tendered in the text. This may seem
more daunting than it is likely to be in practice, because there will only be so many
variations in rules among the interested countries.
25 See Donald T. Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 469 (1967) (sug-
gesting different understandings of the purpose of the Ontario guest statute at issue in
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)); see also Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286
N.E.2d 454, 455 (N.Y. 1972) (noting that the seminal decision in Babcock may have
been based on an erroneous understanding of the purpose of the Ontario law in ques-
tion).
296 See P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and
New Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REV. 165, 175 (1994) (discussing the effect of enhanced
access to information on whether civil law or common law forms of reasoning will
likely7prevail internationally).Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 1199.
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would ignore the spillover effect that U.S. rules would have on the
Caledonian education system, so too exclusive reliance on cybernorms
ignores the spillover effect that digital rules have on terrestrial actors
and events. The substantive law method will consider each of these
affected interests.
What would examination of the purposes of the different rules re-
veal? It would reveal first that Caledonia does offer copyright protec-
tion to works of art; it is not a copyright haven. If it were, we might
adopt a less generous attitude to the exceptions. Moreover, an ex-
amination of the Berne Convention reveals a solicitude for educa-
tional uses of copyrighted works. Article 10(2) provides that countries
may permit the use, "to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary
or artistic works by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or
sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is
compatible with fair practice."5 5 This suggests that the Caledonian
policy is entitled to some weight.
The U.S. position is also entitled to some weight, however. The
TRIPS Agreement is premised upon the ability of copyright owners to
exploit the value of copyrighted works in foreign markets; indeed, the
Caledonian activity may impede the ability of Appletart to exploit ex-
isting markets both domestically and abroad. Moreover, a market for
the product exists, suggesting that the Caledonian use will interfere
with the normal exploitation of the work. 9  (Indeed, the free access
; Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 10(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 38; see also WIPO
Copyright Treaty, supra note 36, pmbl. cl. 5 ("Recognizing the need to maintain a bal-
ance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research and access to information." (emphasis added)).
.I See TRIPS Agreement art. 13 (requiring signatory states to confine any limita-
tions to "certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder");
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 36, art. 10 (adopting the same test). There is a
danger of reading a Texaco-like interpretation of "normal markets" into Article 13. See
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing
markets relevant to the question of harm and giving weight to the existence of licens-
ing mechanisms in an existing market). If this occurs, national laws could never seek
to recalibrate the balance in copyright law by creating a new exception or limitation
for a circumstance in which the copyright owner could previously have extracted a li-
cense fee. Construed in this fashion, Article 13 could embody a one-way ratchet un-
suited to the dynamic and uncertain state of the means by which works will be ex-
ploited in the digital environment. Cf Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1996), available at
http://wAw.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/distrib/96dc.htm ("Contracting Parties [may]
carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and
exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the
Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit Con-
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means that Appletart's noneducational markets may also be affected
in addition to the educational market.)
Certain considerations suggest that the court should strive for a
middle ground. First, U.S. policy on distance learning has not yet de-
veloped;3 U.S. law has not yet adopted a firm position on the scope of
educational exceptions in the digital environment. Second, the con-
cept of fair practices embodied in the Berne Convention encourages
the reference to external norms. Practices both in the educational
community and the internet community appear to be appropriate ref-
erents. Both probably favor some latitude to the university. Finally,
comity suggests that U.S. courts recognize the different educational
challenges with which the Caledonian university is faced by virtue of
the geography of that country.
So what solutions should the court consider? At either extreme,
the court could apply U.S. law (and grant an injunction)M° or apply
Caledonian law (and deny relief). Under traditional choice of law
analysis this would be the limit of a court's choice. But the substantive
law method suggests that the court develop a solution that accommo-
dates more than one interest. M2 The two most obvious practical solu-
tions are requiring the university to impose technological measures
tracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the
digital network environment."). The public international law standards can be viewed
as a baseline for the development of international principles through the substantive
law method. But, as discussed above, see supra Part II.C.2, the international law stan-
dards should not be interpreted in an activist manner, and thus I view them as impos-
ing only general limits on national autonomy, with further refinement of the appro-
priate standards to be pursued by the process discussed in this part of the Article-
namely the use of the substantive law method in international copyright litigation. See
supra note 155.
For a thorough discussion of the issues raised by distance learning, see U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DIsTANcE EDUCATION (1999).
301 As a practical matter, the enforcement of the injunction would likely be pur-
sued through contempt proceedings. Foreign courts are more likely to enforce judg-
ments awarding financial penalties than orders purporting to regulate conduct on
their soil.
302 Cf. Proposed Information Society Directive Common Position, supra note 147,
art. 5(3) (a) (permitting exceptions from scope of reproduction right where the use is
for the sole purpose of teaching and there is acknowledgment of source and provision
for fair compensation). Publishers have argued that a compensation condition is es-
sential because the "cost of... educational ... policies ought to be assumed by society
as a whole and not only by rightholders." Charles Clark, Net Law: A Cyberspace Agenda
for Publishers, 3J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 97, 105-06 (2000). But, even if free copying
were permitted, society as a whole would bear that cost. If educational institutions
bear the cost of reproduction, the ultimate bearer of that cost will depend upon the
means by which the educational system is funded.
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restricting access to class students... or requiring payment of some li-
cense fee to Appletart (but denying an injunction) . The former
measure interferes to some extent with the educational philosophy of
the Caledonian University, but permits it to continue its core mission.
The latter measure fails to provide Appletart with full exclusive rights
in her works, which (even with the grant of a license to others) would
ordinarily permit her to deny certain individuals authority to repro-
duce her worksY5 Which of these solutions should be adopted might
depend upon the extent to which technological measures would inter-
fere with the educational mission (as to which, cost would be rele-
vant),3,6 and the extent to which it would be possible to make the
value of the license reflect the losses that Appletart would suffer.
Let us assume further that a U.S. web site, www.greatart.com, es-
tablishes a link to the university web site in Caledonia. Might the web
site be liable to Appletart under U.S. law? Here, U.S. law is even less
clearly developed; U.S. courts have not yet established the parameters
of permissible linking."' Two arguments for liability might be, first,
that providing a hypertext link to an infringing site facilitates direct
infringement by users in a manner that amounts to contributory in-
" A third alternative might be to deny access from the United States. Territorial-
ists would support the imposition of such technological measures because this would
create legal borders where none in fact exist. See Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 484-85
(presenting arguments in support of territorial regulation of internet transactions).
This might appear to suggest an elegant solution to the problems caused by cyber-
space, but this is descriptively and normatively unhelpful. At the practical level, such
restrictions may be easily circumvented and at some level (although, to be sure, not
simply because one person can circumvent them) they become ineffective. Norma-
tively, this regressive approach discards one of the great social benefits of the internet,
namely, the enhanced public access to a number of works throughout the world. See
supra note 25.
-" See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (acknowl-
edging that the goals of copyright law are not always best served by injunctive relief).
, See Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1985)
(recognizing that the grant by the author of a license to one licensee to publish his
work does not prevent him stopping others from publishing without authorization, but
holding that the unpublished nature of a work cuts against a finding of fair use).
K Cf Germany to Enforce Child-Friendly Internet, CHI. TRIB., July 5, 1997, § 1, at 4
(noting German law holding access providers liable if they are aware of content illegal
in German) and fail to "use technically possible and reasonable" measures to block
that content).
-,,7 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (creating safe harbors for service pro-
viders who provide information location tools, conditioned upon compliance with sev-
eral detailed requirements including lack of knowledge of infringement, no commer-
cial benefit from the direct infringement, and removal of the link upon formal
notification by copyright owner).
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fringement,305 or, second, that (if the link is not clean, but instead es-
tablishes a framed version of the infringing site) the framing link re-
sults in the creation of a derivative work."'0 Although each of these
theories has been presented to U.S. courts, the ensuing opinions have
been largely unsatisfying. On one level, the theories can formally be
supported: if the linker is aware of the direct infringement that it is
facilitating (the user's alleged infringement), then the elements of
contributory infringement are formally satisfied; if the link causes the
reproduction of the protected work within an external frame, the
work is arguably transformed or recast in a way that involves the
preparation of a derivative work. Yet, the case endorsing the former
theory failed to consider whether the user's acts of browsing, although
prima facie infringement, might otherwise be excused."' And no
308 See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1294-95 (D. Utah 1999) (finding contributory liability where defendants "ac-
tively directed" the public to infringing works posted on the web). Other cases have
been filed in the United States alleging copyright infringement based upon linking to
an allegedly infringing site, but these have been dismissed without comment. See, e.g.,
Bernstein v.JC Penney Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (involving links to an
allegedly infringing site in Sweden); cf. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1344, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that infringement does not occur by
reason alone of "deep linking" to interior pages of plaintiff's web site). The classic
statement of the doctrine of contributory infringement is that "one who, with knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infring-
ing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory infringer.'" Gershwin
Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (denying claim
of contributory infringement where equipment used to facilitate copying, videocassette
recorders, had a substantial noninfringing use). One Dutch court has premised copy-
right liability on providing links to infringing materials. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Da-
taweb B.V. and Spaink, No. 96/1048 (Dist. Ct. of the Hague, Civil Law Sector, June 9,
1999); see also IFPI Belgium v. Beckers, [2000] E.C.D.R. 440 (Ct. First Instance, 1999)
(enjoining links to internet sites containing unauthorized MP3 files). Some scholars
have commented (somewhat optimistically, I would suggest) that the decision would
affect only publishers in Holland. See Dan Goodin, Scientologists' Copyfight Suit Shapes
Net Liability, CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-343442.html
(June 9, 1999). On the liability for linking under German and U.S. laws, see Torsten
Bettinger & Stefan Freytag, CivilLaw Responsibility ForLinks, 30 1.I.C. 883 (1999).
309 See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 2005, 2009-10
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and reasoning that a framed
link could constitute a derivative work); see also Ticketmaster Corp., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1346
(noting that hyperlinking of itself involves no violation of the Copyright Act because it
involves no copying).
310 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994) (giving the copyright owner the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work).
In one regard it is unsurprising that the Utah Lighthouse court failed to consider
whether the act of browsing constituted the necessary direct infringement (or was pro-
tected, for example, by fair use). See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 (failing to
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court considering either theory has given any significant attention to
the question of whether linking might be accorded greater latitude
given its centrality to the operation of the world wide web."
Even if the U.S. courts were to find that linking to an infringing
work gave rise to potential contributory infringement liability (de-
pending upon the mental state of the linker), would it matter that the
infringing work was found in Caledonia (where it was not considered
infringing)? Under traditional analysis, it would be of no avail that
the web site was in Caledonia because, as discussed above, this could
by virtue of U.S. accessibility be reconceptualized as publication within
the United States. That is, a related direct infringement in the United
States could be made out under the traditional theory.
Application of the substantive law method might permit accom-
modation of the myriad interests that are implicated by this fact pat-
tern, and it might also contribute to a converging international ap-
proach to the question of linking. The strength of the different
national laws' position on linking would be considered; U.S. law is un-
settled, and let us assume that Caledonian law is also undeveloped 3
consider the fair use doctrine when proceeding on the assumption that the act of
browsing the infringing web site constituted infringement). In cases applying the
predicate act theory to recover foreign profits, U.S. courts have (with one notable ex-
ception) failed to analyze whether the foreign acts for which recovery of damages was
sought were actionable under the copyright law of the foreign country in question. See
supra note 185. To be sure, in recent cases considering whether the domestic authori-
zation of foreign acts supported subject matter jurisdiction under the U.S. Copyright
Act, the Ninth Circuit stressed that contributory infringement could only exist under
the U.S. statute if there existed an actionable direct infringement. See Subafilms, Ltd.
v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
("Contributory infringement under the 1909 Act developed as a form of third party
liability. Accordingly, there could be no liability for contributory infringement unless
the authorized or otherwise encouraged activity itself could amount to infringe-
ment."). But in this latter context also, the Subafilms court considered whether a direct
infringement action existed under U.S. copyright law rather than whether such a viola-
tion had occurred abroad under the foreign law in question. See id. at 1089.
12 Cf Kelly v. Arriba Software, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (suggest-
ing that the new technological environment in which a defendant's use is occurring
might alter the outcome of a fair use inquiry); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin,
No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct.Jan. 21, 2000) (declining to en-
join links to a DeCSS program that unlocked technological protection on DVD format-
ted motion pictures and noting that "links to other websites are the mainstay of the
Internet and indispensable to its convenient access to the vast world of information").
See generally Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Recent Linking Issues, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8,
2000, at 3 (discussing the McLaughlin case).
As a general matter, U.S. copyright law tends to be more developed than other
countries, especially in matters involving technologically advanced activities. Indeed,
this has caused some foreign commentators to explore the extent to which regard
should be had to U.S. case law even in domestic cases. SeeAztech Sys. Pte Ltd. v. Crea-
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This would suggest that the interests of each state in the application of
a rule closely approximating the currently unsettled rule of their own
law are not strong.34 International law also provides few answers.
Here, postnational practices may be particularly helpful because link-
ing is uniquely a web-based activity. Reference to web norms will likely
reveal that different types of linking are used: clean surface linking,
clean deep links, and framing links. Each of these serves a different
function in web-based business and communication models; but each
is not equally essential to the viability of the web and thus to the value
of encouraging authors to make the broadest possible dissemination
of works (one of the purposes of the Berne Convention).
The solutions that a court might consider may therefore include
regulation of the different types of linking that can be used in differ-
ent settings, and again compromise solutions such as rights of com-
pensation might be considered in lieu of injunctive relief. Although it
is unclear which solution a court following the substantive law method
would or should develop, it is clear that such a court would be af-
forded much greater flexibility than courts applying the alternative
approaches canvassed by other scholars. The regressive technologist
might mandate the taking down of the link unless a technological
measure could be developed to restrict activation of the link by a user
in the United States (which is not yet effectively possible)." The ten-i-
torialist would consider only whether there was publication in the
United States and whether that was knowingly and substantially facili-
tive Tech. Ltd., 1996 F.S.R. 54 (Sing. High Ct. 1995) (using U.S. copyright case law in
the absence of developed Singapore law), rev'd on other grounds, 1997 F.S.R. 491 (Sing.
1996); Estelle Derclaye, Software Copyright Protection: Can Europe Learn From American
Case Law? Part I, 22 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 7 (2000) (examining whether American
precedents will be a useful guide for European judges). The internet may, however,
have leveled out this tendency; notwithstanding the predomination of U.S. users of the
internet, case law has been quite vigorous in surprisingly diverse locales. For example,
the first case filed on the question of linking arose out of the activities of local newspa-
pers on the Shetland Islands in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. See Shetland
Times Ltd. v. Wills, 1997 Sess. Cas. 316 (Outer House 1996) (Scot.) (holding that link-
ing could constitute copyright infringement). Few places are more physically remote.
314 Cf Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 727 (Cal. 1978) (ex-
plaining consideration of "history and current status" of state laws in applying "the
comparative impairment approach to the resolution of true conflicts").
One U.S. court has noted that, "[w] here... a new use and new technology are
evolving, the broad transformative purpose of the use weighs more heavily than the
inevitable flaws in its early stages of development." Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. Un-
der this reasoning, the Kelly court found that a "visual search engine" that copied im-
ages in the course of indexing images necessary to fulfill its search engine function was
protected under the fair use doctrine notwithstanding that, in the early stages of de-
velopment, the search engine engaged in copying that was not necessary to its func-
tion. Id.
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tated by the link. A "nerve center" theorist might be willing to apply
U.S. law to the entire arrangement and order the taking down of the
link. And the cyberisolationist would look only to the norms of cyber-
space without consideration of the interests of the states involved or of
the principles found by analogy in the international system.
c. Advantages as an Instrument of International Copyright Lawmaking
This approach has several advantages as a means (but not the sole
means) of internationalization of copyright. Using the substantive law
method to develop international norms harnesses the generative fac-
ulty of international litigation.16 There is a public value to litigation
beyond the resolution of disputes between warring private parties. 7
Moreover, like activist WTO adjudication, using private law mecha-
nisms to develop norms of copyright law applicable to international
disputes permits attention to issues raised by new technology. The
approach of "choosing" applicable law is inherently conservative; it
ensures that innovations necessary to achieve the best substantive re-
sult take the form of manipulating conflicts rules rather than develop-
ing copyright rules. That is, forcing courts to decide between existing
rules makes them more backward-looking. Using the substantive
choice of law method as part of international lawmaking can supply
the dynamism appropriately missing from classical public interna-
tional lawmaking 8
_4" Of course, one might recognize the generative force of adjudication but be
more skeptical of its value or worth. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (FR DE SItCLE) (1997) (discussing the ideology of adjudication).
See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27,40
(1993) (Steens,J., dissenting) (suggesting restraints on the capacity of parties to settle
their case on condition of vacating the lower court opinion, and noting that judicial
opinions "are not merely the property of private litigants"). In this vein, in Creative
Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., Judge Ferguson dissented from the forum non
conveniens dismissal of a copyright infringement litigation from the U.S. courts, defer-
ring to the courts of Singapore, on the grounds that the dismissal deprived the U.S.
courts of the opportunity to address an important and unresolved question of copy-
right law affecting computer software. 61 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 1995) (Ferguson J.,
dissenting).
-41 Traditionally, choice of law and harmonization are cast as alternative means of
accommodating international differences. Choice of law analysis involves difficult de-
cisions where harmonization has failed to eradicate differences in national laws; har-
monization of national laws reduces the importance of choice of law determinations
where those determinations have become too troublesome or uncertain. The latter
obsenration explains in part the recent explosion in copyright harmonization efforts.
But the substantive law method would enlist one strategy in the cause of the other, by
facilitating the convergence of different national rules applicable to international dis-
putes. See infra note 319 (discussing the relevance of examination of common sources
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The substantive law method will achieve this, however, without in-
curring the costs associated with broad WTO lawmaking. In particu-
lar, the parties bringing private disputes to courts, and thus having in-
put to the development of international norms, are likely to be more
diverse (or at least different) from those having input into the con-
duct of WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The disintermediation
involved in enabling direct input to the production of international
norms by a number of groups will remove the filters that threaten to
confine the range of voices heard in the public international lawmak-
ing process. In this fashion, private international copyright lawmak-
ing may claim to facilitate the pluralized perspective required by the
range of contemporary social and economic activities now affected by
copyright.
A further strength of this means of developing international
norms is, ironically, its relative weakness. States would remain free to
deviate from multinational standards developed by other countries'
courts,319 although reference to the practices of other national courts
devising international solutions would be encouraged.3' ° But any con-
cordance with the standards of another court would be based upon
the force of reason rather than trade sanctions, perhaps a more en-
during basis for long-term convergence and acceptance of interna-
to convergence of results).
319 The ability of national courts to deviate from the rules applied by foreign courts
to international disputes both recognizes the value of national experimentation and
acknowledges that the rules developed by national courts under this approach are, at
bottom, local rules of law to be applied in international cases. This does not under-
mine the project of internationalization, in support of which I advance this proposal.
To be sure, the lack of a centralized superior court (such as the European Court of
Justice or the U.S. Supreme Court) to referee between competing solutions may delay
imposition of a universal international rule. But long-term harmonization will as likely
result from the conscious efforts of national courts to nudge closer to each other; well
reasoned decisions of the courts of one country should have a magnetic attraction to
courts in other countries. Harmonization by persuasion rather than centralized com-
pulsion, coupled with the freedom to accommodate diverse national priorities, may
ultimately be more enduring. And in the interim, it is likely that national courts fol-
lowing the substantive law method will converge to a far greater extent than national
courts do at present, because they would be considering the same or similar norms and
sources of law (as opposed to the purely national sources to which they presently
look). In short, the differences between a French court applying an international rule
and a U.S. court applying an international rule are likely to be significantly less than a
French court applying French law and a U.S. court applying U.S. law. Differences that
may remain are likely to be on the margins rather than in fundamental respects. In-
deed, those differences may be not only an acceptable (reduced) cost but also a desir-
able recognition and accommodation of national difference within a global market.
320 See supra note 263 (discussing the benefits of comparative analysis of decisions
of foreign courts in the search for solutions).
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tional standards.'" Pending such convergence, there would develop a
range of alternative visions of international copyright in a way not pos-
sible with the publication of a WTO ruling. 2  Reliance on this
method of international lawmaking may thus permit a richer body of
experience from which to construct ideal principles of copyright law
than would the premature articulation of an international rule by a
NAWTO panel (which may suppress the useful educational role of dispa-
rate national systems as comparativist experiments).
Indeed, the "weak" nature of this form of developing appropriate
international norms affords important latitude also to the state whose
courts articulate the standard. Unlike a WTO dispute settlement rul-
ing, a court decision articulating international standards is more read-
ily subject to legislative reversal, and thus more closely linked to the
democratic process.
d. Troublesome Issues
So what has in the past prevented the adoption of this approach
in conflicts of laws generally? What constrains courts to choose (and
scholars to suggest that courts choose) between existing rules? Why is
the multinational setting of the facts a variable that is treated differ-
ently from any other factual variable? I discuss three possibilities here:
effect on certainty, the legitimacy ofjudicial lawmaking, and inherent
biases in judicial lawmaking.
i. Certainty
The question of certainty is important. Indeed, participants in
copyright industries might be willing to exchange some optimality of
legal rules ex post for certainty ex ante.323 But to the extent that such
34 See H. Lauterpacht, The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of
Thought in International Law, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 31, 52 (1931) (arguing that the
power of judicial precedent is "in the long run not greater than the inherent value of
the legal substance embodied in it"); cf Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 332
(suggesting that the work of the panels and Appellate Body "should be carried on with
great care in the intellectual property area-terra incognita for the GATT/WTO sys-
tem-with attention not only to the outcome of a given case but to the persuasiveness
of the reasoning and explanations, for the parties and for the wider interests at stake").
- See supra Part II.C.2.d.ii (suggesting that activist WTO lawmaking may under-
mine the role of national copyright laws as laboratories for an international system).
"42 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 278 ("[T~he nature of the innova-
tion business is such that investments are made far in advance of commercialization. If
intellectual property law is to function as intended-to encourage investment in re-
search, development, dissemination, technical training, and technological infrastruc-
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participants are repeat actors, the benefit of such a calculation is di-
minished with every act of repetition. Thus, in the long term some ex
ante uncertainty might be worth the gains in terms of aptness of legal
rules. Moreover, current choice of law analysis arguably may induce
less predictability and certainty than the method proposed here.24
The proposal advanced here would not be the first time that
choice of law jurisprudence has cast off an ill-fitting raiment knowing
that it will be some time before a custom-made replacement is avail-
able. In Neumeier v. KuehneW" the NewYork Court of Appeals reviewed
the choice of law revolution that it had in part ignited nine years ear-
lier in Babcock v. Jackson 326 with its rejection of the invariable applica-
tion of the lex loci delicti in tort law:
When... we rejected the mechanical place of injury rule in personal
injury cases because it failed to take account of underlying policy consid-
erations, we were willing to sacrifice the certainty provided by the old
rule for the more just, fair and practical result that may best be achieved
by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which has the
greatest concern with, or interest in, the specific issue raised in the litiga-
tion.... In consequence of the change effected-and this was to be an-
ticipated-our decisions in multi-state highway accident cases.., have, it
must be acknowledged, lacked consistency....
The single all-encompassing rule which called, inexorably, for selec-
tion of the law of the place of injury was discarded, and wisely, because it
was too broad to prove satisfactory in application. There is, however, no
reason why choice of law rules, more narrow than previously devised,
should not be successfully developed, in order to assure a greater degree
of predictabilitysand uniformity, on the basis of our present knowledge
and experience.
The court thus concluded that "the time has come.., to endeavor
to minimize what some have characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case
approach by laying down guidelines, as well as we can, for the solution
tare-it must be made predictable long before disputes occur.").
324 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 25, at 112 n.279 (noting the complexity
of choice of law in copyright); cf Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Re-
thinking Conflicts, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 2448, 2449 (1999) (commenting that "[c]hoice of
law is a mess. That much is a truism."). The extent to which the approach sketched in
this Article endangers the certainty required for international commercial transactions
must be assessed in comparison to alternative choice of law approaches. A formal
commitment to territorialism in the current social and economic climate will result in
easy forum shopping, with the attendant uncertainties that flow from that activity.
32 31 N.Y.2d 121 (1972).
326 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484 (1963) (discarding the prior steadfast application of the
choice of law rule based on the lex loci delicti, and holding that the applicable choice of
law rule should also reflect consideration of other factors).
327 Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 127.
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of guest-host conflicts problems."3 28 Importantly, the court noted the
role that cases presented to the court and resolved through such an
"ad hoc" approach played in developing these new "rules": "Babcock
and its progeny enable us to formulate a set of basic principles that
may be profitably utilized, for they have helped us uncover the under-
lying values and policies which are operative in this area of the law."
329
The court thus acknowledged several steps in the process of construct-
ing a choice of law approach that is both flexible and fair. First, the
rigid approach must be torn down if an improved construct is to be
erected. Second, we must be willing to accept a period in which there
is a degree of "rubble" before the new construct is discovered and/or
created.". Third, a new construct will arise.38 And, fourth, the bricks
used to construct a new approach are made out of the raw material of
actual disputes presented to the court.
This last part of the process is particularly important. The Neu-
meier court acknowledged that the candid serial resolution of factually
situated disputes under a degree ofjudicial discretion, without the ties
of overly formalistic rules, helps to uncover the values and policies
that are most appropriately to be given weight by courts. Having un-
covered those values, courts "may proceed to the next stage in the evo-
lution of the law-the formulation of a few rules of general applicabil-
ity, promising a fair level of predictability."33 ' The facade of copyright
rules based upon territoriality needs to be stripped away, and a new
approach constructed. Some uncertainty is an inevitable, but worth-
while, short-term cost.
One particular certainty-based concern is worthy of mention. If
courts adopt a rule that in international copyright disputes they will
consciously take into account considerations other than domestic U.S.
copyright law, parties in domestic litigation with unfavorable positions
3 Id.
Id.
Cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE SOciAL STRucruRE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970) (discussing development of new paradigms in sciences).
'" In this, the legal construct will parallel the reconstruction of social rules when
the existing social structure is pulled down. See FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT
DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 263-77
(1999) (recounting the history of past "Great Disruptions" and the reconstitutions of
social order that they engendered); cf DAVID HAKKEN, CYBORGS@aGBERSPACE? AN
ETHNOGRAPHER LOOKS TO THE FUTURE 131 (1999) (noting that the "hegemony of the
nation is being deconstructed in current social practice as well as theory, but as yet nei-
ther 'reconstructed' terminology for describing macro-social relations nor viable struc-
tures for democratic control have emerged").
332 Neumeier, 31 N.Y.2d at 128.
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under that law might frame their dispute as international in nature in
order to persuade courts to ignore U.S. law.3" This concern has, in
fact, been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver, Co., the Court considered whether to enforce an arbitration
clause where one party to the contract wished to bring a private action
for securities fraud.3m Previously, the Court had held that private se-
curities claims could not be submitted to arbitration because they im-
plicated matters of public interest inappropriate for determination
outside the court system. 3" The Court distinguished its earlier deci-
sion on the ground that it had involved a domestic claim, whereas
Scherk involved an international commercial matter."M Justice Douglas
dissented on the ground that this opened a Pandora's box in that par-
ties could avoid the effect of the Court's earlier decision, denying the
right to arbitrate, simply by invoking an international contact.337 The
majority responded by noting that courts would have to develop case
law as to whether a set of facts is closer to the domestic fact pattern or
to the international fact pattern.3"8 The Supreme Court thus appears
unperturbed by this aspect of the judicial task. That said, in setting
the parameters of what should be regarded as national or multina-
tional, one might look at how the issue will affect the certainty of
commercial transactions.
In one sense, developing a separate set of rules for international
copyright cases comports closely with a key pragmatic component of
the Berne Convention. Under the Convention, while the substantive
minima are mandatory with respect to foreign Unionist authors,
Berne members may derogate from these minimum protections for
their own nationals (or works) on the theory that domestic norms may
333 Forum shopping would also likely be reduced because of the convergence of
sources to which different national courts would look in international cases. See supra
note 319.
334 See 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (holding that the agreement of the parties to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction is to be
respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of
the Arbitration Act).
3 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953) (holding that an agreement to
arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from seeking ajudicial remedy under
the Securities Act of 1933).
S6 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515 (explaining that a crucial difference between the
agreement in Wilko and the one in Scherk is that the Scherk agreement was truly interna-
tional).
$37 See id. at 528-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (fearing the "invocation of the 'inter-
national contract' talisman").338 See id. atS517 n.ll.
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apply to purely domestic disputes.9 The United States has taken ad-
vantage of this provision, for example, in requiring registration as a
prerequisite for an infringement suit only for domestic authors (or
works)." But this is generally more difficult to justify politically. It
might be easier tojustify if the more generous international norm ap-
plied equally to local and foreign authors operating in the same mul-
tinational environment; the differentiating variable would (under this
proposal) be the domestic or multinational nature of the case rather
than nationality or place of publication (as is presently the case). Y
Finally, concerns regarding the effect that the substantive law
method would have on commercial certainty seem unwarranted when
the one area in which anything approximating this approach is now
being pursued with enthusiasm is international commercial arbitra-
tion.
ii. Legitimacy
The democratic legitimacy of the process and its effect on sub-
stantive copyright law might, however, be worth pondering further.
Any proposal that judges candidly engage in lawmaking is likely to
raise concerns of legitimacyw Yet, judges do make law, and they have
M See Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 5(1), (3), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35 (requir-
ing that authors shall enjoy, in countries of the Union other than the country of ori-
gin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may grant to nationals, as well as
the rights specially granted by the Convention, for works protected by the Convention
but that protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law). Existing
copyright choice of law analysis may reference nationality in several ways. See Itar-Tass
Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1998) (con-
sidering nationality as relevant to the law applicable to the question of copyright own-
ership). And U.S. courts have taken the nationality of parties into account in other
ways without, they have argued, offending the principle of national treatment. See
Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the argument that
the preference given to choice of forum by a domestic, but not foreign, plaintiff in fo-
rum non conveniens analysis was inconsistent with the national treatment principle).
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1994) (requiring registration of copyright claims before
institution of actions for infringement of U.S. works); see also 17 U.S.C. § 104A (Supp.
IV 1998) (limiting the restoration of copyrights in certain works mandated by TRIPS to
non-U.S. works from a Berne or WTO country).
341 Moreover, a line between domestic and international settings, rather than do-
mestic or foreign nationals, better reflects social realities. Although the ability of
Berne countries to derogate from Berne minimum levels of protection attempts to en-
sure that "domestic norms may continue to apply to purely domestic copyright contro-
versies," Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 270, a nationality-based line does not effectuate that
consideration.
M2 This concern might be accommodated in the means by which the proposal ad-
vanced in this Article is implemented. Although courts (in the United States) can
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long made copyright law. Courts have been an important factor in
shaping the contours of domestic U.S. copyright law and policy; the
fair use doctrine is a notable example.143 The more pertinent question
is whether establishing international copyright norms, and applying
laws other than those promulgated by Congress, somehow diminishes
the legitimacy of the proposal in this Article.
A nexus between the law applied to a citizen and that citizen's
participation in the political process which gives rise to that law is im-
portant.344 My proposal accommodates this concern in three primary
adopt copyright "choice of law rules" as a matter of federal common law, see supra text
accompanying note 207, there exist other more cautious means by which to implement
the proposal advanced in this Article. The legitimacy of the proposal might be en-
hanced either by unilateral congressional legislative instruction to adopt such an ap-
proach or by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty under which signatory countries
agree to implement such an approach. Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo,
Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules and Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 493,
509 (1997) (discussing the means of implementing proposed Transnational Rules of
Civil Procedure, which would apply in national courts where parties were nationals of
different countries). The former approach-unilateral legislation incorporating such
standards in causes of action for copyright infringement involving an international
component-is politically unlikely. But the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994), which creates a cause of action for aliens in the United States based
upon violations of the "law of nations," might be a rough model in this regard. For a
discussion of the ATCA, see Chibundu, supra note 233. The latter alternative-to con-
clude an international agreement directing judicial attention to international stan-
dards in cases within its scope-may mirror the instruction that some scholars have
seen in the Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). See Van Alstine,
supra note 5, at 761 (describing the CISG). This approach might enhance domestic
political acceptability at a time when protection of U.S. intellectual property interests is
assuming greater political prominence. In other areas of international commerce, ef-
forts are continuing apace to conclude multilateral treaty systems modeled on the
CISG. These agreements, like the CISG, concentrate on the articulation of universal
substantive rules on such matters as accounts receivable financing, and thus have en-
countered delays in compromising common law and civil law philosophies on substan-
tive legal concepts (such as nonpossessory security interests). A treaty commitment to
the substantive law method in international copyright cases might necessitate fewer ex
ante compromises, leaving difficult questions to the courts in particular factual set-
tings. Agreeing to implement the substantive law method does not bind signatory
states to any particular substantive vision of copyright law. Moreover, it provides
signatory states greater assurance that if foreign courts assume jurisdiction over an in-
ternational copyright case in which it has an interest, its interest will be taken into ac-
count. The depth of that assurance would be tested only if signatory states also con-
cluded an international convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments.
See supra note 191 (discussing the proposed Hague Convention).
34 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (developing
the fair use doctrine); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 1976 WL 14045 (discussing the fair use doctrine). See generally
Wuj-IAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1985).
H4 Cf Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law-A Scot's View, 63
HARV. L. REV. 468, 475 (1950) (noting that "[plublic respect for law, without which
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ways. First, as noted above, this international lawmaking will exist
within a national setting. The courts that develop and apply this in-
ternational law will not be responsible to an amorphous international
society. They will be nationally appointed, nationally reviewed, and
nationally influenced. The national courts that develop international
norms are connected to a national legislative or political unit that can
revisit apparent judicial over-reaching. Indeed, framed alternatively
in the language of Walter Wheeler Cook's local law theory, this re-
mains the application of forum law. 5 That is, in terms of that theory,
it merely endorses the incorporation of foreign learning into the judi-
cial development of domestic law governing a particular (interna-
tional) fact pattern.
Second, the legitimacy of the endeavor is surely enhanced by ap-
plying an international solution to an international problem, rather
than squeezing matters into a domestic U.S. model and deciding it ac-
cording to domestic U.S. norms. The substantive law method treats
the "applicable law" as a truly international construct, thus reflecting a
growing social reality that citizens of the global community will
achieve input into international norms in a variety of different ways.
Third, the approach that I propose can be no more offensive to
national sovereignty than the wholesale application of foreign law. If
it is consistent with our existing notions ofjudicial duty either to apply
the forum law or the law of another state, the application of a law fal-
ling between that of the forum and the other state cannot be more of-
fensive to notions of democratic legitimacy or state sovereignty.
iii. Biases Inherent in the Nature of International Litigation
To some extent, the proposal advanced in this Part of the Article
reflects an underlying preference for new issues of copyright law to be
addressed by courts rather than legislatures. That is, it might be easier
for competing claims to be weighed by considering a particular set of
facts rather than in the abstract context of a legislative or treaty de-
bate. An analysis of the appropriate intrusion of national norms into
international settings probably cannot be answered deductively from
first principles of globalized society. And litigation may accommodate
law cannot exist and civilization itself is threatened, depends upon the law's ability to
satis : the average man's feeling for common justice visibly done").
See WNALTER 'WHEELER CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
OF LkVS 20-21 (1949) (suggesting that when a court applies a rule of foreign law, it is
in fact applying its own law but adopting as its own law a rule identical or similar to the
law of that foreign state).
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the range of interests involved in modem copyright disputes in a
more even-handed fashion than is possible through extensive reliance
on the legislative process. If lobbying efforts are not equal in the do-
mestic context, the disparities may become even greater when the
number and geographical location of lawmaking fora are increased."'
There is a danger, however, that an understanding of appropriate
international copyright norms developed through common law adju-
dication would become court-centered, with various other attendant
biases.M 7 For example, I argue in this Article that empowering judges
to incorporate international norms in their adjudicatory activities is
helpful in keeping copyright law current with rapidly changing tech-
nologies. But not all scholars have seen courts as faster and more re-
sponsive than legislative articulation. And to be sure, the necessarily
random manner in which issues come to courts precludes a compre-
346 See D.J.G. Visser, The Netherlands, in COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE 124, 131 (Marcel
Dellebeke ed., 1997) (discussing the extent to which lobbying affects available excep-
tions in Dutch copyright law). On the other hand, one could argue that public inter-
est groups previously insufficiently funded or staffed have had greater impact on re-
cent legislative efforts because enhanced communication has enabled pooling of
resources.
47 To the extent that this proposal rests upon similar approaches being adopted in
other countries, a celebration of common law forms of adjudication may seem unduly
parochial and dismissive of the culture of civil law systems. Conventional understand-
ing of civilian systems emphasizes the more mechanical nature ofjudging. But civil law
judges make law just as much as their common law counterparts. See generally JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985) (exploring the history
of the civil law tradition in Western Europe and Latin America); KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3rd rev. ed.
1998) (surveying the field of comparative law). Indeed, von Mehren cites French
court decisions in the 1920s among the few examples of the substantive law method in
operation. Seevon Mehren, Special Substantive Rules, supra note 229, at 363.
348 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 344, at 474-75 (arguing that "[flundamental trans-
formations.., cannot be worked out empirically by the Anglo-Saxon method with its
reliance upon slowly developing tracts of judicial decisions evolved with infinite cau-
tion by generations of elderly and timorous judges conditioned by Victorian ideals").
As the latter part of Cooper's comment suggests, this critique may reflect not the in-
herent capacity of common law judging but the composition of the English bench (es-
pecially in the nineteenth century). This may also be true of Dicey's wry observation,
quoted by Cooper, that in the nineteenth century "statute law reflected the public
opinion of yesterday; and judge-made law, the opinion of the day before." Id. at 474.
And another institutional restraint in the nineteenth century may have been the per-
ceived need to erect a veneer that judges were engaged in incremental revelation of
historically existent law rather than prospective production of law. English choice of
law attitudes of the day (essentially, apply English law) did not encourage judicial in-
novation, and indeed neither do current methods. The method suggested here is con-
sciously empowering, and in part thus responds to the critique of such common law
judges (and perhaps of common law judging).
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hensive systematization of appropriate conduct in new fields of activ-
ity; this is a matter that legislatures do better.
Two rebuttals can be tendered to this critique of the judicial role.
First, I view this role as complementary to legislative systematization
and not exclusive of it. Indeed, the pace of legislative progress may be
aided greatly by a willingness to defer certain narrower issues to later
adjudicatory arenas. Second, legislation and treaty-making are not the
same. As I demonstrated in Part I of this Article, copyright treaty-
making historically has been a codifying exercise, and when it moves
beyond such limited ambition it is subject to significant criticism.
Thus, the comparison of the means by which international norms are
incorporated into copyright law is not solely a comparison of legisla-
tion and adjudication.
There may also be a concern that, if national courts are encour-
aged to look to the approaches of other countries in developing
norms of international copyright law, the natural tendency to look for
ready-made answers may embed a bias toward states (such as the
United States) with substantial litigation of such questions. Those
states would likely have mature intellectual property systems.3 49 This is
a legitimate concern. 5 It is important to stress, therefore, that this is
a complementary strategy designed to ensure that international copy-
right lawmaking does not run the risks associated with the new model
of public international copyright lawmaking.
CONCLUSION
We need a broader understanding of international copyright
lawmaking. That broader vision may be realized in various ways. The
mere limitation of WTO influence will in itself permit progress toward
that vision by leaving open issues for continuing debate and avoiding
premature entrenchment of fundamental norms. But this (inten-
tional) gap may also be affirmatively filled, in a more cautious and ap-
propriate way, and with a more pluralistic vision of copyright, by other
SCI See id. at 469 (noting the decline of Roman law as a source of solutions when
other systems became available to provide alternative solutions from which countries
wrestling with questions for the first time could "borrow").
350 It may be that countries that engage in a systematized codification of interna-
tional case law would be more likely to provide a ready model for adoption. See id. at
472 (noting that "systems codified and applied on the civilian principle" have been
adopted freely throughout the world but "Anglo-American common law by contrast
has been imposed by conquest and has followed colonization"). The EU experience in
the last decade may confirm this suggestion.
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mechanisms. These include not only the traditional public lawmaking
vehicles of the WIPO and other international copyright institutions,
but also private law mechanisms. Private law dispute resolution
mechanisms can, and should, assume a greater and more direct role
in the international lawmaking process. National courts have a role to
play in the creation, recognition, and enforcement of global norms. A
new approach to choice of law can facilitate that role.
